A reader commented on February 12 as follows regarding an old post regarding Venezuela’s Red Notice history:

“Your animus towards Venezuela (or towards the Chavez Govt.) is misplaced, given the malfeasance of other INTERPOL member states.  The judge you mention, Maria Lourdes Afiun, did not merely dismiss charges against a corrupt Venezuelan banker (which she was not entitled to do), she also ushered him out of her courtroom via a back door where an accomplice was waiting to spirit him away on a motorcycle.

This is hardly acceptable judicial practice.  And Lourdes Afiun is not incarcerated; she is under house arrest.

Neither Lourdes Afiun nor the banker in question face the death penalty – unlike Hamza Kashgari, detained yesterday in Kuala Lumput at INTERPOL’s request, on behalf of the Saudi Theorcrates.  Kashgari faces extradition, torture, and death at the hands of the Sauds, thanks to INTERPOL.  His crime?  Tweeting about the Prophet (pbuh).”

Hmmm.  Where to start?  First, I would probably characterize my writings as criticism of the Venezuelan government rather than animus.  But let’s say we go with animus:  “hostile spirit or angry temperment.”  I’m not sure such an attitude would be inappropriate given Venezuela’s use of INTERPOL’s tools.

Second, while it is true that the judge discussed in the post is now on house arrest, it is also true that she was incarcerated until February of last year, when the post was written. 

More to the reader’s point, however, is the idea that such criticism, or animus, might better be directed at those member countries engaged in even worse abuses than Venezuela.  The reader focuses on Hamza Kashgari, who is wanted by Saudi Arabia, and who now has reportedly been extradited to Saudi Arabia.  There were initial reports that INTERPOL aided in that extradition, but INTERPOL has repeatedly denied any involvement in Mr. Kashgari’s case.

As already pointed out by Fair Trials International leader Jago Russell, any involvement by INTERPOL in Mr. Kashgari’s case would be inappropriate.  INTERPOL’s constitution prohibits it from taking a role in any matter of a religious nature, as Article 3 provides that:

“It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.”  

At this point, it is unclear why the Malaysian police would have indicated that INTERPOL was involved in the case.  Reuters has reported that Malaysian Home Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has now clarified that INTERPOL did not, in fact, have a role in this extradition, and that when the police said otherwise this past Friday, it was a mistake. 

Minister Hussein also stated that Malaysia will not allow itself to be used as a safe haven by terrorists or other wanted people.  In choosing to use Mr. Kashgari as an example of this policy, Malaysia has brought into serious question its dedication to human rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Its actions stand in stark contrast to its statement in 2006 when it applied to the United Nations Human Rights Council: 

“Consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), successive Malaysian Governments have made the guarantee of the individual’s fundamental rights and liberties, as enshrined in the Constitution, the cornerstone of its policies and programmes . . . “

So at this point it appears that we have two INTERPOL member countries acting outside their capacities as member countries.  Any criticism of either country, however deserved, would be unrelated to their status as member countries.

I will say, though, that I agree with the reader on the premise that abusive INTERPOL member countries should continue to be criticized and held accountable for their INTERPOL-related activities.  I would simply stretch that idea to allow for the fact that all “malfeasance,” whether relatively slight or  more severe, is properly subject to being publicly denounced.  To reserve criticism to only the worst offenders, I believe, allows for a kind of relativism that runs contrary to the absolute rules set forth in INTERPOL’s governing rules and texts.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 

In the last post, the focus was on INTERPOL’s consciousness of its potential vulnerability to legal action based on improperly issued Red Notices.  INTERPOL’s I-Link system, which allows member countries much more broad discretion in the issuance of Red Notices, has allowed for information to be processed using INTERPOL’s databases in a way that was impossible prior to the I-Link system being implemented.

As INTERPOL has become aware of the dangers associated with member countries’ increased autonomy, it has taken steps to guard against improper processing of individuals’ information. Beginning in July of this year, INTERPOL’s new rules regarding the processing of data will become effective.  The new rules obviously retain and incorporate many of the existing rules, but there are also new provisions designed to hold individual National Central Bureaus (NCBs) accountable for their actions.

If the new rules are effectively enforced, wayward NCBs will be restricted in their ability to behave in a corrupt or careless fashion.  With 190 member countries, there will always be difficulties in terms of the proper use of INTERPOL’s tools, and member participation will never be perfect or flawless.  INTERPOL’s willingness to acknowledge and address the problems that have arisen from the misuse of its tools, however, is a step in the right direction.

As always, comments and questions are welcome.

 

In a recent MSNBC.com article, Ian Johnston reports on some of the frustrations experienced by Red Notice subjects as they attempt to challenge their Red Notices.  He addresses the issue of possibly pending lawsuits against INTERPOL as a means of changing the manner in which a Red Notice is issued or challenged.

Although such efforts are in very early stages, and previous similar efforts have failed, INTERPOL has long been aware of the possibility of such legal action and governs itself accordingly.  In its 2010 Annual Activity Report, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (“CCF”) recognized its possible vulnerability to lawsuits.  Specifically, the CCF lauded INTERPOL’s decision to have its Constitution registered with the United Nations Charter as a means of solidifying its status as an international organization operating under international law.  The CCF noted that such status would

              “enhance INTERPOL’s immunity from legal process vis-a-vis     

                    national courts in all of its member countries.”

The CCF went on to highlight the fact that its I-link project (discussed in more detail here and in the next post) has created a significant likelihood that INTERPOL and its NCBs would both be liable in the event that a Red Notice subject was prejudiced by the inappropriate entry of information into its databases.

This concern was echoed in CCF Chairman Billy Hawkes’ speech to the General Assembly in November of 2011.  As always, his speech was both respectful and frank.  He discussed the CCF’s concern that, at that time, the appropriate control mechanisms for the I-Link project had not been implemented in a timely fashion.  He further acknowledged that the data quality of information processed through the I-Link system would determine whether National Central Bureaus of member countries could properly rely on Red Notices.

It is clear that the CCF is both aware of the issue of potential liability for INTERPOL’s actions and actively working to ensure that INTERPOL does not process information improperly.  Mr. Hawkes rightly observed that “for an Organisation of 190 members, this will always be a significant challenge.”  But if the appropriate safeguards are not in place, that challenge becomes unwieldy, and perhaps, impossible.

Next time:  more on I-Link.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 

 

 

 

Back in December, I received the following comment from a reader in response to the post entitled, “How Much Political Motivation is Too Much for INTERPOL?”

“I have been working in this Organization for the past 10 years and i can easily say that decisions on issuing red notices mainly depend on several people, when it comes to “sensitive” issues.  And, by doing so, the name of it is being degraded constantly.”

For the sake of this discussion, let’s assume that the reader is in fact an employee at INTERPOL.  I waited a while in case further comments were forthcoming; they were not.   

I will be the first to admit that I have done my fair share of criticizing about, and complaining to, INTERPOL. I also try to be fair, and give credit where credit is due.  In fairness, I would have to say that my preference, and probably the preference of other lawyers who represent clients on INTERPOL matters, would be for INTERPOL’s more experienced staff members to work on the more “senstive” cases, if I am correct in assuming that by “sensitive,” the reader refers to diplomatically challenging issues.

I am unsure whether the reader is dissatisfied with the fact that the same few people seem to review the issues s/he discussed, or if, as I suspect, instead the reader disagrees with the decisions reached by those who review Red Notice issues. I would be interested to hear whether the process or the result is more of a concern.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

 

A reader posted a question recently in response to a previous post about the manner in which INTERPOL member countries respond to locating a Red Notice subject.  The reader specifically asked whether Red Notice subjects would be arrested in every member country upon their arrival to the country.

As the reader’s question focused on New Zealand, let’s use that member country as an example:  New Zealand’s policy regarding the arrest of Red Notice subjects was stated clearly by Detective Senior Sergeant Liam Clinton this past November.  He advised that New Zealand cannot make an arrest based upon a Red Notice, and instead requires a local arrest warrant issued pursuant to a formal extradition request.

While some other member countries have similar policies, it would be unwise for a Red Notice subject to believe that she can move freely about member countries with no problems.  Both official and anecdotal information reveal that whether a Red Notice subject is detained in a member country depends on several factors.  Those factors include:

  • the relationship between the originating member country and the member country where the subject finds himself;
  • the nature of the underlying charge; 
  • the policy regarding Red Notices in the member country; and
  • the depth of the security check to which the person is subjected.

Obviously, the existence of a Red Notice has a profound effect on a person’s ability to conduct business, to travel, and to maintain a livelihood.  The temptation to travel and hope for the best is a strong one, especially for people who travel for business. While there are plenty of examples of people who have been able to travel without being detained despite a Red Notice in their names, a substantial likelihood of detention exists.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 

 

In the last post, I left off on the question of whether INTERPOL could survive without its more corrupt member countries.  So, could it?

The typical lawyer answer is the one I’ll give:  it depends.   It depends on whether INTERPOL is interested in maximizing the reach of its data-sharing capabilities regardless of its sharing partners.  if INTERPOL takes the approach reportedly espoused by the late Mother Teresa, it will accept a member country’s dues and information sharing on the basis that the good they accomplish is reason enough to keep them.

On the other hand, if INTERPOL is interested in protecting the integrity of its organization and its affiliates at all costs, then those more corrupt countries would be shown the door.  Given the relatively high number of corrupt countries in the world and on INTERPOL’s membership list, excluding those countries would significantly decrease INTERPOL’s reach and effectiveness.

Of course, there is another option.  The other option is that INTERPOL retains all of its member countries, but assigns differing levels of credibility to those who have historically shown themselves to be more corrupt.  The level of credibility would determine how easily their requests for Red Notices would be processed, and with how much oversight.  INTERPOL would thereby retain the maximum possible reach while ensuring additional safety measures when necessary.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

 

In order for INTERPOL to exist, it must be financed.  Certainly, it receives occasional donations and gifts. But by and large, like any other large and voluntary organization, it can function because members pay “dues.” 

All member countries pay to be member countries of INTERPOL.  The fee for membership is commensurate with the country’s fiscal well-being.  How this pans out is that the wealthier countries effectively subsidize the membership of the the poorer countries.  If everyone agrees that the goal of global police communication is worth supporting the less affluent countries, then everyone is relatively happy with the arrangement.

But what happens when it one of the member countries is using INTERPOL for corrupt purposes?  In recent posts, we have considered the issue of corruption and misuse of Red Notices.  Today, the conversation includes the idea that “clean” member countries effectively support those countries who would abuse their INTERPOL membership.  

When a member country with little or no history of corruption, such as Sweden or Denmark, acts as an INTERPOL member country, few complaints can expect to be heard regarding bribery attempts and the like.  Such members clearly “earn their keep” as INTERPOL member countries, and impose no negative image on INTERPOL.

However, when one of the historically more corrupt countries, utilizes any of the tools at its disposal as an INTERPOL member country, it is much more likely that corruption will taint that effort in some fashion. The possibility of inappropriate Red Notice requests or improper use of data is much greater for those countries.

Both types of member countries are afforded the same level of access and presumption of validity of action by INTERPOL.  What this means is that the “clean” countries pay into the system which supports and allows the actions of the “dirtier” countries.  

Could INTERPOL survive without the “clean” countries and their financial support?  Probably not.  An international organization is only as good as its reputation, and for INTERPOL, much of its credibility comes from its acceptance and recognition by the more powerful, and less corrupt, countries who are members.

But what of the “dirtier” countries?  Next time:  Could INTERPOL survive without the participation of its more corrupt member countries? 

As always, questions and comments are welcomed.

How many bribes does it take to get a Red Notice removed?  While this sounds like the lead-in to a bad joke, for many people facing Red Notices, it is unfortunately a matter that bears consideration.

Let me be clear:  never once have I read, observed, or been advised by anyone about any bribery efforts on the part of anyone who works for INTERPOL.  In fact, to the contrary, in the cases to which I am privy, I have found that INTERPOL’s staff members have gone out of their way to avoid any appearance of impropropriety.

The issue of bribery, when it arises, inevitably appears in the judicial and executive branches of government of the member countries that request Red Notices.  Subjects report requests for bribes from National Central Bureau (“NCB”) officials (who are employees of the member countries, not of INTERPOL), arresting officers, judges, prosecuting attorneys, and other judicial and law enforcement officials.

Red Notice subjects have complained regarding the issue of bribery in so many member countries that the question has to be asked at some point, are they all lying?  While any person charged with a crime arguably has a motive to lie, should we not also recognize that these individual, un-verifiable reports take on credibility after they are made repeatedly from different sources at different times under different circumstances?

Member countries interact with INTERPOL via their own governmental officials who work at NCBs, which serve as the liaisons between the countries and INTERPOL.  This arrangement ensures that the people who are in the best position to determine whether a country’s laws have been followed- that country’s own law enforcement officials- serve as the gatekeepers between the country and INTERPOL. 

It also also creates opportunity for non-INTERPOL staff to introduce corruption into INTERPOL’s processes. Every member country’s NCB is run by a law enforcement agency assigned by the member country itself.  It is also staffed by employees of the member country, not INTERPOL.  The NCB officials are therefore in a position to decide whether to request a new Red Notice, or to request that one be removed.  In the more corrupt member countries, officials who are so inclined may seek bribes in exchange for either the issuance or removal of the Notice.

If the claims of some Red Notice subjects are true, the subjects are left to decide whether to:

  1. pay a bribe, which is likely a crime in both the country where they are wanted and the country in which they reside, 
  2. blow the whistle, or 
  3. say nothing.  

If they either pay the bribe or report the bribery efforts, they further endanger themselves.  If they do not, they fight the Red Notice while playing by the rules, even though the corrupt member country does not.

Quite a quandry.  

In the next posts, more on this topic.

As always, questions and comments are welcomed.

 

 

A reader recently emailed me a very practical question:  How long does it take for INTERPOL to consider and decide a case that has been submitted by a Red Notice subject?

For those who are new to the world of INTERPOL, the question itself requires explanation.  A Red Notice subject is a person who is wanted for a crime committed in any of INTERPOL’s 190 member countries, and who is believed to have fled from that country.  In order for a member country to locate and eventually extradite the wanted person, that country obtains a Red Notice in the person’s name.  The Red Notice is circulated worldwide among all member countries, and the Red Notice subject is effectively immobilized: if she travels, she is likely to be monitored, detained, and possibly extradited back to the member country for prosecution or sentencing.

Many times, the subject of the Red Notice believes that the Red Notice was improperly issued for reasons ranging from political motivation to mistaken identity.  In those instances, the subject may seek relief from INTERPOL, asking that the Red Notice be withdrawn or modified.

Time is clearly of the essence for such a request, given the profound impact of a Red Notice on a person’s professional and personal life.  A number of factors will influence the amount of time its takes for a Red Notice request to be reviewed and determined.

Some factors are determined by the subject herself, or her attorney:

  • Is the challenge to the Red Notice well-prepared?  Is everything submitted properly in accordance with INTERPOL’s rules?  Will the applicant create a delay because of an incomplete or inappropriately based request?  

Other issues depend on the nature of the individual case:

  • How complex is the case?  How many issues will have to be studied?  Are there questions to which the member country will have to respond?

And of course, there are some matters over which the subject has little or no control:

  • When is the request submitted in relation to the CCF’s next meeting?  Will the applicant’s matter be put into the queue behind numerous other requests ? 

In my experience and observation, requests for relief to INTERPOL have taken anywhere from just a few months to several years to resolve.  It is true that responses can take what feels like an extremely long time, especially as INTERPOL has grown and changed in the last few years.  However, the subject of the Red Notice can reduce the time it takes to obtain an appropriate response by ensuring that the challenge to the Red Notice is properly and fully prepared, and does not need to be “re-done” later. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 

 

An update to this post: Last year, INTERPOL added two member countries:

  • The Solomon Islands
  • The State of Palestine

INTERPOL noted in its press release announcing the two new members that each application was approved by a more than two-thirds majority vote at INTERPOL’s General Assembly, where the organization’s member countries meet annually.

(The original post appears below)

Last month, INTERPOL increased its member countries to 190.  As of October 31, 2011, the new member countries are:

  • Curacao, with its NCB in Willemstad

South Sudan became a country in July of this year, as noted here.  Curacao and Sint Maarten became autonomous countries when the Netherlands Antilles was dissolved in October of 2010.

A search of the publicized Red Notices on INTERPOL’s website shows no Red Notices for Sint Maarten, Curacao, or South Sudan as of today’s date.  Whether any one of the new member countries will become an active requesting member country remains to be seen.

It is certain, however, that INTERPOL’s decision to allow member countries to enter their own Red Notices on INTERPOL’s databases will make their membership activity much simpler than it was for longer-standing members of INTERPOL.  That ease of entering information will likely add to INTERPOL’s ever-growing list of Red Notice subjects as well.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.