Egyptian officials have reportedly requested that INTERPOL issue a Red Notice in the name of Mahmoud Ezzat, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Mr. Ezzat was, until recently, a professor at Zagazig University Faculty of Medicine.

The Red Notice request is based upon the underlying charges of inciting murder and violence.  Prosecuting Attorney General Hisham Barakat requested the Red Notice through Egypt’s National Central Bureau, NCB Cairo.  (Red Notice Law Journal has requested verification of INTERPOL’s receipt of this request, as well as its decision on the request.  INTERPOL’s response will be posted here upon its receipt.)

Whether INTERPOL becomes involved in Mr. Ezzat’s case will depend on whether INTERPOL views the case as being primarily politically motivated or not.  Given the current struggle for political power between the Muslim Brotherhood and its opponents, there is a distinct possibility that this case will be treated as political in nature.

The charges are alleged to have arisen during protests and sit-ins related to the political battle in Egypt.  Mr. Ezzat was named as the temporary leader of the Muslim Brotherhood after his predecessor was arrested in August.  

Two major blows to the official political status of the Brotherhood in Egypt occurred recently.  On September 23, the organization was banned from operating and its assets were seized by the government.  And just hours ago, Egypt removed the Muslim Brotherhood from its list of sanctioned non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as reported here.

As more information becomes available reqarding INTERPOL’s treatment of this case, Red Notice Law Journal will continue to provide updates.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 

 

A reader recently sent in a question about INTERPOL’s response time for requests for removal of Red Notices, which is commonly asked by Red Notice subjects.  That question, in pertinent part, is:

I have challenged the notice and a month back I have heard from Interpol that they have admitted my request.  The clarification, I wish to seek is that after admitting the request, how much time generally Interpol takes to decide the matter and is it purely Interpol discretion to remove / delete the name from its record or the party on whose initiative the RCN has been issued. 

The reader’s experience of having received a finding of admissibility is a normal one, as the CCF is required to issue such a response within thirty days of having received a request for access to INTERPOL’s files.  The reference to a “RCN” means “Red Corner Notice,” which is a commonly used term for a Red Notice in certain parts of the world.

Regarding the question of how long the CCF may take to respond to a request for removal of a Red Notice, the unsatisfying answer is that there is no specific deadline.  Cases may take more or less time to be determined based on the CCF’s workload, the relevant NCB’s timeliness (or lack thereof) in responding to any requests for information, and other factors that the CCF does not share with the world at large. Several months is not at all unusual, nor is one to two years, and occassionally, a response could take longer. However, in my experience, the CCF is responsive to requests for updates when cases are taking longer than normal.

As to whether the removal of a Red Notice is purely in the discretion of INTERPOL, ultimately, the answer is yes.  While a challenge that includes specific evidence of relevant violations is more likely to succeed than one that does not contain such evidence, and NCB’s are often consulted prior to a removal request being decided, INTERPOL is the ultimate decider of whether its rules have been violated and whether a Red Notice should be removed.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 

 

 

INTERPOL has planned its 82nd General Assembly meeting for next month in Colombia.  To get right to the point, out of all the planned events for the meeting, I am most interested in reading about the presentation of the Annual Report by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF). Traditionally, the CCF’s report has been presented to the General Assembly in conjunction with a speech by its chairperson.

This year, one of the primary topics of the report is likely to be whether the Rules on the Processing of Data (“RPD”) have been implemented completely in practice, and if so, to what effect?  A critical issue in the RPD, for both INTERPOL and for attorneys practicing before INTERPOL, is that of the accountability of National Central Bureaus (“NCB’s”) for INTERPOL’s member countries.  

When the RPD took effect in July of 2012, the new rules included multiple provisions that were clearly intended to shift responsibility for proper data processing to the NCB’s and away from INTERPOL itself.  One concern, which remains to be fully publicly addressed, was how the CCF and INTERPOL would identify misbehaving NCB’s, and how the available sanctions would be applied.

While it has only been a little over a year since the effective date of the new rules, sufficient time has passed for the CCF to have observed, directly or indirectly, improper actions taken by some member countries’ NCB’s.  It will be interesting to see whether the Commission addresses NCB malfeasance and sanctions in connection with the implementation of the new rules.  If so, the Commission will have taken another step towards the goals of transparency and accountability that INTERPOL sets for itself.  If not, we will be left to wonder whether the new rules matter very much.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 

 This post is an updated version of the original, which was published in July of 2011.

 

How could INTERPOL shield itself from being used as a political weapon against a corrupt country’s own people? In a previous post, I referenced an article by CNN writer Libby Lewis entitled, “Are some countries abusing Interpol?” In the article, Lewis raises numerous questions, one of which is whether a more in-depth review process should occur prior to INTERPOL’s acceptance of Red Notice requests.

As it stands, INTERPOL relies on member countries to be aware of and observe the rules requiring that Red Notice requests be made legally, in compliance with the country’s own laws and INTERPOL’s rules. A Red Notice request is processed with a presumption of validity and remains so unless it is challenged specifically, or otherwise brought to INTERPOL’s attention as being improper.  This very frequently means that a Red Notice subject or his attorney must not only fight the underlying charges, but also seek the removal of the notice.

Senator Jeff Sessions from Alabama reportedly requested a revision of that process, and his is a good idea. For INTERPOL, however, the thought may be rather daunting. Imagine having to review the validity of thousands of Red Notice requests, particularly when they originate from 190 countries across the globe, all with differing legal systems and law enforcement practices. Where is one to start?

Here’s an idea. Start by amending INTERPOL’s rules and requiring the existence, funding, and operation of a small human rights monitoring division. Charge that division with the limited duty of studying and documenting corruption and human rights violation activity among INTERPOL’s member countries. When a member country with a questionable history requests a Red Notice from INTERPOL, require additional information and checks from the country to guard against improper requests being granted.

All member countries must contribute financially in order to be members of INTERPOL, and as discussed here before, INTERPOL occasionally benefits from other monetary contributions. Funding such a division is within easy reach. An amendment providing for a human rights monitoring division, with the accompanying appropriation of funding, would allow INTERPOL to do the one thing that would allow it to continue serving as a law enforcement aid while maintaining a sense of integrity: trust but verify.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

 

In a recent post, I addressed the issue of companies in the United Arab Emirates using INTERPOL’s channels to enforce civil debts.  As discussed there, it seemed for a time that the UAE had changed course and was no longer utilizing INTERPOL Red Notices to hunt down people who were wanted for bouncing “security checks.”  These checks are typically required by lending institutions for the full amount of a mortgage when a company or individual takes out a loan for a mortgage.  If a payment is missed, whether due to a lost job or illness or loss of legal status in the UAE, the check is cashed.  It promptly bounces, and forms the basis for a criminal charge.

Many of the underlying Red Notices for such checks were reportedly removed from INTERPOL’s website, and change seemed to be afoot.  But not so fast.

While the UAE has decriminalized security check bouncing for its nationals who have agreed to participate in a type of loan forgiveness/repayment program, foreign nationals still face criminal charges for bounced security checks, regardless of the reason for the insufficient funds.

Some may ask why one shouldn’t face criminal charges and extradition for bouncing a check, particularly when the check is written for such a significant value as is typcial of most mortgages.  The answer is that, while UAE law requires a fraudulent intent at the time the check is written in order to form the basis for a criminal charge, that intent is routinely overlooked and assumed in practice in the UAE.  In other words, there is no distinction between the debtor who is forced to leave the UAE after losing his job, and therefore his legal status there, and the debtor who intentionally abandons his duty to pay a mortgage obligation.

Likewise, financial institutions seem to be making no such distinctions.  Anecdotally, there is recent evidence that financial institutions routinely threaten INTERPOL action against their debtors, and collection agencies openly refer to INTERPOL as one of their collection tools.

All of this activity is still occurring, despite the fact that the banking industry in the UAE has recognized that utilizing security checks is an outdated and ineffective means of securing loans.

The result of the UAE’s ongoing policy regarding foreign nationals and bounced security checks is that they still become (or remain) Red Notice subjects when security checks bounce.  This is true whether the reason for the bounced check is within the debtor’s control or not, and that fact makes the UAE’s bounced check charges inappropriate for Red Notices under INTERPOL’s rules.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

The issue of Russia’s request for INTERPOL’s help in locating William Browder was previously covered here.  Mr. Browder sought the removal of his data from INTERPOL’s files, and his request was granted.  Since that time, Russia’s interest in Mr. Browder has continued, and earlier this week, Russia requested a Red Notice in Mr. Browder’s name.  

As of yesterday, INTERPOL issued a public statement regarding Russia’s most recent request for INTERPOL’s assistance against Mr. Browder: 

Today, Friday 26 July, INTERPOL received another request from the National Central Bureau of Moscow concerning Mr Browder, this time seeking to locate and arrest Mr Browder with a view to his extradition on a charge of ‘qualified swindling’ as defined by the Russian Penal Code.

INTERPOL considers this charge to be covered by the previous decision of May 2013. Therefore all information related to this request for Mr Browder’s arrest has been deleted from INTERPOL’s databases and all INTERPOL member countries have been informed accordingly.

While it is unusual for INTERPOL to issue a statement regarding a decision to deny or grant a Red Notice request, Mr. Browder’s case is also unusual, particularly in terms of the level of attention his case has received.  INTERPOL went on to explain the publication of the reasoning behind its decision:

INTERPOL has taken the decision to make its decisions and actions public in response to the Russian Federation’s request, given their public statement on the matter.

The issues in Mr. Browder’s case were determined to have been politically motivated and thereby prohibited by INTERPOL’s constitution.

As always, comments and questions are welcomed. 


For a while, it seemed that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) might stop using INTERPOL’s Red Notice system as a private business dispute resolution agency for its financial institutions.  In the UAE, it is common practice for financial institutions to insist that mortgage recipients supply them with a “security check,” or a check for the full amount of the mortgage.  If a debtor falls ill, loses his job, or fails to make a mortgage payment for any other reason, the check is deposited, promptly bounces, and forms the basis for a fraudulent check charge.  The fact that a fraudulent check charge requires fraudulent intent at the time the check was issued is routinely dismissed.

For foreign nationals who left the UAE after losing their jobs or legal status in the UAE and bouncing a security check, the financial institutions turned to INTERPOL.  They sought and received Red Notices against the debtor, regardless of whether the debtor wanted to default on the mortgage or not.

A public outcry and the efforts of several organizations, including Detained in Dubai which is  ably led by Radha Sterling, seemed to have led to the cessation of the UAE’s seeking Red Notices for bounced checks. The UAE’s page on INTERPOL’s website showed a drastic decrease in financial/banking/fraud charges and a higher percentage of what would be considered “ordinary crimes,” such as crimes of violence.

Also, the banking law with respect to bounced checks was changed- but not for foreign nationals.  After an initial report to the contrary, officials from the UAE clarified that the decriminalization of bounced checks would only apply to UAE nationals.

In the next post:  is the UAE still misusing INTERPOL’s Red Notice system for civil collection purposes?

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Ever since INTERPOL rolled out its I-link system in 2009, the organization has faced the issue of how to control those member countries that submit Red Notices in violation of INTERPOL’s rules and governing texts. Remember that I-link allows member countries to directly upload Red Notices for immediate circulation to all other member countries, without first requiring a check for validity by the Secretary General of INTERPOL.  Naturally, this capability increased the efficiency of information sharing between member countries.  

It also increased the ability, and probably the instances, of misuse by member countries.  In his 2012 speech to INTERPOL’s General Assembly, the Chairman of the CCF, Billy Hawkes, noted that the increased capabilities of the member countries was not without additional obligations:

But with increased authority comes increased responsibility. The Commission has been concerned to ensure that NCBs have the tools to discharge this new responsibility in a way that respects the rights of individuals. This is a responsibility of all personnel of NCBs. But the role of the Data Protection Officer is particularly important. It is essential that these officers have the knowledge and independence to challenge inappropriate uses of the I-Link system and of INTERPOL’s tools.

. . . NCBs and their Data Protection Officers are the first line of defence in relation to data protection.

Mr. Hawkes made clear that the role of the Data Protection Officer within the NCB is not the mere “rubber-stamping” of Red Notice requests that are submitted by a member country’s various law enforcement agencies, but to challenge inappropriate uses of INTERPOL’s tools.

Given the number of erroneously, or otherwise wrongly, issued Red Notices that come to our attention even by anecdote, it would be interesting to know how many Red Notice requests are challenged by NCB officials every year.  I don’t think it would be unfair to guess that that number is relatively low, and much lower than it ought to be.

As always, comments and questions are welcomed.

The case of Edward Snowden has not been discussed in this blog until now because INTERPOL is reportedly not involved in Mr. Snowden’s case, and no Red Notice exists in his name.  The case does, however, provide an interesting opportunity to address how the relationships between multiple countries can affect a wanted person’s ability to travel.

The United States has received extraordinary levels of cooperation from its allies in an effort to make Mr. Snowden’s travel via air almost impossible, with Austria going so far as to force Bolivian president Evo Morales’ jet to land in Austria while flying over its airspace.

Mr. Snowden reportedly plans to seek political asylum in one of the countries that has offered that relief to him- Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua-but he has not been able to leave the Moscow airport because most travel routes to any of those countries requires flight over either the United States or its allies.

Mr. Snowden has now turned to at least two internationally renowned human rights organizations for possible assistance.  He has reportedly asked for meetings with Transparency International and Amnesty International.  Both organizations are reported to have accepted his invitation to meet.  Last week, the organization strongly condemned the United States’ actions against Mr. Snowden, characterizing U.S. efforts as “deplorable.”

The request for assistance from human rights organizations is based, according to a written statement by Mr. Snowden, on the United States’ frustration of Mr. Snowden’s asylum seeking efforts:

“In recent weeks we have witnessed an unlawful campaign by officials in the U.S. overnment to deny my right to seek and enjoy this asylum under Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Snowden wrote.

While Mr. Snowden’s case is extreme in terms of publicity, it is not unusual for countries to work together in diplomatic efforts to return a wanted person to the requesting country.  All of the countries that have worked in support of the United States are also member countries of INTERPOL, but their efforts have arisen from their diplomatic relations, not from their INTERPOL membership.  Although INTERPOL’s assistance is often very useful and often triggers extradition proceedings, Mr. Snowden’s case makes it clear that it is not critical to extradition, particularly when a wanted person’s whereabouts are thought to be known.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A reader recently sent in this question:  

If you were trying to ascertain someone’s red notice status, and had followed the correct channels when inquiring with Interpol, could they still ignore you? If so why, and how else would you acquire this information without being arrested in the process? Just to clarify, I’m not an international criminal on the run, just curious.

The reader’s question taps into a particularly frustrating fact:  most INTERPOL Red Notices are not published on INTERPOL’s wanted pages.  INTERPOL’s rules allow for member countries to either keep their Red Notices private, and available only to law enforcement agencies, or to publish them on the website.

As the reader’s question indicates, the more obvious way to inquire as to one’s INTERPOL status would be to present oneself to any police department and inquire.  That approach naturally carries with it the risk of arrest and detention.

Another approach, as referenced by the reader, is to inquire directly with INTERPOL.  INTERPOL may answer the inquiry, but may also refusing to answer the question if the member country that requested the notice does not want the notice to be published.  In my experience, however, inquiries are normally met with a timely response and not ignored.  Whether the response is the desired one is a different question.  Non-publication makes sense when one considers that a person who is unaware of his Red Notice status is more likely to travel and be apprehended, which is the purpose of every Red Notice.  Red Notices are not arrest warrants, but the two are similar in that they are often more effective when their subject is unaware of their existence.  

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.