Join us live for an online event on Thursday, December 7th at 11:00 a.m. EST, 5 p.m CET
The link to the event is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WN5WvZ9Oass
As the previous post in this series addressed the systems in place to prevent INTERPOL abuse and Secretary General Jürgen Stock’s recent comments on that topic, today’s post will focus on what is needed for these reforms to be effective.
After INTERPOL’s Secretary General Jürgen Stock’s reform efforts had been integrated, INTERPOL still had to review the notices it amassed over the years. As of 2019, there were still around 50,000 active Red Notices that had not been reviewed and may have resulted in wrongful arrests, according to the New York Times. While statistics show that only about five percent of these outstanding Red Notices could be a result of abuse of the system, these alerts can be extremely damaging and dangerous if the individual were to be prosecuted.
The system has seen structural reforms, however, Red Notices sent out by repressive governments have continued to slip through the cracks, calling significant attention from the media. For example, in 2021, Idris Hasan, a Uyghur activist, was arrested in Morocco following a Red Notice requested by China. After the arrest, INTERPOL classified the Red Notice as “non-compliant,” however, Mr. Hasan’s arrest exemplifies the dangers posed to persecuted minority groups by countries prone to Red Notice abuse.
Criteria for effective reform
In order for reform efforts to be effective, INTERPOL must:
Bad actors always eventually find their way around obstacles, and Red Notices are no exception. In this practice, we have seen a trend toward the use of diffusions, rather than Red Notices, after Red Notices began to be scrutinized more closely. This single example indicates that reform must remain ongoing, and that success is never final but requires vigilance.
As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.
*Thanks to guest author, Ingrid Matteini, B.S. candidate 2025, Georgetown University
INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock recently addressed what he referred to as misinformation regarding the organization in the media and critics of the Red Notice system who claim it has become a tool of repressive states.
In an op-ed published in Euronews, Mr. Stock reiterated that Red Notices are a key tool for cooperation among countries to locate and arrest an individual who has committed a crime. This is obviously true; it is also true that this tool provides an opportunity for abuse by ill-intentioned actors and that the need for reform will likely remain constant.
INTERPOL Reform Efforts
In 2016, two years into his new role as INTERPOL’s Secretary General, Jürgen Stock, along with the General Assembly and the Executive Committee, made a series of reforms to address accountability issues after a tumultuous decade and a half that resulted in numerous arrests in cases that critics say were politically motivated.
The organization added the Notices and Diffusions Task Force (NDTF), composed of lawyers, police officers, and operations specialists, to pre-review Red Notices and carry out a quality and legal compliance review prior to a notice’s authorization. Mr. Stock also tightened records requirements, added a data protection officer, and strengthened the internal review commission.
In the opinion piece referenced previously, Mr. Stock aimed to remind readers that critics often claim certain countries abuse INTERPOL for political reasons, but he does not believe this to be true. “Although Interpol is a technical policing organisation, we are not blind to geopolitical realities. Red Notices are not issued in an information vacuum,” Mr. Stock wrote in his op-ed.
For example, in October 2022, INTERPOL rejected India’s second request to issue a Red Notice against Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, founder of Sikhs for Justice, a U.S.-based group seeking a separate homeland for Sikhs. INTERPOL rejected the alert on terror charges stating Punnun’s activities have a “clear political dimension,” according to the Wire.
Mr. Stock also states that in 2021, 483 out of 23,716 alerts were refused because they were believed to be political by nature, alluding to INTERPOL’s increased accountability and transparency, demonstrating the effectiveness of Mr. Stock’s reforms.
The next post will further address reform efforts and how effective they may be for INTERPOL as well as individuals.
As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.
*Thanks to guest author, Ingrid Matteini, B.S. candidate 2025, Georgetown University
INTERPOL’s Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF’s) third session of the year occurred from October 16th to the 20th. As no further sessions are publicly scheduled for this year, this will likely be the last session during which the CCF will review INTERPOL notice subjects’ requests for notice removal and access to information.
The CCF’s Processing of Requests
When reviewing requests, the CCF ‘s Secretariat examines and determines the admissibility of each request it receives. The CCF then performs a detailed assessment of the request according to the Organization’s rules. This will often involve gathering more information from the applicant, the source of information, and may include open-source research. A summary of the case is then submitted to the Commission during one of its sessions for discussion and a decision.
As the CCF has four months to render a decision on an access request, and nine months to decide on a correction/deletion request, any requests not addressed in the upcoming session will likely be discussed in January. Although the CCF does not always notify an individual that their request will be discussed at the next session, the CCF’s general procedure includes communicating the results of a processed request, so if no results are received, it can be assumed that the request will be discussed at the next session.
When its decision becomes final, the CCF notifies an applicant within one month. The CCF recommends applicants should wait at least three months after the date of the session that examined the request before inquiring about the outcome of the request.
What to expect from the CCF
Each year, the CCF releases its annual activities report, which reviews the activities of the prior year’s supervisory and advisory chambers as well as the requests chamber. If the CCF’s reports from 2021 as well as 2019-2020(combined report due to COVID-19) are indicators of what to expect this year, we await over 1,500 finalized CCF requests, a majority of them being complaints access requests.
Once the CCF’s annual report is released, RNLJ will be able to compare this year’s report with those of years past.
As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.
This year, INTERPOL celebrates its hundredth year as an organization. To commemorate this, INTEPROL’s General Assembly will take place in Vienna, Austria, where the organization was founded. INTERPOL’s General Assembly is an annual event hosted for INTERPOL’s member countries to discuss and vote on varying global law enforcement issues.
General Assembly Agenda
Following the conclusion of INTERPOL’s CCF’s third and final required session of 2023 in October, this year’s General Assembly takes place in November. The agenda each year includes:
Attendance of INTERPOL’s General Assembly
As reported by Vienna International News, in total, police and government leaders from up to 195 member countries are expected to attend this occasion, and a total of 1,500 participants are expected. As this annual event is attended by high-ranking police experts and government leaders from all over the world, it brings Vienna a unique security challenge. Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BK) director Andreas Holzer states:
“My colleagues have been working for quite some time to make this General Assembly a safe event that does justice to the significance of this anniversary,”
The detailed itinerary of this year’s General Assembly will only be available after it concludes. Once it becomes available, it will reveal some of INTERPOL’s priorities as well as its plans for the coming year.
As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.
INTERPOL’s Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF’s) third session of the year will occur from October 16th to the 20th. If the CCF has no more sessions this year, this will be the last session that the CCF will review INTERPOL notice subjects’ requests for notice removal and access to information.
The CCF’s Processing of Notice Requests
The CCF receives requests from attorneys and individuals seeking access to INTERPOL’s files as well as requests for removal or correction of data. When reviewing requests, the CCF Secretariat examines and determines the admissibility of each request it receives. The CCF then performs a detailed assessment of the request according to the Organization’s rules. This will typically involve gathering more information from the applicant and the source of information, and may include a review of open source information. A summary of the case is then submitted to the Commission during one of its sessions for discussion and a decision.
As the CCF has four months to render a decision on an access request, and nine months to decide on a correction/deletion request, any requests not addressed in the upcoming session will likely be discussed in January. Although the CCF does not always notify an individual that their request will be discussed at the next session, the CCF’s general procedure includes communicating the results of a processed request, so if no results are received, it may be assumed that the request will be discussed at the next session.
When its decision becomes final, the CCF notifies an applicant within one month.
What to expect from the CCF
Each year, the CCF releases its annual activities report, which includes a review of the activities of the prior year’s supervisory and advisory chambers as well as the requests chamber. If the CCF’s reports from 2021 as well as 2019-2020(combined report due to COVID-19) are indicators of what to expect this year, we await over 1,500 finalized CCF requests, a majority of them being complaints access requests.
Once the CCF’s annual report is released, RNLJ will be able to compare this year’s with years past and discuss the meaning behind any variations present.
As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.
In our last post, we discussed the issue of former Red Notice subjects facing difficulty upon entry to the United States, even though their Red Notices had been removed. Today’s focus is on whether to apply for one and when to do so.
How do I know if I could benefit from a Redress Control Number?
A Redress Control Number is not required to travel and will not be granted to everyone who applies. In many instances, however, travelers may have encountered issues that have hampered their travel experience even though they have resolved old criminal charges and/or had a Red Notice removed. The TSA offers the following travel-related issues that may qualify an individual for a redress control number:
If someone is consistently experiencing any of the above situations, a Redress Control Number may be useful. Receiving a Redress Control Number does not guarantee that you may not experience additional screening when traveling but that it is less likely to occur.
When should I apply for a Control Number?
We have seen in our practice that it takes some time for databases to be updated after we have assisted a client in removing a Red Notice or resolving another criminal matter. Based on this experience, we recommend waiting at least three months after a case is resolved to take any action that relies on the related data to be removed from a system. Additionally, many people will have no difficulty upon re-entry to the U.S. after their cases are resolved. Therefore, it is not recommended that one apply immediately after a case is resolved; it simply may not be necessary.
On the other hand, if a person has allowed ample time for the respective databases to be updated and has still experienced repeated difficulties upon entering the U.S., it is likely time to seek a Redress Control Number. Information on that process can be found at https://www.dhs.gov/redress-control-numbers or by contacting our office for assistance in applying for a Redress Control Number.
As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.
Many Red Notice subjects are concerned about whether they may face issues when traveling, even after their Red Notices have been removed from INTERPOL databases. In some instances, although they are permitted to enter a country after a Red Notice has been removed, subjects have encountered issues at airports and either face delays or are denied permission to travel. For such people traveling to (or back to) the United States, a Redress Control Number may be appropriate.
What is Redress Control Number?
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provides a secure flight screening program through the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). This program was created to assist and simplify the watch-list matching process to prevent further misidentification of
travelers. People who continually face delays and questioning upon their entry to the United States due to an old criminal case or Red Notice can apply to this program for relief.
Why is a Redress Control Number useful?
If an individual’s redress number application is approved, TSA assigns a seven-digit number which will ease the screening process for travelers who may have been added to a security watch-list or incorrectly marked as high-risk. This number can be added to travel reservations during booking, on a traveler’s frequent flyer profile, or added by an airport agent at check-in.
In the next post, we will address how to know whether and when to apply for a Redress Control Number.
As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.
On September 29, 2023, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issued new agency-wide guidelines regarding how its employees will address cases in which Red Notices and Diffusions.
The complete guidelines are found here, and the likely effect of some of the most practically impactful provisions are listed in part 2 of this series, found in our last post.
Today’s focus is on the provisions that will likely have little effect on detentions or immigration proceedings involving subjects with Red Notices or Diffusions. Those provisions and the reasons that they will probably not have much impact are:
ICE officials are prohibited from relying exclusively on Red Notices or Diffusions as a basis for action in immigration proceedings. This new policy element is already a fact, as immigration court decisions have made clear in the last several years. However, the reminder is a good one, as not all immigration officials or judges have had much experience with Red Notices.
ICE officials must conduct a preliminary review of available information for evidence of abuse or non-compliance with INTERPOL’s rules. This requirement is a good one, but it presupposes that the ICE officials will know what evidence of abuse of INTERPOL would look like. It also presumes that they have enough knowledge of INTERPOL’s rules to recognize non-compliance. This is a complex area. It seems improbable that ICE officials will receive the requisite training and materials to detect invalid Red Notices or Diffusions, though it would be nice to be wrong.
All in all, the new policy is well-thought-out and provides a solid basis for ICE personnel to perform their duties without detaining people who are wanted by old or invalid data entries within INTERPOL’s databases.
As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.
On September 29, 2023, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issued new agency-wide guidelines regarding how its employees will address cases in which Red Notices and Diffusions.
The complete guidelines are found here, and the most relevant provisions (in my estimation) are listed in our last blog post.
In part one of this series, we referenced the fact that some of the new provisions would likely be more impactful in a practical sense than others. The provisions that are likely to have the strongest impact, and the reasons for that, are:
ICE officials must verify the validity of such data to ensure it is still current and active. This new requirement should eliminate the possibility that an outdated piece of data from INTERPOL is used improperly to detain a person in the U.S. in any situation. For people with pending immigration proceedings, this should prevent an unjustified detention, which can severely affect the direction of an immigration case.
ICE officials are required to get the approval of a supervisor to act on the Red Notice or Diffusion. Though likely to take the form of a brief review and authorization, this requirement places another roadblock against the possibility of ICE officials detaining a person “just in case” and instead only detaining people when doing so is based on valid information.
ICE officials must obtain the underlying documentation from the U.S. National Central Bureau (NCB), the U.S. liaison with INTERPOL, in Washington, D.C., and request the authority to use the data from the U.S. NCB if ICE plans to use the data in immigration proceedings. This is critical. In many cases, until now, an immigration finder of fact often does not receive the underlying documentation from the government, and the petitioner or detainee is left to attempt to obtain it from the foreign government. Frequently, the person cannot access that information either in time for the proceedings or at all, given their absence from the country or lack of funds required to hire someone to assist in obtaining the documents. This new policy element will be key to people receiving fairer proceedings.
ICE officials are required to provide the Red Notice / Diffusion subject with the underlying documentation and provide a meaningful opportunity to contest it or its contents. This new requirement is clearly designed to provide a Red Notice or Diffusion subject with a chance to defend against invalid information. Currently, petitioners are often denied an opportunity to contest the information underlying a Red Notice or diffusion because they cannot obtain the information in time, and there is no specific requirement that they be permitted a meaningful opportunity to defend against it. This provision changes that.
It will be interesting to see how this provision is implemented for detention cases, particularly how the opportunity to contesting the information is implemented.
ICE officials are prohibited from representing/implying that the data is an arrest warrant or that it conveys independent legal authority or any independent judgment by INTERPOL regarding probable cause or the validity of the underlying criminal proceedings. This new requirement is a game-changer. While INTERPOL has always clearly stated that Red Notices and Diffusions do not constitute probable cause, immigration officials have often relied upon and/or presented them as substantial evidence of crimes. This clear directive should prevent such representations in the future.
In the next post, we’ll address why some of the remaining new provisions may have little effect on the treatment of Red Notices and Diffusions in detentions and immigration proceedings.
As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.