Every year, INTERPOL’s Commission for the Control of INTERPOL Files(CCF) releases an Annual Report covering the Commission’s accomplishments. Today’s post will be addressing the report for 2024 and the reported requests for deletion, revision, and access. Each of these requests has a different intent and meaning.

As stated in a previous post,

  • Access requests are sent by clients wanting to confirm or deny that their information is being stored in INTERPOL’s databases
  • Correction/deletion request refers to the Commission correcting incorrect or abusive data or deleting false information from the organization’s databases
  • Revision of a previous decision made by the Commission is a request for the CCF to review new, relevant information relating to an earlier decision if that information was submitted in a timely fashion and would have made a difference to the CCF’s consideration of the case.  

The following data table displays the percentage of each type of admissible requests received in 2024:

Access RequestsDeletion RequestsRevision Requests
37%45%18%

Of the 2,586 new admissible requests, approximately 37 percent were access requests, 45 percent were deletion requests, and 18 percent were applications for revision. 

Our next post will detail how the CCF’s recent delays can be problematic for those interacting with INTERPOL. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

This series of posts will focus on INTERPOL’s Commission for the Control of INTERPOL Files(CCF) 2024 activity report,* including the growth of  requests for access, deletion, and revision of INTERPOL notices. 

In the beginning

The CCF was founded in 1984. At that time, it was called the Supervisory Board for the Internal Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Archives. As stated in the CCF’s 2024 Activity Report, the CCF received five requests from individuals that were considered during its 1986 session.

Fast forward to the most recently reported numbers

In 2024, it received 2,586 admissible requests, the highest amount ever received. 

Below is a chart displaying the rising number of total admissible requests sent to the CCF:

201720182021202220232024
9751,2651,3001,9402,4702,586

Why the numbers have increased

The biggest reason for the growing number of requests is, predictably, the increasing number of Notices being issued. INTERPOL’s systems growing in usage and popularity is a positive change overall, reflecting increasing international trust between law enforcement and improving tools to fight crime across borders. However, the organization must continue to evolve to meet set expectations. As stated in the report, despite implementing various internal measures to increase its efficiency, there were often significant delays in completing requests.

Increased notices lead to longer response times

In 2024, 70 percent of access requests took more than four months to complete and 30 percent of deletion requests took more than nine months. INTERPOL’s website tells applicants, “in accordance with its Statute, the CCF shall decide on a request for access within four months of the date when the request became admissible. Requests for correction and/or deletion shall be decided within nine months after becoming admissible.” The delays are problematic for applicants, for NCBs and for INTERPOL itself; we will elaborate on those problems in the following posts. 

The Annual Activity Report shows that INTERPOL sought increased resources for the CCF in 2024. We know that in 2025 those resources have been put to use; time will tell whether the organization can meet the growing needs of existing member countries. 

Our next post will address the number of requests for access, deletion, and revision and what these numbers mean.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

*The CCF’s annual reports are usually issued a full year after the year’s end; the 2024 report was issued in late 2025 at INTERPOL’s annual General Assembly meeting.

In our last post, we announced the good news that we received earlier this month: Estlund Law successfully applied for the deletion of Russian-requested Red Notices for our clients. That post is here.

Some details of the case are provided below. This information illuminates the manner in which law-abiding individuals can become ensnared in the political and economic actions of their governments, leading to invalid arrest warrants and Red Notices.

Case background:

After the international community imposed economic sanctions on the Russian Federation in 2014 and 2016, the Russian government’s expropriation of private sector assets became commonplace. The banking and insurance industries were deeply affected by this activity.

The partners have extensive experience in the insurance industry in Russia and have been internationally recognized for their achievements in their field. 

In 2022 and 2023, they discovered that they had become targets for criminal prosecution in relation to a company that employed Partner A briefly five years earlier. The Russian Central Bank had intervened in that company in early 2018; placed the company under provisional administration; and eventually revoked its license. Partner A had been appointed by the Board of Directors when the Russian Central Bank was nationalizing private insurance companies. She held no signing authority, executive authority, or financial control. Partner B had no direct connections to the company at all. 

The Central Bank’s activity led to the company’s bankruptcy. To recover funds, the company’s bankruptcy trustee filed multiple arbitration proceedings, including one against Partner A. The arbitration court found that Partner A’s actions had not harmed the company’s assets.

Despite this finding, Russian authorities filed criminal charges against both partners, falsely accusing them of fraud and misappropriation for a large-scale theft of properties of the company. These charges formed the basis for the Red Notices against the partners.

Estlund Law disputed the Russian government’s statements in the Red Notice and court filings, and submitted a deletion request for both partners. INTERPOL’s CCF agreed with our position, and issued its decision, discussed here.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Miami, Florida, U.S.A. – Estlund Law clients and owners of a major re-insurance company (“Partners A and B”) are now free of the Red Notices that the Russian Federation had previously obtained against them. The details of the case are found here.

When the partners learned that they were the subjects of an INTERPOL Red Notice, they contacted Estlund Law for representation to seek the deletion of the notices.  Estlund Law prepared and submitted a deletion request for both Partners. The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s files (“CCF”) issued its decision in January of 2026.

The CCF stated in its decision to delete the notices: 

“…the Applicants by comparison provided a clear and substantiated trajectory in support of their argument that their case falls within a larger context of a nationalization campaign on insurance companies…The response of the NCB…does not adequately rebut the overall description provided by the Applicants on this general context of the arbitration that related to the same facts.”

“[The CCF] identified some doubts over the existence of a political aspect” and in its conclusion stated “the lack of coherent and sufficient information on the facts of the case…coupled with the questions raised above on the possible existence of a political dimension…determines that the diffusion request fail to meet [the requirements] for data quality and a clear description of criminal involvement, and that its examination of the character of the case raises concern as to their compliance with Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution.” 

Estlund Law and the Partners welcome this news; the Partners look forward to moving on with their business and personal lives free from the immobilization that accompanies a Red Notice subject status.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In our last post, we discussed the issue of former Red Notice subjects facing difficulty upon entry to the United States, even though their Red Notices had been removed or their criminal case has been resolved. Today’s focus is on whether to apply for one and when to do so.

How do I know if I could benefit from a Redress Control Number?

A Redress Control Number is not required to travel and will not be granted to everyone who applies. In many instances, however, travelers may have encountered issues that have hampered their travel experience even though they have resolved old criminal charges and/or had a Red Notice removed. The TSA offers the following travel-related issues that may qualify an individual for a redress control number:

  • Being denied permission to travel;
  • Encountering delays in boarding an aircraft;
  • Having difficulty printing a boarding pass at a ticket kiosk or online;
  • Repeatedly being referred to a second screening by U.S. Customs and Border Protection;
  • Being advised by a Customs and Border Protection agent of the need to update your fingerprints, and
  • Being informed that the Federal Government is not authorizing you to travel or enter the country.

If someone is consistently experiencing any of the above situations, a Redress Control Number may be useful. Receiving a Redress Control Number does not guarantee that no additional screening will occur when traveling, but does make it less likely.

When should I apply for a Control Number?

We have seen in our practice that it takes some time for databases to be updated after we have assisted a client in removing a Red Notice or resolving another criminal matter. Based on this experience, we recommend waiting at least three months after a case is resolved to take any action that relies on the related data to be removed from a system. Additionally, many people will have no difficulty upon re-entry to the U.S. after their cases are resolved. Therefore, it is not recommended that one apply immediately after a case is resolved; it simply may not be necessary.

On the other hand, if a person has allowed ample time for the respective databases to be updated and has still experienced repeated difficulties upon entering the U.S., it is likely time to seek a Redress Control Number. Information on that process can be found at https://www.dhs.gov/redress-control-numbers or by contacting our office for assistance in applying for a Redress Control Number.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

(updated on 1/16/2026)

Many Red Notice subjects are concerned about whether they may face issues when traveling, even after their Red Notices have been removed from INTERPOL databases, or after a criminal case has been resolved. In some instances, although they are permitted to enter a country after a Red Notice has been removed, subjects either face delays or are denied permission to travel. For such people traveling to (or back to) the United States, a Redress Control Number may be appropriate.

What is Redress Control Number?

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provides a secure flight screening program through the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). This program was created to assist and simplify the watch-list matching process to prevent further misidentification of travelers. People who continually face delays and questioning upon their entry to the United States due to an old criminal case or Red Notice can apply to this program for relief.

Why is a Redress Control Number useful?

If an individual’s redress number application is approved, TSA assigns a seven-digit number that can ease the screening process for travelers who may have been added to a security watch-list or incorrectly marked as high-risk. This number can be added to travel reservations during booking, on a traveler’s frequent flyer profile, or added by an airport agent at check-in.

Our firm regularly assists clients who seek a redress control number. In the next post, we will address how to know whether and when to apply for a Redress Control Number.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Today’s post will address Article 3 of INTERPOL’s constitution and why it exists. 

When an INTERPOL member country’s Red Notice request appears to be predominantly motivated by political, military, religious, or racial reasons, Article 3 requires that the organization deny the request.

Using the example cited in part 1 of this series, Bosnian officials sought a Red Notice against Milorad Dodik, the former separatist leader. A Bosnian court sought a Red Notice after Mr. Dodik and his aide went abroad in defiance of an internal arrest warrant for allegedly attacking the constitutional order. The office of Serbian Interior Minister Ivica Dacic reported, “We are informed that INTERPOL General Secretariat has evaluated, based on our protest note and explanation by the INTERPOL Belgrade, that the request is not aligned with Article 3 … and that the terms for issuing warrants have not been met.” 

What is Article 3, and why is it needed?

Article 3 of INTERPOL’s constitution states specifically,

“It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.”

INTERPOL adopted Article 3 in 1956 to help prevent member countries’ abuse of the organization. As INTERPOL develops, it adopts resolutions that aid in the development of interpretations of Article 3. In 2004, for example, the organization adopted a resolution pertinent to the interpretation of Article 3. INTERPOL has also established that notices are reviewed on a case-by-case basis which takes into account the context of each individual case. 

The primary objectives of Article 3 are: 

  1. To prevent the compromising of INTERPOL’s neutrality or otherwise affecting its mission to assist its member countries in combatting crimes
  2. To reflect international extradition law
  3. To protect individuals from persecution

Article 3 of INTERPOL’s constitution aims to safeguard the organization’s neutrality and ensure that it remains a tool for law enforcement cooperation rather than a mechanism for political persecution. By prohibiting involvement in matters of a political, military, religious, or racial nature, INTERPOL continues in its efforts to protect individuals from corrupt member countries.

Cases like that of Mr. Dodik underscore the importance of Article 3 and demonstrate how critical it is for INTERPOL to evaluate requests to ensure they align with its requirements.  In our practice, we have assisted clients who are private individuals and journalists who have engaged in dissident speech and behavior and political activity for opposition parties. The protection afforded by Article 3 is often the difference between a Red Notice staying in place and being removed.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Today’s post will address political motivation requests from INTERPOL member countries, and the effect they have on individuals as well as the organization as a whole. 

As an example from last year, consider the case of Milorad Dodik. As reported by Reuters, INTERPOL has denied a Bosnian court’s request for a Red Notice for Mr. Dodik, a Bosnian Serb separatist leader, who is accused of attacking the constitutional order and allegedly went abroad in defiance.

The controversy reportedly began after Mr. Dodik, the president of Bosnia’s autonomous Serb Republic, defied rulings by the international envoy to Bosnia, whose role is to prevent the Balkan state from slipping back into conflict. The dispute pits Mr. Dodik and his allies, Russia and Serbia, against the United States and the European Union. Reuters reported this conflict as one of the biggest threats to peace in the Balkans since the 1990s conflicts that followed socialist Yugoslavia’s collapse. 

Following the accusations against Mr. Dodik, the Bosnian court ordered an international arrest warrant be issued for Mr. Dodik and his aide based on his alleged attack against the constitutional order after the two went abroad in defiance of an internal arrest warrant. The office of Serbian Interior Minister Ivica Dacic said in a statement, “We are informed that INTERPOL General Secretariat has evaluated, based on our protest note and explanation by the INTERPOL Belgrade, that the request is not aligned with the Article 3 of the Statute and that the terms for issuing warrants have not been met.” (Article 3 will be discussed further in part 2 of this post)

Politically motivated Red Notices are a common topic for the Red Notice Law Journal, and for good reason. A large percentage of Estlund Law’s improper Red Notice cases concern invalid criminal charges or the allegation of criminal activity when the overarching motivation for the charge is political in nature.

INTERPOL denied the Red Notice request in Mr. Dodik’s case based on the organization’s prohibition against involvement in politically motivated matters. It appears that INTEPROL was able to quickly identify the matter as one of a political nature.

Certainly, there remain instances where the organization cannot immediately identify the political motivation behind Red Notice requests. In such cases, the subject of the Red Notice often only learns of the notice when she travels or applies for a change in immigration status. The notice may lead to detention, a denial of immigration relief, bank account closures, and reputational damage.

Our next post will address Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution, how it affects the organization, and the reason it was established. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

INTERPOL is soon to host its 93rd General Assembly (GA) from the 24th to the 27th of November in Marrakech, Morocco. 

Each year, a different member country welcomes representatives from all over the world to discuss and vote on varying global law enforcement issues. Often, before an assembly, the Red Notice Law Journal discusses the country hosting, along with possible implications of its leaders’ influence. In this case, Morocco’s presence within INTERPOL appears to be relatively small. While the majority of INTERPOL Red Notices are not publicly available and are circulated for use by law enforcement only, the number of published notices provides some indication of how often a member country utilizes this INTERPOL tool. In the case of Morocco, out of over 6500 publicly listed Red Notices, Morocco currently only has 11.  This would seem to indicate a fairly low incidence of requesting Red Notices at all, let alone abusive Red Notices- obviously a good thing.

The country isn’t without its INTERPOL-related controversies, though. In 2022, Amnesty International wrote a call to action regarding Idris Hasan. The organization reported that in July 2021, Moroccan authorities arrested Idris Hasan at Casablanca’s airport based on a request from China. He was accused of terrorism, but in reality, his only “crime” was documenting human rights abuses against Uyghurs. INTERPOL quickly canceled the Red Notice against him, but Morocco still approved his extradition to China—where he would have faced imprisonment, torture, or worse. Despite widespread warnings that returning him to China would violate international law, Moroccan authorities kept him in detention for more than three years until February of 2025. During this time, activists worldwide campaigned to stop his extradition and demand his release.

Human Rights Watch has recently published a report on Morocco’s record of arresting and prosecuting human rights activists, dissidents, and journalists. But that scrutiny has not seemed to affect Morocco’s popularity as a beloved travel destination rich in culture and tradition. It also seems unlikely to affect INTERPOL itself in the near future; none of the candidates for the open seats in the Executive Committee are from the host country this year.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Today’s post will cover INTERPOL’s upcoming General Assembly from 24 to 27 of November. 

INTERPOL’s General Assembly is an annual event hosted for INTERPOL’s member countries to discuss and vote on varying global law enforcement issues. The 93rd meeting will take place this year in Marrakech, Morocco. The traditionally 4-day event is always hosted by one of INTERPOL’s member countries. Attending representatives vote on issues to ensure that INTERPOL is meeting the needs of its member countries. The General Assembly is INTERPOL’s supreme governing body and there are either one or several representatives (typically police chiefs and ministry officials) elected from each of INTERPOL’s current 195 member countries. Each country may cast one vote on issues discussed.

The agenda this year includes: 

  • Identifying and disrupting transnational organized crime.
  • Dismantling transnational scam centres.
  • Expansion of INTERPOL’s global policing capabilities.
  • Women in policing.
  • Silver Notice pilot project results.
  • Promoting the ratification of the United Nations’ Convention Against Cybercrime.

The Assembly will also vote for new members of the Executive Committee, including the President, as their mandates come to an end.

Our next post will address Morocco’s hosting of the event, why INTERPOL may have chosen it, and how the country behaves within INTERPOL. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.