In general, attorneys advocate for fair treatment by encouraging equality. There are times, however, when equal treatment does not lead to a fair outcome. In today’s post, we will focus on Article 28 of INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data, and why the equal application of this rule to all INTERPOL member countries is not fair, or just.

Article 28 which states in a relevant part:

Data are… considered to be accurate and relevant when entered by a National Central Bureau, a national entity or an international entity into the INTERPOL Information System…

When a rule such as this is applied equally to all INTERPOL member countries,  whether they have a strong due process and transparency record and low levels of corruption, like Denmark, or whether they consistently violate due process standards, have no transparency, and high levels of corruption, like Russia or China, INTERPOL is left vulnerable to countries which will abuse this level of trust. 

Countries with high levels of corruption typically do not have the same level of transparency as those with lower levels of corruption. In those countries with consistently high levels of corruption, the absence of oversight can easily lead to the manipulation and/or fabrication of data for political and personal gain. For example, China has a history of unfairly targeting successful business owners who speak out against the government. When INTERPOL accepts data from such countries as being valid without enhanced oversight, it inadvertently creates a tool vulnerable to abuse which can be used to silence individuals rather than protect them. 

To address these concerns, Estlund Law and other advocates have repeatedly suggested that INTERPOL implement additional safeguards and reviews of data submitted by countries with unreliable judicial systems or high abuse records. A more vigorous data checking process could perhaps improve the validity and legality of data entered. 

Because INTERPOL has publicized little information regarding its treatment of data received from most abusive countries, it is difficult to guage whether it is applying a higher level of scrutiny to known abusive countries.

In 2022, INTERPOL did publicize its efforts to reign in and deter Russian INTERPOL abuse, and issued the following language in a statement:

. . . To prevent any potential misuse of INTERPOL’s channels in relation to the targeting of individuals within or beyond the conflict in Ukraine, heightened supervision and monitoring measures in relation to Russia have now been implemented by the Secretary General, a decision which was endorsed by the Executive Committee.

Effective immediately, diffusions can no longer be sent directly by NCB Moscow to member countries. NCB Moscow must now send all diffusions to the General Secretariat to be checked for compliance with INTERPOL’s Rules. Only if a diffusion is found compliant will the General Secretariat then disseminate it to member countries. This procedure is in addition to the General Secretariat’s current process of reviewing all Notice requests for compliance.

[Emphasis supplied.]

Such statements go a long way toward strengthening public faith in INTERPOL’s processes and providing transparency as to INTERPOL’s commitment to fairness and the rule of law.

As INTERPOL’s caseload and global activities continue to increase, it will be interesting to see whether its public statements on abuse prevention also grows.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Today’s post will address extradition and deportation due to Red Notice status, using as examples the case of two fugitives from India who were INTERPOL Red Notice subjects and were arrested in India following their return from the U.S. and Thailand.  

One of the men, ​​Janarthanan Sundaram, was allegedly deported from Bangkok to India after being accused of siphoning over ₹87 crore( almost 9 million USD) of investor’s money through a Ponzi scheme. Mr. Sundaram was reportedly denied entry to Bangkok on the basis of a Red Notice. After being deported to India, Mr. Sundaram was detained and handed over to local police. 

The other alleged offender, Virendra Mani Patel, was wanted in a case of fraud of ₹77 crore (almost 8 million USD) registered by the Gujarat Police in 2002. INTERPOL issued a Red Notice against him in 2004, a Central Bureau of Investigation(CBI) spokesperson said in a statement.

“On the basis of the Red Notice, Patel was detected at Ahmedabad airport while on arrival from the US on January 29, 2025 and was detained and later handed over to the Gujarat Police team,” they said.

These cases illustrate that Red Notices do not necessarily lead to extradition, but can still have the requesting country’s intended effect of returning the wanted person if the Red Notice leads to deportation (removal) from another country.

Extradition vs. deportation

Extradition and deportation are two different processes, often handled by different branches of government.

Extradition is typically handled by the criminal court officials, although it may be a civil proceeding, and is typically conducted pursuant to the terms of an extradition treaty. When extradited due to the charges that precipiated a Red Notice, the sending country returns an individual back to the requesting country to face a trial or sentencing.

Deportation is most often handled by a country’s immigration officials. When an individual is deported, the deportation decision is not necessarily based on an outstanding Red Notice; it could be that the Red Notice brought other immigration matters to light, such as being out of status.

In cases where a person cannot be extradited- whether due to a lack of dual criminality or absence of an extradition treaty- upon seeing an outstanding Red Notice, a country may still choose to deport an individual back to the requesting country.

The circumstances around the case of Mr. Patel are common among Red Notice holders. Many individuals with outstanding Red Notices are unaware of them until they are flagged in interactions with law enforcement such as airports or traffic stops. These interactions can lead to deportation or extradition.

Determining one’s Red Notice status

As the cases above illustrate, traveling as a Red Notice subject can result in significant consequences. If an individual wishes to know whether a Red Notice exists against them, the cautious route is to contact a lawyer or INTERPOL rather than risking travel when unsure of whether they could be detained. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Today’s post will address the limited publicity of some of the CCF’s decisions. 

The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) releases confidential decisions to the General Secretariat, the applicant, and the concerned National Central Bureaus upon receiving individual requests. As provided for in the Statute of the CCF, all decisions are issued confidentially and not meant for public dissemination. Nonetheless, the CCF publishes certain anonymized decisions on the INTERPOL website to provide information on its activities and in accordance with its Statute.

4 New Decisions

In 2025, the CCF added 4 new decisions to INTERPOLs anonymized decision section of its website. The CCF does not publish decisions that contain personal information, nor does it systematically publish all of its decisions. It can publish excerpts of anonymized decisions which raise issues that could be of use to the general public, to understand the working methods of the Commission and to provide a better understanding of the Commission’s analysis of INTERPOL’s various governing texts. These decisions are the Commission’s means of providing some public insight as to its decision-making processes, and can be helpful in crafting removal requests.  

While INTERPOL’s decision-making process remains largely confidential, the Commission’s publication of these anonymized decisions do offer some guidance to Applicants and attorneys seeking direction when applying for a Red Notice or diffusion removal.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

Today’s post will address the CCF’s current delays, and how those affect Red Notice subjects globally. 

INTERPOL has provided online notification for some time now of the delays being experienced due to higher influxes of requests, along with longer submissions, stating: 

The CCF has been experiencing delays in meeting its deadlines due to increases in the workload of the CCF and other INTERPOL stakeholders. The CCF recognizes that this has created challenges for both Applicants and INTERPOL National Central Bureaus, and has been working to address the issues.

The RNLJ has been aware of these delays, and reached out to the CCF in late 2024, inquiring directly to the CCF as to the Commission’s seeming lack of compliance with Article 40(3) of the Statute on the CCF, which requires notification to the parties when the required deadlines are not met, and asking about the possible reasons for the delays. The CCF has 9 months to respond to a decision for a Red Notice removal request; outside of that time frame, the applicant should be notified of the delay. The CCF responded to our request and cited lengthy requests from applicants as a major contributing factor for the widespread delays, as well as an increased workload.

While it can be quite challenging to minimize a removal request in a case involving a complex political or business dispute, we as advocates for applicants can aid in resolving this issue by keeping our submissions as concise as possible while still providing all relevant information.

What can INTERPOL do?

INTERPOL has addressed these delays in part with a resolution passed in the last General Assembly. It authorized additional funding for the CCF which will enable the hiring of new staff. Additionally, INTERPOL states that the General Secretariat is working with the CCF to develop new information technology tools. These changes are expected to improve processing times after they are integrated, although the CCF reminds readers that delays are still expected in 2025 as these programs are introduced. 

In our next post, we will discuss the time it takes the CCF to make decisions, and its limited publication of some decisions. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

INTERPOL’s Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files(CCF) has finished its first session of the year and has listed the 2025 sessions on INTERPOL’s website as follows: 

  • 131st session: 27 -31 January 2025
  • 132nd session: 07- 11 April 2025
  • 133rd session: 23-27 June 2025
  • 134th session: October 2025 (date not yet specified)

Despite INTERPOL’s rules only requiring three sessions, the CCF has scheduled four, allowing for more cases to be reviewed during the course of the year. The organization did this last year as well. Although the increased number of sessions indicates INTERPOL moving in the right direction, four sessions may not be enough to combat the CCF’s current workload. As stated in a previous RNLJ post discussing 2024’s CCF dates, there currently does not appear to be an adjustment of the number of sessions held to correspond to the workload that the Commission faces.

For example, according to the CCF’s annual activity reports, the CCF received 643 new requests in 2015, and 1,417 in 2021, but convened only four times in both years. This means that INTERPOL’s CCF held the same number of sessions despite receiving over twice as many requests for consideration. 

The CCF has been experiencing some delays because of this massive influx of requests, which is concerning considering the remaining low number of CCF meetings. This greatly affects individuals with notices against them, as the longer it takes the CCF to review information, the longer it takes them to remove/edit that information to minimize improper notices being circulated. The next post will address current delays in INTERPOL systems. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Late last year, after growing increasingly frustrated with the CCF’s uncharacteristically delayed responses to both access requests and removal requests, we inquired directly to the CCF as to the Commission’s seeming lack of compliance with Article 40(3) of the Statute on the CCF, which requires notification to the parties when the required deadlines are not met, and we asked about the possible reasons for the delays.

The CCF, to its credit, responded to our inquiry and provided some information that assists in gaining an understanding of the Commission’s workload situation as well as how response times might improve.

The CCF’s future practice regarding Article 40(3) is unclear

Our inquiry did not yield a substantive response as to the Commission’s practice of notifying parties regarding such delays. It is our observation that notification of a delay or its cause is not typically provided to INTERPOL applicants. We hope that notification of delays will be more routine in the future.

How INTERPOL attorneys are contributing to delays

However, the CCF was quite clear in explaining that a significant factor contributing to the increase in the time for decisions to be issued is that the some of removal requests it receives have become so lengthy that the duration of the consideration process is affected.

The Commission specified that not only do extensive removal requests contribute to the delays, but requests with a great number of exhibits or annexes also increase the needed review time.

Next steps

This firm is certainly one that has submitted lengthy removal requests and/or numerous exhibits when needed to fully explain a client’s case. There are times when it is difficult, if not impossible, to present the relevant evidence and arguments in a brief space. At the same time, one cannot both complain about delays and ignore their own contribution to those delays.

Going into 2025, the mantra of “less is more” may help to resolve the delay issue by assisting in bringing the Commission’s workload to a more manageable level.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

It has recently come to our attention that another law firm and/or its marketing team has plagiarized the contents of the Estlund Law, P.A. website, resulting in false online representations that it is affiliated with Estlund Law, P.A. or Michelle Estlund.

(While imitation is flattering, that action is unethical. It is also curious that a firm advertising INTERPOL representation – which requires written submissions on behalf of clients- chooses not to write its own content.)

Estlund Law, P.A. and Michelle Estlund have no partnership or ongoing formal relationship with any other law firm that is not expressly stated by Estlund Law, P.A. or Michelle Estlund.

Any person who has not spoken directly with Michelle Estlund and who has not executed an engagement agreement with Estlund Law, P.A. after consulting with Michelle Estlund is not a client of Estlund Law, P.A. or Michelle Estlund.

If any person has any doubts as to whether they have contracted with Estlund Law, P.A. or Michelle Estlund for any legal services or representation, they are encouraged to contact Estlund Law at +1.305.448.0077 or www.estlundlaw.com.

Our last post detailed cases of member countries abusing or attempting to abuse INTERPOL to target specific journalists. Those cases are not at all unique; INTERPOL abuse by its member countries has been documented for years. Turkey and Brazil are not the only offenders. Egyptian officials have sought Red Notices against journalists repeatedly, as reported by the RNLJ; in at least some instances, INTERPOL was able to identify and reject the invalid requests.

Today’s post aims to discuss INTERPOL’s reform options moving forward.

For each case of INTERPOL abuse, more individuals will inevitably fear being targeted for operating with integrity. Although it will likely never be fully eradicated, the only way for INTERPOL to combat such abuse is by continuing to improve and implement reforms such as:

  • Developing stricter criteria for issuing and reviewing Red Notices, ensuring they are not used for political or retaliatory purposes against journalists.
  • Subjecting requests for Red Notices from historically abusive member countries to a higher degree of scrutiny;
  • Forming a dedicated unit within the CCF to aid victims of abusive Red Notices, ensuring they receive tailored support and guidance to correct false and erroneous data;
  • Collaborating with international media organizations and press freedom groups such as the Committee to Protect Journalists to aid in screening notice requests for journalists;
  • Adopting more transparency and publish more information regarding Red Notices and how many are abusive.
  • Administering publicized consequences such as limited access to INTERPOL’s databases to countries who knowingly abuse the system.

We have seen INTERPOL reforms create beneficial change in the past. Continually evolving efforts are necessary to ensure the Organization’s integrity and strength.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Member countries abusing Red Notices to target reporters is a particularly heinous form of repression and political persecution. Today’s post will address specific instances of INTERPOL’s tools being used to silence or retaliate against journalists. 

This issue’s prevalence has led RNLJ to cover it in the past. In 2018, Turkey’s Red Notice request against reporter Can Dündar was denied. Dündar was the former chief editor of the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet. The Committee to Protect Journalists requested that INTERPOL deny the request due to its being politically motivated, and the notice was not issued. INTERPOL rejected the Red Notice request, despite authorities’ claims that it was based on espionage charges, alleging that he disclosed state secrets in the course of his reporting. 

More recently, member countries continue to target journalists notwithstanding INTERPOL’s efforts at reform over the years. The Whistler states that David Hundeyin, an investigative journalist, has alleged that desperate attempts had been made to involve him in a criminal investigation to damage his international refugee status and place him on an INTERPOL notice list, among other things. Mr. Hundeyin stated,

“This is part of the price that you have to pay when you decide to say the truth at the time it wasn’t fashionable to do so, especially a regime that sees truth-telling as an affront or threat to it,” 

Additionally, earlier this year, journalist Paulo Figueiredo, testified at a US congressional hearing regarding the human rights abuses committed in Brazil and Brazilian efforts to weaponize INTERPOL against journalists.  In his discussion, Mr. Figueiredo described the rampant censorship in Brazil, leading to the Brazilian government’s forced closure of a social media platform to silence his criticism. 

Our work on behalf of wrongly targeted INTERPOL subjects relies in no small part on journalists’ and human rights activists’ reports. Their unfettered ability to report the truth from every corner of the world greatly impacts our capacity to provide proof to decision-making entities such as INTERPOL and courts charged with weighing issues of human and due process rights observation.

INTERPOL and the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) have the critical and delicate burden of cautiously evaluating requests from member countries for Red Notices or diffusions against journalists.

Our next post will focus on how INTERPOL can prevent journalist targeting.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In our last post, we addressed the ongoing issue of China’s abuse of Red Notices against people who owned very successful businesses and against dissidents. Today, we’ll consider a primary goal of certain criminal cases being filed against those individuals: asset seizure. 

In China and much of the world, a person’s assets may be seized in association with criminal charges being issued against them. However, in repressive regimes such as China, where improper and abusive charges are not uncommon, arbitrary asset seizure is often associated with people being targeted improperly. 

In our practice, we have noted the phenomenon that the Chinese government has generated charges of a financial nature following a person’s dissident speech or a refusal to share a successful business with people in power. In these cases, criminal charges are filed, the individual’s or the company’s assets are seized, and if the person is out of the jurisdiction, a Red Notice is requested.

Such a case may look like the one that was filed against Sun Dawu, a billionaire business owner. In his case, INTERPOL was not involved because he stayed in the country. The underlying facts of the case, however, closely mirror those of several of our clients and provide a representative example of how abusive criminal cases can lead to asset seizure and forfeiture.

After Mr. Dawu spoke out against China’s ruling communist party, the 70-year-old is now serving an 18 years in jail for alleged corruption. Following his detention, Mr. Dawu’s company was placed under new management. A detailed Reuters article by journalist David Lague reports that, in April of 2022, Mr. Dawu’s company was sold to a group set up just three days before a court-ordered auction, as reflected in Chinese corporate filings and court documents. It was sold at a fraction of its true value, according to his family. The impression left is that the Chinese government jailed Mr. Dawu purely for control of his assets. 

“Their objective was very clear,” said Yang Bin, a former government prosecutor turned defense lawyer. “They wanted to totally crush his whole business.”

Mr. Dawu stated that some evidence shown at his trial was fabricated, some was exaggerated, and other allegations didn’t involve illegal conduct.

Cases like Mr. Dawu’s illustrate how relatively easy it is for a government to abuse its systems- and if needed, those of INTERPOL- to obtain a desired result. Charges that appear to be legitimate can be used to issue Red Notices and target individuals through INTERPOL. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.