Last week, INTERPOL issued a press release confirming that it had modified the Red Notice against Sayed Abdel Latif, and that the modification was made at the request of Egypt’s National Central Bureau (“NCB”) in Cairo.  The stated reason for the modification was that the charges listed in the Red Notice were incorrect, and had apparently been incorrect for over twelve years, despite Egypt’s repeated representations to INTERPOL that the charges were accurate.

Mr. Abdel Latif is in Australia seeking asylum.  He was originally listed as a wanted subject for the crimes of premeditated murder, destruction of property, and possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives without a permit.  The actual charges that remain listed on the Red Notice are membership of an illegally-formed extremist organization and forging travel documents for the organization’s members.  His attorney maintains that even these remaining charges are false.

What is interesting to note is the timing of Egypt’s request for the Red Notice correction.  Mr. Abdel Latif was detained by Australian authorities, and Australian law enforcement officials relied upon the Red Notice in its treatment of Mr. Abdel Latif.  

His case attracted attention when Australian officials expressed dismay that Mr. Abel Latif had been in detention for an extended period of time without his status as a Red Notice subject and “jihadist terrorist” being known to them.  Efforts to understand the possible security lapse led to substantial public discussion about the case.

Advocates who worked on Mr. Abdel Latif’s behalf raised questions as to the validity of the underlying charges listed in the Red Notice, as well as the fact that his conviction was obtained through a trial in absentia.  Egypt’s problematic use of trials in absentia to obtain convictions has raised due process and human rights violation issues, as discussed here previously.  Ultimately, the security concerns raised by Australian officials evolved into questions about the validity of the underlying charges for the Red Notice.  Egypt finally, after twelve years, recognized that the information it had provided to INTERPOL was false.  (The question of whether the remaining charges are politically motivated or otherwise invalid is also subject to speculation, as discussed here.)

While the request for the correction came from Egypt, that request was only made when it became politically impossible for Egypt to do otherwise.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

A reader recently sent in the following comment and question:

I have a diffusion notice against me , which was issued by the Indian government. This was done purely to harass me , using the high influence of politics. The case I was wrongly implicated in, is now resolved. So is there a way that we apply to remove the name from the diffusion notice? This  is causing me terrible stress in the airport everytime I enter the airport.

The reader’s experience with difficulty and delay when travelling is a common one.  Even after the underlying grounds for a Red Notice or diffusion have been resolved, many countries fail to remove the original information from their systems.  This failure is a violation of INTERPOL’s rules and make the offending member country subject to sanctions by INTERPOL.

When a member country does not advise INTERPOL that an underlying warrant or conviction is no longer a valid grounds for a Red Notice or diffusion, the subject of the notice or diffusion is forced to either hire an attorney to assit him or to try to remove it himself.  Of course, it never hurts to first request that the member country execute the removal itself, as it is bound to do by its INTERPOL obligations. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 


Readers of this blog know that one of the stories we’ve been following has been the plight of the non-governmental workers who were charged with crimes related to their journalistic activities in Egypt.  

The reason that this story is appropriate for a blog about INTERPOL is that Egypt sought Red Notices for those workers who had left the country prior to the charges being filed.  INTERPOL properly rejected Egypt’s request for those Red Notices because of the political nature of the charges.

Now we have the disappointing news that 43 NGO workers, both Egyptian and non-Egyptian, have been found guilty of the charges.  The story is here.

Those individuals who managed to leave Egypt prior to the trial, or prior to sentencing, are unlikely to ever serve their sentences because of the fact that they are not Red Notice subjects and that INTERPOL’s channels will not be used to facilitate their extradition.  They will, however, need to use caution when travelling abroad, and will need to consider the diplomatic relations between the countries they visit and Egypt.  

The international community benefits immensely from the work of people such as those who were recently convicted, and to the extent that this case has a chilling effect on journalistic efforts, the international community will also suffer.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

Last week, INTERPOL immediately announced its decision to remove investment banker William Browder from its databases, thereby denying Russia’s request to keep Browder’s information in circulation between its 190 member countries.  The background between Mr. Browder and Russian officials is found here, in an article by David M. Herszenhorn.

INTERPOL’s press statement regarding the CCF recommendation is here.

The decision is certainly a significant one, but on its merits is not unheard of.  INTERPOL’s “appellate” body, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (“CCF”), routinely receives requests for removal of information from INTERPOL’s databases.  So what makes Mr. Browder’s request and decision unusual, and what part of his case is “run of the mill” for INTERPOL?  Let’s take a look:

The complaint:  the fact that a complaint was even filed is unusual.  Out of all the wanted individuals in INTERPOL’s databases, only 170 people (.35% of subjects) filed complaints in 2011.  This makes sense, given that requests for assistance with criminal apprension are presumed to be, and should be, valid.

The basis of the complaint:  Mr. Browder’s complaint alleged political motivation as the primary basis for Russia’s request that INTERPOL circulate his data.  This basis for a complaint to the CCF is not all that unusual, as it was raised in 29% of complaints in 2011.

The CCF’s decision about the complaint: The CCF decided to withdraw Mr. Browder’s information from its databases.  A decision to cancel a search of a subject or to destroy the information in INTERPOL’s databases was made in approximately 19% of cases heard by the CCF in 2011.  When we consider that many challenges to Red Notices and other notices are improperly and/or poorly prepared, and may or not be validly based, that percentage is a higher rate than one might expect.

The announcement of the decision:  The news release about the CCF’s recommendation and the General Secretariat’s decision to follow the CCF’s recommendation is obviously not a routine matter. Very few cases become the subject of a news release by INTERPOL.  The international drama that occured in the background of this particular case nearly mandated the news release.

The timing of the announcement of the decision: Here’s where Mr. Browder’s case is highly abnormal.  While the CCF has been willing to advise a complainant or his attorney as to the date that his case is likely to be considered by the CCF, it is very unusual to learn of the decision on the same date of the hearing.  

The grounds for the decision: The fact that the CCF provided a reason for its decision is to be expected, certainly in a case that has been monitored so closely from so many corners of the globe.  But the CCF frequently provides a basis for its decision, either in its response letter or after an inquiry regarding the grounds for the decision.  

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

* Statistical references are gleaned from the CCF’s most recently published report, which is the Annual Report for 2011.  

The Palestinian Authority (“PA”) is seeking admission as a full member to INTERPOL.

In November of 2012, the PA was granted non-member observer state status with the United Nations.  This acceptance allows for, among other privileges and obligations, the possibility that the PA might be admitted to other intergovernmental organizations, such as INTERPOL.

Should the PA be admitted to INTERPOL as a member, it would have the authority to issue Red Notices as well as all of the other notices that are available to INTERPOL member countries.  It would also be required to maintain its financial obligation to INTERPOL, to undergo the requisite training for its assigned law enforcement agencies, and to bring its practices into compliance with INTERPOL’s governing rules and texts.

And while aiding in the apprehension of criminals may be the obvious goal of member countries who join INTERPOL, the overriding benefit for the PA would be that of recognition and validation from the international community.  This effort, with respect to INTERPOL, was articulated back in 2010 as the PA anticipated discussions regarding its potential INTERPOL membership at the 2011 General Assembly meeting of INTERPOL.

When the General Assembly meets later this year and considers the PA’s application, it will adhere to its “one country, one vote” policy.  If the votes at the UN last year are any indication, the PA may very well be INTERPOL’s next member.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

As observers of INTERPOL and environmental issues know, a Red Notice has been pending against environmentalist Paul Watson of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (“SSCS”) since last year. INTERPOL’s press statement about the notice is here.   The grounds for the Red Notice, according to INTERPOL, are the charges of ‘Breaking into the Vessel, Damage to Property, Forcible Obstruction of Business, and Injury’ in relation to two incidents that took place on the Antarctic Ocean in February 2010 against a Japanese whaling ship.

Mr. Watson and the SSCS have argued that the Red Notice is politically motivated, and they now have the support of former SSCS member and fellow conservationist Pete Bethune.

Mr. Bethune and the SSCS were, until recently, engaged in a legal battle over a vessel that was used during a confrontation with a Japanese ship.  Mr. Bethune was the captain of the vessel that sunk after it was rammed by the Japanese ship.  His dispute with the SSCS stemmed from a disagreement over the amount of money that the SSCS should pay for the destroyed vessel, and was accompanied by a long period of bad relations between the parties.

The SSCS and Mr. Bethune recently settled their dispute, agreeing that the SSCS would pay a specified amount for the vessel, and that Mr. Bethune would aid in Paul Watson’s avoidance of extradition to Japan.  As of this writing, the SSCS had not responded to a request for information regarding exactly how Mr. Bethune would provide such aid, but if a response is given, it will be posted here.

As always, comments and questions are welcomed.

 

 

 

In the 2011 film version of The Adventures of Tintin:  the Secret ofthe Unicorn, part of the plot concerned two detectives who were “INTERPOL agents” investigating a crime.  The two detectives look very similar to one another and are portrayed as more or less bumbling, ineffective agents.  

This was an animated film, so some artistic license is to be expected, but it bears pointing out that INTERPOL does not send agents or detectives around the world investigating pickpockets (as in the film) or other crimes.  Rather, it receives information from the law enforcement agencies in INTERPOL member countries around the world and shares that information with other member countries to aid in the suspect’s apprehension.  

When we hear about “U.S. INTERPOL” or “the Ethiopian INTERPOL office,” we are hearing a reference to the liaison between that member country’s National Central Bureau (“NCB”) and INTERPOL, not to an office owned or operated by INTERPOL.

So it was with interest that I read yesterday that INTERPOL’s agents in Mexico had gone missing while conducting an investigation.  Multiple media outlets reported that INTERPOL’s investigating officials had left the city of Chihuahua on Monday and not reached their destination of Ciudad Juárez.  This would be odd, of course, when INTERPOL has no such officials.  

INTERPOL was quick to clarify that in Mexico, the NCB is under the authority of the Policía Federal Ministerial, a part of the Procuraduría General de la República, not INTERPOL.  Moreover, as reported here, Mexican officials have stated that not only are no INTERPOL officials missing, but no one at all is missing.

So, to be clear:  No Thompson and Thomson, no INTERPOL agents in Mexico, and no missing police officers in Mexico.  At all.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 

 

This post was originally published on July 18, 2011; this is an updated version.

Today’s post addresses an insightful and very personal comment that was posted here.  The author of that comment noted, correctly, that INTERPOL is sometimes used to further the corrupt goals of certain law enforcement officials in various member countries.  Obviously, the issuance of a Red Notice has a debilitating effect on its subject, and when the Notice is improperly issued, that effect is worsened by the very real sense of injustice that accompanies the Notice.  The author of the comment reports having experienced just such an injustice, and wonders why INTERPOL seems to allow this to happen without oversight.

Unfortunately, his is not an isolated experience.  INTERPOL has 190 member countries, each of which is bound by its membership conditions with INTERPOL to request or publish Red Notices only when it has ensured that the proper legal channels have been followed.  Based on that obligation, INTERPOL does assign a rather high level of trust to member countries, and Red Notices are strongly presumed to have been validly issued.

This does not mean that a Red Notice, once issued, must remain active until it has led to an arrest.  On the contrary, INTERPOL’s stated goals include observation and adherence to not only its own rules, but also such texts as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  When a subject or his lawyer files a proper challenge which shows a violation of INTERPOL’s governing rules and texts, it is indeed possible for a Red Notice to be withdrawn, modified, or revoked.

Nonetheless, what of the author’s larger question about INTERPOL’s quality assurance issues? INTERPOL’s “honor system” with its member countries inevitably results in the problem that any honor system encounters:  someone, somewhere, cheats.   That cheating may take the form of active misinformation or simple laziness and failure to carry out one’s duties.  Regardless of the manner of non-compliance with INTERPOL’s rules, the outcome for the Red Notice subject is the same:  she is immobilized, finds difficulty obtaining employment, suffers financially, and risks detention by law enforcement constantly.  

My thanks to the author of the comment for raising these important questions about a persistent problem, and I hope that he or his lawyer were able to resolve his problems.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

 

 

We know that Egypt has attempted to utilize its access to INTERPOL’s databases for political reasons against people who posed ideological threats to the current government, and more recently, to a political opponent of its current president.  In accordance with its own constitution, INTERPOL has rightly refused to become involved in (or stay involved in) such politically motivated matters.  Egypt has also at least threatened to seek INTERPOL’s involvement in religiously based criminal offenses.

But what of other, less obvious violations of INTERPOL’s rules?  If Egypt is willing to violate INTERPOL’s rules in order to prosecute individuals, is it also willing to violate its own due process laws in order to obtain convictions?  The case of Wael Abbas is summed up here, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”)”

Award-winning digital journalist Wael Abbas was charged with selling communications services without a license, and because neither he nor his lawyers were ever informed of the trial date, he was sentenced in absentia to six months in prison and fined 500 Egyptian pounds ($86).

THe UNHCR went on to point out that, while the conviction was ultimately thrown out, the threat of multiple charges for the same alleged crime is also a very real threat in Egypt.

Even assuming that Egypt were to follow its own criminal procedure laws, Egyptian law does not contain the internationally accepted safeguards that allow for a due process compliant trial in absentia.  The problems with Egypt’s form of trial in absentia were aptly described by Human Rights Watch in its Q & A column about the trial of Hosni Mubarak:

Trying a defendant in absentia can undermine some of the defendant’s basic rights to a fair trial, including the right to be present, to be defended by counsel of the person’s choice, and to examine witnesses. International law disfavors but does not prohibit trials in absentia. National systems that maintain the practice should, at a minimum, institute procedural safeguards to ensure the defendant’s basic rights. These include requirements that the defendant be notified in advance of the proceedings and that the defendant unequivocally and explicitly waive his right to be present. The defendant should also have the right to representation in his or her absence, and should be able to obtain a fresh determination on the merits of the conviction following the person’s return to the jurisdiction.

Egyptian law does not meet these minimum requirements… Egyptian law does not include any procedural safeguards requiring that the court take into account whether the defendant’s absence was by choice or assess whether a defendant unequivocally and explicitly waived the right to be present before deciding to proceed with a trial in absentia.

Given that we have seen Egypt’s pattern and practice of using, and attempting to use, its access to INTERPOL’s tools in an abusive fashion in political and religious cases, there is no basis to believe that Egypt does not also misuse that access to further its goals in criminal cases where gross due process violations have occurred.  When the goal is a criminal conviction regardless of the means by which the conviction is obtained, no other motivation is necessary for a member country to violate INTERPOL’s rules.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 

 

Now that Nicolas Maduro is the President of Venezuela, most hopes of political reform in Venezuela have been dashed, at least for the next six years.  This blog has addressed the issue of political oppression and persecution in Venezuela time and time and time again, as have many journalists and human rights organizations.  In many instances, political persecution has taken the form of Venezuela’s misuse of INTERPOL’s Red Notices in order to further the country’s goals of nationalism and political oppression.

While all outward appearances indicate that INTERPOL has become wary of many Red Notices that are initiated or requested by Venezuela, particularly those that concern charges of easily fabricated financial crimes, there remains plenty of room for concern that Venezuelan authorities will continue to attempt to abuse their access to INTERPOL’s tools.

Because of the fact that INTERPOL’s I-Link system provides member countries with the ability to instantly issue Red Notices, which are not subject to an immediate “human” check, countries that do not honor their obligations to properly utlize INTERPOL’s tools can – and do- obtain Red Notices improperly.  If INTERPOL authorities are  unaware of the illicit nature of the Red Notice, it remains active at least until the problem is brought to INTERPOL’s attention and reviewed.

Nicolas Maduro campaigned on a pledge to continue with Chavez’ policies, and there is every indication that he will do just that, including the misuse of their access to INTERPOL’s databases.

As always, questions and comments are welcomed.