For the past fourteen years, I have accepted very few INTERPOL cases wherein people were subjects of U.S.-requested Red Notices. The United States has historically been one of the countries that scores highest on due process observation, human rights protection, and application of law to proven facts. Our justice system is certainly not without flaws; anyone who practices regularly in any courtroom knows this.

But by and large, the courts have operated in accordance with applicable procedural and substantive rules, and law enforcment officials at the federal and state levels have at least maintained a record of compliance with their governing statutes and codes. This has meant that court files contained demonstrable proof of:

  • notice of proceedings,
  • observance of time limits and deadlines,
  • announcement of the rights to which every defendant or respondent has available in that venue, and
  • reference to evidence of the alleged law violation.

Moreover, the vast majority of court proceedings (with few exceptions) in the U.S. are public, with publicly available court records, hearing calendars, and discovery schedules, processed with due observance to domestic law.

Because of this record of compliance with the law and transparency, U.S.-requested Red Notices have been much less suseptible to attack: there is usually proper service, a translator, public proceedings, substantive and individualized bond hearings, and the like.

And there is usually not torture; pressure against family members to convince a person to return to the jurisdiction by seizing the family members’ pension; or public stated preferences by a member of the executive branch regarding the outcome of a case. There is relatively little record of politically motivated prosecutions, executive branch commentary on judicial activity; or pressure against the judiciary to rule a certain way. All of these safeguards have resulted in U.S.-requested Red Notices being less vulnerable to challenges.

Until now.

The current administration has begun to engage in prosecutions that are described by insiders and observes as being political, and firings of prosecutorial staff for refusing to support those efforts, or for appearing “disloyal” to the Trump administration. These actions include:

  • Firing a career prosecutor for refusal to file an an indictment unsupported by law and fact (link here);
  • Firing a federal prosecutor based on an anti-Trump post from several years ago, leaving the prosecution of serious federal cases in jeopardy (link here); and
  • Pressuring a federal prosecutor to resign for refusal to charge a political opponent (link here).

The current administration has publicly stated that it:

  • Has and will continue to kill suspected criminals in international territory with no efforts to provide any due process (link here);
  • Will no longer allow immigration courts to make findings regarding a person’s danger to the community or risk of flight in a bond hearing for any undocumented immigrants, even if they have no disqualifying criminal record (link here);
  • Will send troops to selected U.S. cities led by party opponents to fight a “war from within;” such cities include New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Portland (link here and here). Courts have intervened to prevent these military actions.

The U.S. has recently been added to a global human rights watchlist over “declining civil liberties” under the Trump administration. It also reached its “lowest score ever” of 65 out of 100 on Transparency International’s corruption metric.

Things have changed in the U.S. – our case evaluation process must reflect these changes. The current administration’s actions have rendered the U.S. legal system subject to valid skepticism by the international community. We are seeing increased documentation of the failures of the U.S. government’s separation of powers and judicial independence, and that documentation can be used to support valid removal requests, along with individual evidence in a given case.

It brings me no pleasure to make this observation about this country that has always been my home, but it cannot be denied. It is likely only a matter of time before other countries and INTERPOL choose not to support certain U.S.-based requests for extradition.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In today’s post, we deviate from our usual formatting to answer some of the questions frequently posed by Red Notice subjects:

 Q: How can a Red Notice be issued based on false charges? 

 A: As written in a similar blog posted previously, INTERPOL allows its member countries to request or issue Red Notices if certain application criteria are met.  Those criteria do not include proof of guilt (although a record of a conviction is acceptable to INTERPOL as well.) If a member country submits a Red Notice request that is based on a false accusation, INTERPOL often has no way of knowing the false nature of the charge. INTERPOL acts as an information conduit, not as a court that determines guilt or innocence. 

Q: How long will INTERPOL take to respond to an application for removal, revision, or relief?

A: INTERPOL’s rules require, as noted in the CCF’s frequently asked questions page that requests for correction and/or deletion shall be decided within nine months after becoming admissible. After a decision is made, the CCF will notify the applicant within one month.  However, the CCF advises that it is currently behind schedule, resulting in delayed decisions.

Q: What/who is involved in removing a Red Notice?

A: An application for removal of a Red Notice should include the domestic, international, and INTERPOL’s rules- based violations, and proof of those violations. If a Red Notice has been wrongly issued, it is advisable to contact a qualified, experienced lawyer to assist you in your removal request. Requests are sent to INTERPOL’s Commission for the Control of INTERPOL Files(CCF) for review. If the request has been submitted following INTERPOL instructions and the notice was improperly issued, it should be removed from INTERPOL’s databases. 

Q: Can I travel as a Red Notice Subject?

A: Technically, yes. However, traveling as a Red Notice subject includes the risk of being detained, questioned, or arrested. Countries handle Red Notices differently, but there is always a risk when traveling for Red Notice subjects, particularly given that the purpose of a Red Notice is to assist in the detention and extradition of wanted people. 

Q: How do I find out if I am the subject of a Red Notice?

A: The most reliable way to confirm whether you are a Red Notice subject is for the potential subject or her attorney to reach out to INTERPOL’s CCF. INTERPOL’s website has a small number of subjects listed publicly, however the vast majority are kept private as the subjects are easier to find and detain. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

On July 30, from 12 PM to 1:30 PM EDT, Michelle Estlund will be joining fellow panelists in a discussion regarding the latest developments in INTERPOL’s efforts aimed at curbing transnational repression and abuse of its channels. 

Panelists will discuss: 

  • Challenges faced by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF)
  • New CCF case law, and recently proposed changes to the CCF Statute and INTERPOL’s efforts to engage the public in the discussion of the proposed changes
  • The new (third) edition of the INTERPOL Repository of Practice on the Application of Articles 2 and 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution, which require that the Organization act in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and strictly forbids it to engage in politically motivated criminal prosecutions
  • Recently adopted changes to INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data
  • Work of INTERPOL’s Notices and Diffusions Task Force and its participation in the prevention of the abuse of INTERPOL’s resources
  • Silver Notices recently introduced by INTERPOL which are designed to target criminal assets
  • Effect of current U.S. immigration policies and practices on individuals targeted by government requests disseminated via INTERPOL’s channels
  • Due process and human rights considerations in the context of extradition of non-U.S. citizens who are targeted by the government

Bruce Zagaris, Partner, Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP, (USA), is the moderator of this event, and panelists include:

  • Teresa McHenry, Chairperson of the Supervisory and Advisory Chamber for the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s files. 
  • Theodore Bromund, Senior Research Fellow, Anglo-American Relations, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation (Washington, D.C.)
  • Michelle Estlund, Estlund Law, P.A. (Miami, FL, USA)
  • Yaron Gottlieb, Director, Head of the Notices and Diffusions Task Force, Executive Directorate, Legal Affairs, INTERPOL (Lyon, France)
  • Yuriy Nemets, Managing Member, Nemets PLLC (Washington, D.C.)

You can register for this event at https://www.americanbar.org/events-cle/mtg/web/452187150/. 

Here’s an odd fact: sometimes an inquiry alone can lead to a Red Notice removal.  

INTERPOL’s CCF (the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, discussed here) is an unusual venue in which to represent clients. Its purpose (human rights and due process observation in the context of a law enforcement support organization) is different from actual courts (fact-finding and deciding cases on their merits); it is governed by its own set of regulations, boundaries, and procedures. 

The goal of almost every Red, Yellow, or Blue Notice (or diffusion) subject client is to achieve the removal of the notice by explaining and offering proof to the CCF of why the underlying case is improper for INTERPOL’s involvement. Typically, that showing of proof is the reason a notice is ultimately removed.

But not always.

Sometimes, it is the simple asking of a question that leads to the removal of the notice. The act of filing a request to access one’s data in INTERPOL’s files alone, in some instances, can reach the desired goal. This does not happen often, but frequently enough in my practice that it merits a mention.

Why do notices get removed after only an inquiry?

The actual reason for a notice removal following only an access request is usually unknown to the applicant or her attorney. We have learned over the years and through indirect channels that some notices are removed after the access request is filed because the government of the country that originally requested the notice is keen to avoid any international scrutiny about the case. In other instances, the government wishes to avoid any negative decision from INTERPOL and thus removes the notice before INTERPOL has an opportunity to consider the case on its merits. In still other cases, INTERPOL may have information at the time of the inquiry that it did not have at the time of the initial country request which renders the notice untenable.

In such instances, it is not the case that INTERPOL’s General Secretariat missed anything during its initial review of the matter. Deficiencies in notice requests are not always evident from an initial review.

Can the notice be re-published later?

When countries remove a notice without a finding of non-compliance from INTERPOL, notice subjects want to know whether the seeking country will simply put the notice back in place when there is no longer a threat of scrutiny. While this has not occured in my practice, it is not impossible. However, the CCF can review the history of notice requests against an individual and recognize when a repeat request from a member country is suspicious. 

Does removal after only an inquiry indicate abuse of INTERPOL’s tools?

A country that removes a notice after receiving notice of an inquiry may be acting out of recognition that its original request was invalid, and a desire to avoid scrutiny of that act. An organization such as INTERPOL deals with 196 member countries, so abuse of its tools is inevitable. Countries that request invalid notices, only to remove them after an inquiry, still obtain the benefit of temporarily immobilizing a subject. By withdrawing a notice when questioned, countries can avoid examination of their use of INTERPOL and sidestep the risk of a negative finding by the CCF. This tactic can conceal patterns of misuse from INTERPOL as well as the individuals with outstanding notices. On the other hand, the country may remove the notice because it has since decided that it is no longer interested in pursuing the individual or paying for costly extradition proceedings.

Opportunities created by filing an access request with the CCF

As is true in all cases involving criminal accusations, a client does well when the attorney creates as many windows of opportunity for success as possible. Sometimes, the initial inquiry to the CCF is the only opportunity needed to obtain the desired result- the removal of a notice. Most other times, if a notice exists, the inquiry response by the CCF provides either confirmation of the notice or additional evidence of grounds for removal, or both.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Our last 2 posts discussed INTERPOL’s new Silver Notices and how they relate to crypto, along with the current U.S. presidential administration’s reversal of crypto-related crime-fighting measures as the rest of the world seemingly increases their urgency. Today’s post focuses on the “why” of both Silver Notices and the new U.S. about-face on the issue of prosecuting crypto crimes.

Why Silver Notices could aid in identifying and capturing illicit funds related to crypto:

People choose cryptocurrencies over other currencies to aid in illicit activity because:

  • Cryptocurrency is decentralized and distributed, which can offer a secure method to transfer value.
  • A cryptocurrency transfer can occur anywhere. Third parties do not authorize transactions, and transactions cannot be reversed. Criminals from anywhere in the world can exploit these characteristics to facilitate large-scale, instantaneous cross-border transactions without traditional financial intermediaries that employ anti-money laundering programs.
  • Law enforcement may encounter significant challenges when following cryptocurrency that enters other jurisdictions, especially those with lax anti-money laundering laws or regulations.

Silver Notices are meant to aid in the prosecution of such criminal actions, and can assist in country-to-country investigative efforts.

Why the U.S. President may have stifled crypto-related criminal investigations

Donald Trump’s family owns a large portion of World Liberty Financial, a crypto exchange that launched in October 2024. His venture into crypto products has reportedly increased his family’s wealth by billions in the last six months.

President Trump has pledged to turn the U.S. into the “crypto capital of the world,” while World Liberty Financial steadily expands into the cryptocurrency space. A stablecoin, a digital asset intended to maintain a consistent value by being tied to a reserve currency like the U.S. dollar, launched the by World Liberty Financial crypto venture is being used by an Abu Dhabi investment firm for its $2 billion investment in crypto exchange Binance.

At the same time, his administration continues to loosen the federal government’s regulatory approach to the digital currency industry as a whole. The group State Democracy Defenders Action estimated that the president’s crypto holdings now represent nearly 40% of his net worth – approximately $2.9 billion. Although critics have sounded the alarm over many actions by the Trump administration, none of the family’s other business endeavors pose conflicts of interest that compare to those that have emerged since the birth of World Liberty. U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren characterized the U.S. change in approach to cryptocurrency: “This is corruption and no senator should support it.”

The decriminalization of crypto-crime adds danger to a space already prone to criminality due to its decentralized nature, lack of oversight, and the anonymity it provides. Without clear legal consequences, criminal actors may feel emboldened to exploit the system, putting U.S. investors and users at greater risk.

Each nation determines its own policies, meaning that U.S. leadership has limited influence over how other governments approach digital assets or related criminal activity. As INTERPOL’s new Silver Notices remind us, the international community is responding to crypto-criminality, and in a rapidly increasing global economy, one country’s decision to prosecute illicit activity can affect people and entities in other countries as well.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Our last post focused on INTERPOL’s newest notice, the Silver Notice. This new tool allows member countries to request information on assets linked to a person’s criminal activities such as fraud, corruption, drug trafficking, environmental crime, and other serious offenses. Included in this is cryptocurrency, which is increasingly associated with criminal activity despite its many legitimate uses. 

While all member countries will have access to the Silver Notice as a means of targeting crypto-related crime, not all member countries are taking the same approach to stop the growing illicit activities related to crypto. A sampling of enforcement styles:

  • Canada: While crypto is not treated as a form of legal tender in Canada, the country allows its use. Canada has been more proactive than others about crypto regulation. Given the concerns and uncertainties with cryptocurrency, the federal government has clearly stated that federally regulated entities, like banks, must comply with all applicable legal requirements and any guidance from federal regulators when working with crypto assets. In 2024, the RCMP began training more officers to investigate crypto crimes.
  • Countries in the European Union: In 2020, the EU’s Fifth and Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directives came into effect, tightening KYC/CFT (Know your customer/counter financing of terrorism) obligations and standard reporting requirements. The goal of KYC vis-à-vis crypto activity is to prevent money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes, while CDD (Customer Due Diligence) is a set of measures banks and other financial institutions must take to identify their customers, assess their risks and monitor their transactions. Additionally, while crypto is not official legal tender, the EU requires certain crypto service providers to seek an operating license. Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), a framework that increases consumer protections, establishes explicit crypto industry conduct, and introduces new licensing requirements, was placed into effect in 2023. This legislation is intended to give regulators the tools they need to track crypto being used for money laundering and terrorism funding while providing users with protections. The EU also passed new crypto regulations in 2023; including plans to create an EU-wide authority to fight money laundering.
  • The People’s Republic of China: Crypto trading is generally banned in China and crypto is not recognized as legal tender. However, local governments are reportedly using private companies to sell digital coins that have been seized in exchange for cash in the midst of a slow economy.

In stark contrast to each of the above examples, and despite the alarming rate of criminal activity involving crypto, as reported by Reuters, is the U.S. approach:

  • The United States Justice Department is disbanding its National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team and ordering prosecutors to narrow crypto investigations to focus on drug cartels and terrorist groups. The unit known as NCET launched in February 2022 as part of the Biden administration’s bid to combat fraud and illicit finance. But under President Donald Trump, whose family is building its own crypto enterprise, reportedly owning 75% of net revenues from token sales by World Liberty Financial, the U.S. government is now reversing course on crypto. The president has promised to make the United States the “crypto capital of the planet.” The Trump administration is reversing the U.S.’s earlier position even as INTERPOL increases efforts to prevent illegal activities, particularly in the sector of cryptocurrency. The newly stated focus on prosecuting primarily those crypto cases related to drug trafficking and terrorism necessarily excludes white collar crime such as fraud, money laundering, misappropriation of assets, embezzlement, and tax evasion, which may or may not be convenient for the U.S. president and his family.

INTERPOL’s introduction of Silver Notices is a significant step forward in international efforts to trace illicit assets- particularly as cryptocurrencies become an increasingly common vehicle for financial crime. Whether those assets are aggressively pursued will depend on how robust the law enforcement initiatives are in each member county.

It appears that the U.S. has decided not to lead the pack.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

INTERPOL’s got a shiny new notice for its member countries. The organization states that the Silver Notice, first released in January 2025, will serve the purposes of: 

  • Helping to trace and recover criminal assets, combat organized crime and enhance international police cooperation. 
  • Allowing member countries to request information on assets linked to a person’s criminal activities such as fraud, corruption, drug trafficking, environmental crime, and other serious offenses. 
  • Aiding in the location and obtaining information about laundered assets including properties, vehicles, financial accounts and businesses. 
  • Serving as a basis for requests for seizure, confiscation, or recovery of assets, subject to national laws.

INTERPOL assures that the General Secretariat will review every Silver Notice and Diffusion for compliance with the Organization’s rules prior to its publication or circulation. This includes ensuring they are not used for political purposes, in violation of Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution.

INTERPOL’s integration of Silver Notices may aid the organization in fighting the growing use of cryptocurrencies for illicit activities. Cryptocurrency-related crime is currently one of the most rapidly growing means of hiding illegal assets, with industry experts citing the value of illicit activity in 2024 at $40.9 billion.

Our next post will focus on INTERPOL member countries’ attempts to curb crypto-related illicit activities, and how they contrast the U.S., which is reversing its efforts to combat crypto-related crime by disbanding its National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In general, attorneys advocate for fair treatment by encouraging equality. There are times, however, when equal treatment does not lead to a fair outcome. In today’s post, we will focus on Article 28 of INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data, and why the equal application of this rule to all INTERPOL member countries is not fair, or just.

Article 28 which states in a relevant part:

Data are… considered to be accurate and relevant when entered by a National Central Bureau, a national entity or an international entity into the INTERPOL Information System…

When a rule such as this is applied equally to all INTERPOL member countries,  whether they have a strong due process and transparency record and low levels of corruption, like Denmark, or whether they consistently violate due process standards, have no transparency, and high levels of corruption, like Russia or China, INTERPOL is left vulnerable to countries which will abuse this level of trust. 

Countries with high levels of corruption typically do not have the same level of transparency as those with lower levels of corruption. In those countries with consistently high levels of corruption, the absence of oversight can easily lead to the manipulation and/or fabrication of data for political and personal gain. For example, China has a history of unfairly targeting successful business owners who speak out against the government. When INTERPOL accepts data from such countries as being valid without enhanced oversight, it inadvertently creates a tool vulnerable to abuse which can be used to silence individuals rather than protect them. 

To address these concerns, Estlund Law and other advocates have repeatedly suggested that INTERPOL implement additional safeguards and reviews of data submitted by countries with unreliable judicial systems or high abuse records. A more vigorous data checking process could perhaps improve the validity and legality of data entered. 

Because INTERPOL has publicized little information regarding its treatment of data received from most abusive countries, it is difficult to guage whether it is applying a higher level of scrutiny to known abusive countries.

In 2022, INTERPOL did publicize its efforts to reign in and deter Russian INTERPOL abuse, and issued the following language in a statement:

. . . To prevent any potential misuse of INTERPOL’s channels in relation to the targeting of individuals within or beyond the conflict in Ukraine, heightened supervision and monitoring measures in relation to Russia have now been implemented by the Secretary General, a decision which was endorsed by the Executive Committee.

Effective immediately, diffusions can no longer be sent directly by NCB Moscow to member countries. NCB Moscow must now send all diffusions to the General Secretariat to be checked for compliance with INTERPOL’s Rules. Only if a diffusion is found compliant will the General Secretariat then disseminate it to member countries. This procedure is in addition to the General Secretariat’s current process of reviewing all Notice requests for compliance.

[Emphasis supplied.]

Such statements go a long way toward strengthening public faith in INTERPOL’s processes and providing transparency as to INTERPOL’s commitment to fairness and the rule of law.

As INTERPOL’s caseload and global activities continue to increase, it will be interesting to see whether its public statements on abuse prevention also grows.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Today’s post will address extradition and deportation due to Red Notice status, using as examples the case of two fugitives from India who were INTERPOL Red Notice subjects and were arrested in India following their return from the U.S. and Thailand.  

One of the men, ​​Janarthanan Sundaram, was allegedly deported from Bangkok to India after being accused of siphoning over ₹87 crore( almost 9 million USD) of investor’s money through a Ponzi scheme. Mr. Sundaram was reportedly denied entry to Bangkok on the basis of a Red Notice. After being deported to India, Mr. Sundaram was detained and handed over to local police. 

The other alleged offender, Virendra Mani Patel, was wanted in a case of fraud of ₹77 crore (almost 8 million USD) registered by the Gujarat Police in 2002. INTERPOL issued a Red Notice against him in 2004, a Central Bureau of Investigation(CBI) spokesperson said in a statement.

“On the basis of the Red Notice, Patel was detected at Ahmedabad airport while on arrival from the US on January 29, 2025 and was detained and later handed over to the Gujarat Police team,” they said.

These cases illustrate that Red Notices do not necessarily lead to extradition, but can still have the requesting country’s intended effect of returning the wanted person if the Red Notice leads to deportation (removal) from another country.

Extradition vs. deportation

Extradition and deportation are two different processes, often handled by different branches of government.

Extradition is typically handled by the criminal court officials, although it may be a civil proceeding, and is typically conducted pursuant to the terms of an extradition treaty. When extradited due to the charges that precipiated a Red Notice, the sending country returns an individual back to the requesting country to face a trial or sentencing.

Deportation is most often handled by a country’s immigration officials. When an individual is deported, the deportation decision is not necessarily based on an outstanding Red Notice; it could be that the Red Notice brought other immigration matters to light, such as being out of status.

In cases where a person cannot be extradited- whether due to a lack of dual criminality or absence of an extradition treaty- upon seeing an outstanding Red Notice, a country may still choose to deport an individual back to the requesting country.

The circumstances around the case of Mr. Patel are common among Red Notice holders. Many individuals with outstanding Red Notices are unaware of them until they are flagged in interactions with law enforcement such as airports or traffic stops. These interactions can lead to deportation or extradition.

Determining one’s Red Notice status

As the cases above illustrate, traveling as a Red Notice subject can result in significant consequences. If an individual wishes to know whether a Red Notice exists against them, the cautious route is to contact a lawyer or INTERPOL rather than risking travel when unsure of whether they could be detained. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Today’s post will address the limited publicity of some of the CCF’s decisions. 

The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) releases confidential decisions to the General Secretariat, the applicant, and the concerned National Central Bureaus upon receiving individual requests. As provided for in the Statute of the CCF, all decisions are issued confidentially and not meant for public dissemination. Nonetheless, the CCF publishes certain anonymized decisions on the INTERPOL website to provide information on its activities and in accordance with its Statute.

4 New Decisions

In 2025, the CCF added 4 new decisions to INTERPOLs anonymized decision section of its website. The CCF does not publish decisions that contain personal information, nor does it systematically publish all of its decisions. It can publish excerpts of anonymized decisions which raise issues that could be of use to the general public, to understand the working methods of the Commission and to provide a better understanding of the Commission’s analysis of INTERPOL’s various governing texts. These decisions are the Commission’s means of providing some public insight as to its decision-making processes, and can be helpful in crafting removal requests.  

While INTERPOL’s decision-making process remains largely confidential, the Commission’s publication of these anonymized decisions do offer some guidance to Applicants and attorneys seeking direction when applying for a Red Notice or diffusion removal.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.