Red Notice Law Journal - Red Notices, International Extradition, and Perspective

Last week, INTERPOL issued a press release confirming that it had modified the Red Notice against Sayed Abdel Latif, and that the modification was made at the request of Egypt's National Central Bureau ("NCB") in Cairo.  The stated reason for the modification was that the charges listed in the Red Notice were incorrect, and had apparently been incorrect for over twelve years, despite Egypt's repeated representations to INTERPOL that the charges were accurate.

Mr. Abdel Latif is in Australia seeking asylum.  He was originally listed as a wanted subject for the crimes of premeditated murder, destruction of property, and possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives without a permit.  The actual charges that remain listed on the Red Notice are membership of an illegally-formed extremist organization and forging travel documents for the organization’s members.  His attorney maintains that even these remaining charges are false.

What is interesting to note is the timing of Egypt's request for the Red Notice correction.  Mr. Abdel Latif was detained by Australian authorities, and Australian law enforcement officials relied upon the Red Notice in its treatment of Mr. Abdel Latif.  

His case attracted attention when Australian officials expressed dismay that Mr. Abel Latif had been in detention for an extended period of time without his status as a Red Notice subject and "jihadist terrorist" being known to them.  Efforts to understand the possible security lapse led to substantial public discussion about the case.

Advocates who worked on Mr. Abdel Latif's behalf raised questions as to the validity of the underlying charges listed in the Red Notice, as well as the fact that his conviction was obtained through a trial in absentia.  Egypt's problematic use of trials in absentia to obtain convictions has raised due process and human rights violation issues, as discussed here previously.  Ultimately, the security concerns raised by Australian officials evolved into questions about the validity of the underlying charges for the Red Notice.  Egypt finally, after twelve years, recognized that the information it had provided to INTERPOL was false.  (The question of whether the remaining charges are politically motivated or otherwise invalid is also subject to speculation, as discussed here.)

While the request for the correction came from Egypt, that request was only made when it became politically impossible for Egypt to do otherwise.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

Readers of this blog know that one of the stories we've been following has been the plight of the non-governmental workers who were charged with crimes related to their journalistic activities in Egypt.  

The reason that this story is appropriate for a blog about INTERPOL is that Egypt sought Red Notices for those workers who had left the country prior to the charges being filed.  INTERPOL properly rejected Egypt's request for those Red Notices because of the political nature of the charges.

Now we have the disappointing news that 43 NGO workers, both Egyptian and non-Egyptian, have been found guilty of the charges.  The story is here.

Those individuals who managed to leave Egypt prior to the trial, or prior to sentencing, are unlikely to ever serve their sentences because of the fact that they are not Red Notice subjects and that INTERPOL's channels will not be used to facilitate their extradition.  They will, however, need to use caution when travelling abroad, and will need to consider the diplomatic relations between the countries they visit and Egypt.  

The international community benefits immensely from the work of people such as those who were recently convicted, and to the extent that this case has a chilling effect on journalistic efforts, the international community will also suffer.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

We know that Egypt has attempted to utilize its access to INTERPOL's databases for political reasons against people who posed ideological threats to the current government, and more recently, to a political opponent of its current president.  In accordance with its own constitution, INTERPOL has rightly refused to become involved in (or stay involved in) such politically motivated matters.  Egypt has also at least threatened to seek INTERPOL's involvement in religiously based criminal offenses.

But what of other, less obvious violations of INTERPOL's rules?  If Egypt is willing to violate INTERPOL's rules in order to prosecute individuals, is it also willing to violate its own due process laws in order to obtain convictions?  The case of Wael Abbas is summed up here, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR")"

Award-winning digital journalist Wael Abbas was charged with selling communications services without a license, and because neither he nor his lawyers were ever informed of the trial date, he was sentenced in absentia to six months in prison and fined 500 Egyptian pounds ($86).

THe UNHCR went on to point out that, while the conviction was ultimately thrown out, the threat of multiple charges for the same alleged crime is also a very real threat in Egypt.

Even assuming that Egypt were to follow its own criminal procedure laws, Egyptian law does not contain the internationally accepted safeguards that allow for a due process compliant trial in absentia.  The problems with Egypt's form of trial in absentia were aptly described by Human Rights Watch in its Q & A column about the trial of Hosni Mubarak:

Trying a defendant in absentia can undermine some of the defendant’s basic rights to a fair trial, including the right to be present, to be defended by counsel of the person’s choice, and to examine witnesses. International law disfavors but does not prohibit trials in absentia. National systems that maintain the practice should, at a minimum, institute procedural safeguards to ensure the defendant’s basic rights. These include requirements that the defendant be notified in advance of the proceedings and that the defendant unequivocally and explicitly waive his right to be present. The defendant should also have the right to representation in his or her absence, and should be able to obtain a fresh determination on the merits of the conviction following the person’s return to the jurisdiction.

Egyptian law does not meet these minimum requirements... Egyptian law does not include any procedural safeguards requiring that the court take into account whether the defendant’s absence was by choice or assess whether a defendant unequivocally and explicitly waived the right to be present before deciding to proceed with a trial in absentia.

Given that we have seen Egypt's pattern and practice of using, and attempting to use, its access to INTERPOL's tools in an abusive fashion in political and religious cases, there is no basis to believe that Egypt does not also misuse that access to further its goals in criminal cases where gross due process violations have occurred.  When the goal is a criminal conviction regardless of the means by which the conviction is obtained, no other motivation is necessary for a member country to violate INTERPOL's rules.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

The offices of Amnesty International in Russia were recently raided as part of an "audit," as reported in the New York Times by David Herszenhorn and Andrew Roth, here.  Amnesty International is a leading non-governmental organization (NGOs) that provides in-depth and ongoing reports and information on the status of various human rights issues in countries around the world.  

The raid on Amnesty International is the most recent in a series of actions taken by the Russian government to tighten control over NGOs that provide human rights observation and advocacy services. Russian law now requires any nonprofit organizations that receive financing from abroad to register as "foreign agents."  The inspections that have resulted from this policy have appeared to focus on advocacy groups in particular.

The significance of this particular brand of oppressive activity is that it often results in the NGO being forced to reduce its functions in the oppressive country, or to leave the country altogether.  John Dalhuisen, Amnesty International’s Europe and Central Asia director, articulated his concern about Amnesty International's future in Russia in a statement issued last week:

 “There has long been a fear that Russia’s new NGO law would be used to target prominent critical organizations,” said John Dalhuisen, Amnesty International’s Europe and Central Asia director. “The spate of inspections in recent weeks appears to confirm this suspicion. The bigger fear is that this is just round one, and that, after the smearing, the forced closures will come.

For those people who find themselves to be the subjects of Red Notices, the work of NGOs such as Amnesty International could not be more significant.  When challenging a Red Notice, it is often necessary to place an individual's own experience into the context of a country's ongoing practices, and to provide documented proof of a country's history of human rights violations.  

Without the consistent and documented observations of reputable human rights organizations, it would be difficult to provide any substantive evidence of a given country's history and pattern of human rights violations. And once the NGOs are attacked, it becomes increasingly difficult for other advocacy groups to maintain a voice of any kind.  Human rights observers will recall that Egypt conducted a this type of campaign against various NGOs in 2012.

About this time last year, we addressed a very similar situation in Egypt, wherein NGO workers were being arrested for working for unregistered agencies.  With the passage of time, and fewer observers and protections in place, we now see that activists are being targeted for prosecution.  Associated Press reporters Hamza Hendawi and Saral El Deeb report that five promininet activits in opposition to Egyptian President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are the subject of arrest warrants.  In their report, here, Hendawi and El Deeb point out that the five activists who are the subjects of the warrants were at the forefront of the 2011 uprising against former President Hosni Mubarark.  Is anyone surprised?

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

INTERPOL is dedicated to providing global cooperation between the law enforcement agencies for all of its member countries.  Obviously, the primary goal of an organization such as INTERPOL is enforcement of the laws of its respective countries.  But what happens when one country's rule of law is completely out-of-step with that of other member countries?  How does international law enforcement work then?

In the case of religious law violations, it doesn't.  INTERPOL's member countries include many with strict, religious-based codes, that provide for severe penalties for religious transgressions.  When a person accused of violating those laws absconds, the member country may request INTERPOL's assistance in apprehending the person.  According to INTERPOL's constitution, INTERPOL should refuse that request.

Article 3 of INTERPOL's constitution is most often cited for its prohibition on any involvement with matters that are primarily political in nature.  However, religiously motivated charges are also prohibited:

"It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, or religious or racial character."

Article, 3, constitution of INTERPOL.

When member countries utilizes INTERPOL's I-Link system, which allows for Red Notices to be entered into INTERPOL's databases without quality checks being made prior to entry, it is possible that inappropriate Red Notices may be issues.  This possibility certainly exists for crimes based on religious violations as well as politically motivated criminal charges.  

If a person is the subject of an improperly issued Red Notice due to its being religiously based, it is important for that fact to be brought to INTERPOL's attention in a challenge to the Red Notice.  Violations of INTERPOL's constitution provide for valid grounds for the Notice to be destroyed.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Today's post is the third in a series of posts addressing the CCF's Annual Report for 2011 and focuses on the relationship between the CCF and the General Secretariat.  

The CCF is the arm of INTERPOL charged with the protection and monitoring of data processed by INTERPOL.  The General Secretariat has the authority to either accept or reject the CCF's recommended responses to challenges against Red Notices.

In its 2011 Annual Report, the CCF noted that the General Secretariat accepted all of the Commission's recommendations regarding the validity of data processed by INTERPOL.  While there is a procedure in place for that dictates the protocol for instances in which the General Secretariat disagrees with the Commission, no such scenarios arose in 2011 that required the implementation of that procedure. 

Because of the fact that the CCF holds the position of guardian of individual rights within INTERPOL, this is good news for Red Notice subjects and their attorneys.  It remains true that fighting a Red Notice is an uphill battle due to the presumption of validity that cloaks every Red Notice.  However, the  lack of discord between the General Secretariat and the CCF indicates a high level of respect for the CCF's decisions, including its decisions to delete improper data from its databases.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

For the next several posts, the focus of this blog will be on the issues raised and discussed in the 2011 Annual Report by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files ("CCF"), found here.  Every year, the CCF issues its report, focusing on INTERPOL's accomplishments and challenges from the CCF's vantage point.  This year, the 2011 report was presented on November 8 by the Chairman of the CCF to INTERPOL's General Assembly, which took place in Rome, Italy.

The CCF does an admirable job of publicly highlighting the problems faced by INTERPOL and by its member countries, and credibly appears to take seriously its obligation of balancing law enforcement interests with individual human rights.

Among the challenges to be corrected, the CCF noted the rather pervasive problem of member countries' National Central Bureaus ("NCB's") failing to advise INTERPOL when a Red Notice was no longer valid.  The CCF reported that, even when a Red Notice subject had been arrested and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the Notice frequently remained live.

Experience showed that NCBs generally did not follow up such information and only rarely informed the General Secretariat that the person had served his or her sentence.

A fellow attorney contacted me recently with a common question.  The inquiry was as follows:

After I requested that a Red Notice against my client be removed, I received no answer, but it disappeared from INTERPOL's website.  Can I assume that it has been removed?

As with any question about assumptions, the answer is that one shouldn't assume, but should verify.

First, it should be noted that any request regarding the validity of a Red Notice should be met with a response regarding admissibility in thirty days.  In my experience, such responses have always been forthcoming within that timeframe.

Second, while it is possible that the Notice has been removed from INTERPOL's databases, it is also possible that it has not.  The Notice may have become the subject of an inquiry regarding its validity.

Additionally, it is possible that the country that requested the Notice in the first place later requested that it not be published on the website any longer.  Recall that the decision to publish a Red Notice is made by the requesting country, and the requesting country is the owner of the information supplied to INTERPOL. Moreover, the vast majority of Red Notices are unpublished.

Instead of assuming, a better approach would be to directly inquire with the CCF (the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files), INTERPOL's processor of personal information, regarding the status of the matter.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Not too far in the future, INTERPOL's General Assembly will gather in Rome for its annual meeting.  The General Assembly is charged with making decisions about how the organization will be run in the coming year, and considers everything from general policy matters to resources to electing the members of the Executive Committee.  From November 5- November 8, the General Assembly will consider these issues, among others.

This year, we humbly request that the General Assembly acknowledge that the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF) is in need of additional resources.  The time it takes to obtain a response to some appeals for relief can be excruciating for attorney and client alike.  Were there more resources made available to the CCF, the rapidly rising number of Red Notice challenges could be more efficiently addressed, and in a more timely fashion.  When we say "more resources," here's what we mean:

1. More staff.  By increasing the number of staff assigned to the CCF, cases will be reviewed and prepared for sessions at a quicker rate than is currently the case.
2. More sessions.  The CCF has been meeting three times per year, which is the minimum number of sessions allowed per year according to INTERPOL's rules.  By increasing the number of sessions, CCF members would be allowed more time for the consideration of individual requests for relief.
3. More funding.  As the number of Red Notices (and other notices, for that matter) increase, the number of requests for relief increase as well.  Funding must increase in an amount that is commensurate with the demands placed on the CCF if it is to function effectively.

An increase in these resources would also serve as an opportunity for INTERPOL to lend credence to its stated goal of respecting the rights of individuals and ensuring that its member countries are acting in compliance with INTERPOL's governing rules and texts.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

When clients or attorneys ask me what an INTERPOL Red Notice is, I often answer that it's similar to what we would call a BOLO in the United States.  A BOLO, or Be On the Lookout, is an announcement dissiminated to law enforcement officials that describes a criminal suspect in an effort to have him or her apprehended quickly after a crime has occurred.

Similarly, a Red Notice is a request issued by INTERPOL on behalf of any of its 190 member countries, and its goal is to apprehend a criminal suspect or convict who has fled to another country.  

One difference between a BOLO and a Red Notice is that the BOLO is intended to be dissiminated in the time immediately following a crime, with little expectation that the BOLO will remain active for much time afterwards if the suspect is not apprehended.  A Red Notice, on the other hand, can remain active for years, as long as certain of INTERPOL's criteria are met.

A man from El Salvador recently felt the effect of Red Notice's longevity when he was deported from the United States to El Salvador for a crime alleged to have been committed in 1999.  His Red Notice caused United States immigration officials to learn about his wanted status all these years later, as reported here by Bob Egelko of the San Francisco Chronicle.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

I recently read an online inquiry by a Red Notice subject who had been advised that her Red Notice was "in the process of being removed" by the prosecuting attorney.  The subject wondered how long the removal would take.

Every INTERPOL member country has its own National Central Bureau (NCB), which acts as a liaison with INTERPOL itself.  Red Notices are issued at the request of the member countries, and the information contained in the Red Notice, as well as the information contained in the files kept by INTERPOL, actually belongs to the member country that supplies that information to INTERPOL. That ownership was discussed in more detail here (back when INTERPOL had only 188 member countries.)

The requesting member country may decide to publicize the Red Notice or not, and also may decide to withdraw the information at any point.  For example, if a Red Notice is no longer needed because a person has been acquitted or an underlying charging document has been found to be invalid, the member country has the capability of instructing its NCB to arrange the removal of its information from INTERPOL's files.

Once such a decision has been made, the removal can and should be almost immediate.  If the member country is efficient, the subject should not need an attorney to facilitate that process.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

We last addressed the matter of Paul Watson, the leader of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society ("SSCS"), and INTERPOL back in May, when Watson was arrested in Germany.  That arrest was made at the request of Costa Rica, for activity alleged to have occurred over ten years ago, and the arrest did not involve INTERPOL.  INTERPOL issued a press release at that time indicating that its denial of a Red Notice was based on a lack of compliance with its constitution and rules.  

Now, however, things have changed.  INTERPOL has confirmed that it has issued Red Notices in Mr. Watson's name on behalf of both Costa Rica and Japan.

Prior to the second Red Notice being issued, Watson's German attorney, Oliver Wallasch, issued a letter to SSCS. The letter has been publicized and explains the situation from the attorney's perspective.

Obviously, Watson's travel will either be curtailed until the Red Notices are addressed, or he will likely be detained if he attempts to exit or enter any INTERPOL member country while the Notices are outstanding.

Whether Watson decides to formally challenge the Notices remains to be seen.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A reader sent in this series of questions, which are good ones for INTERPOL newbies:

1. Can a country member of Interpol get a red notice, if this country has sentenced a person in absence, without this person having been stopped and obviously without having knowledge that in some country she was prosecuted or sentenced? 

2. Are the condemnations valid dictated in a person's absence and without detention nor previous knowledge of the one imputed, so that Interpol issues a Red Notice?

3. The condemnations in absence are contrary to the Universal declaration of Human rights, is Interpol able to issue the red notice against this declaration?

It is true that a person may be tried and convicted in absentia in some countries. If the underlying charges and the judicial proceedings were handled in accordance with the country's rule of law, then INTERPOL very well may issue a Red Notice at that country's request.

On the other hand, if the proceedings were contrary to the country's laws, then the Red Notice may be subject to challenge and eventual removal. Likewise, if the proceedings were violative of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Red Notice removal may be appropriate.

The one certainty is this: if INTERPOL doesn't know that the proceedings were illegal, the Red Notice will remain in effect.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A reader recently posed this question:

I would like to know if you can asnwer my questions. I know of a person, Ethiopian citizen, which has been red-noticed. The individual has committed crimes in the US and has been now hiding for the past 14 years in Ethiopia. I have met this man and he is very violent and dangerous.

How can I make sure that this man gets apprehended and the families of the victims get justice? Do you think he can get extradited to the US?

The issue of extradition to any INTERPOL member country will depend on the nature of the extradition treaty between the two countries (if one exists) and the possibly the nature of the diplomatic relations between the countries.  The list of countries having extradition treaties with the United States can be found here. (Regarding the reader's specific question, Ethiopia does not have such a treaty with the United States, but the countries do maintain diplomatic relations.)

 In terms of "making sure" that a Red Notice subject is apprehended, that may be beyond the control of any particular person.  Naturally, it is more likely that a person will be apprehended if he or she has contact with law enforcement officials who are aware of their Red Notice status than if no such contact ever occurs.

Obviously, if there are problems with the validity of the Red Notice and the subject challenges the notice, it may be withdrawn, modified, or destroyed.  Assuming that the notice is valid in every respect, then it can be instrumental in aiding in a subject's apprehension.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Once upon a time, a business with interests abroad had little reason to consider INTERPOL in its evaluation of whether to accept international business opportunities.  That time is no longer.

As INTERPOL grows and its member countries have increasing contact with one another both politically and economically, so grows the need for private businesses to conduct previously unheard-of analyses of costs and benefits.  INTERPOL receives requests for Red Notices not only for people accused of violent crimes, terrorism, and human trafficking, but also for people alleged to have been involved in business gone bad.

For those accustomed to a more Western approach to business issues, there is a frequently held assumption that an unsuccessful business transaction or plan will result in nothing more than lost future oppportuniities or, at the worst, a civil law suit.  In many other countries, however, the loss of money by one party can quickly become a criminal matter for the other party. When this transformation of a civil matter into a criminal matter takes place in an INTERPOL member country, the member country may request a Red Notice after criminal charges are filed.

How does this play out?  Even if the accused party is innocent, and even if that party has always conducted business activity from outside the member country, once criminal charges are filed, the accused party becomes the subject of a Red Notice.  Whether the Red Notice was properly requested or not, the now-subject of the Red Notice is left to either challenge the propriety of the Red Notice or live with the fact that she can no longer travel for business or pleasure and is subject to being detained.

Just like grandmother used to say, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.  A business considering international contracts or endeavors would be well-served to research the country of concern prior to engaging in that activity.  Questions to be answered in advance by a company or its attorney should be:

• How does the country treat debtors?
• Does the country have a history of jailing people for primarily civil matters?
• How does the country's judicial system regard failed business transactions?
• Does the country have a high level of corruption?

Obviously, if these inquiries are not made by the interested company, the individual charged with conducting the international activities will need to research those issues prior to becoming involved.  Only once the answers to these questions are known should a new business concern with an INTERPOL member country begin.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In the last post, we addressed the fact that the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF) is still required under its operating rules to meet only three times per year.  This requirement has remained the same in spite of the fact that the Commission's requests for relief have continued to increase over the last few years.  Based on the rate of new Red Notices being issued currently, there is every reason to believe that individual requests to the Commission will continue to climb year after year.

Even though INTERPOL missed out on a great opportunity to amend the CCF's operating rules along with so many other rules when it modified so many other rules and created its new Rules on the Processing of Data, not to worry.  The Commission can still greatly increase its productivity without modifiying its rules.

The current Operating Rules of the CCF, specifically Article 36, require that the Commission meet "at least three times a year." This means that the Commission has authority to meet much more frequently than it currently does.  It also means that the three yearly sessions, as scheduled for 2012, are the bare minimum allowed under its rules.

Given the workload now faced by the Commission, it's time for more than the bare minimum number of meetings.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

INTERPOL's most well-known tool, the Red Notice, exists to aid its member countries' law enforcement efforts for the following purpose:

To seek the arrest or provisional arrest of wanted persons with a view to extradition.

Member countries are required to be responsive to requests for supporting documentation regarding the grounds for an extradition request once a Red Notice subject has been detained.  The requests may come from INTERPOL or directly from the detaining member country.

So what happens when a Red Notice exists, but the requesting country fails to follow through on its extradition obligations?  

The effect of a county's non-response to requests for extradition-related information is that the subject of the Red Notice may be released within the country where she currently finds herself, but she certainly risks detention again if she travels to other countries.  

If there is no valid reason for that failure, then the member country's request is not being used for the appropriate purpose as set forth in INTERPOL's governing rules.  Where the party making use of INTERPOL's tools obstructs the underlying purpose of the rules, then the Red Notice subject very well may have a cognizable claim for relief. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A reader recently inquired as to how a Red Notice requested by Country "A" could remain outstanding in his name when his own country, Country "B," had found a complete lack of evidence for the charges after an investigation.

This reader's problem is rooted in the fact that it is the underlying criminal charges, as stated in the Red Notice from the requesting country, that must be addressed for Red Notice purposes.  The reason a Red Notice is issued is to aid in the return of the subject to the requesting country, not for another country to conduct its own investigation into the matter.

If Country "A" still has valid grounds and supporting documentation for the underlying charges, and has not agreed to an investigation and prosecution in Country "B," then it is quite likely that the Red Notice will remain outstanding absent a proper challenge.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In response to the last post on the significant events between Egypt, the U.S., and INTERPOL, and particularly regarding INTERPOL's stated offer to clarify matters regarding its involvement in a given matter, a reader left this comment:

Thanks for the great work in this area Michelle.  My wife, one of the named individuals in this case attempted to contact INTERPOL here in Washington and their automated system says if you are a private citizen to press 3.  At which point you get a recorded message indicating they will not talk to you.

Pushing the issue and contacting the public affairs person she was not given information to assist her regarding the diffusion notice or risks if she travels.  She was told "contact your local law enforcement."

 Interpol has NOT reached out to the individuals involved in this egregious use of the diffusion system, a secretive process with no legal recourse, to assist in any way.

The reader's frustration is understandable, as INTERPOL can be difficult to navigate.  It helps to understand, however, that there is a significant difference between INTERPOL and its member countries' National Central Bureaus.  That difference accounts for the fact that any inquiries (regarding the status of an individual's information with INTERPOL) to any entity outside of the actual organization called INTERPOL headquartered in Lyon, France, will likely be fruitless.  

National Central Bureaus for member countries serve as their countries' liaisons between INTERPOL and the member countries.  While they work closely with INTERPOL, they are not branches or divisions of INTERPOL. The National Central Bureau for the United States, for example, unfortunately refers to itself as INTERPOL Washington.  It is operated by the Department of Justice, not by INTERPOL.  Thus, when one reasonably believes she is dealing with INTERPOL, she is in fact dealing with the law enforcement officials of the United States government.

Regarding the idea of INTERPOL- the real one, the one in France- reaching out to the aggrieved individuals to offer assistance, such action would seem contrary to the procedures set forth in INTERPOL's opoerating rules.  A response to an individual's formal request is certainly a reasonable expectation, and has always been forthcoming in my experience.  Whether the response is satisfactory or not, obviously varies. 

INTERPOL would likely argue that it does provide recourse to those individuals affected by improper diffusions and Red Notices.   The simple fact is that, for private citizens and attorneys accustomed to an open, transparent, public legal process, INTERPOL's procedures can be difficult to comprehend or accept. The organization is an animal unlike any other.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

Who should be outraged by Egypt's recent move to obtain Red Notices against NGO staff members? Out of basic concern for the human condition, all of us.  More specifically, and more selfishly, those of us who rely on the activities and findings of international journalists and non-governmental organization (NGO) workers should be very concerned about Egypt's recent activities.  

Egypt is seeking Red Notices in the names of 43 people, including 17 American NGO workers who are alleged to have worked for their respective organizations in Egypt without the proper licenses, and has asked the U.S. for assistance in locating those individuals. Those sought by Egypt include people affiliated with the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI).

For the alleged offense of operating without a license, Egyptian officials seek the extradition and prosecution of each individual.  As reported here, the U.S. government is engaged in talks with Egypt and INTERPOL to prevent the subject Red Notices from being issued.  

Let us hope those discussions are successful in preventing the issuance of Red Notices, because collectively, we will suffer if the voices of these individuals are silenced.  

If you thought it was bad when country-to-country cables published by Wikileaks were unavailable due to funding issues, or when Wikipedia blacked out for twenty-four hours, imagine how difficult it would be to accomplish the following without the verified and unbiased information provided by trained international journalists, human rights watch organizations, and political observers:

1. Engaging in the preparation of an asylum petition for a client, without access to current reports from organizations such as Amnesty International regarding country conditions or political persecution.
2. Monitoring international elections on behalf of a professional organization without being able to rely on the monitoring efforts of organizations such as Freedom House or National Democratic Institute.
3. Researching and organizing a challenge to an INTERPOL Red Notice based on politically motivated grounds without current information regarding the issuing country's political activities, such as harassment of dissidents, retaliatory detention, or disparate treatment of political opponents.

I can't think of many attorneys who have the time, the skill, or quite honestly, the guts, to travel from country to country to gather the information provided by these organizations.  Without the work of investigative journalists and NGO's, we will lose access to quality information regarding country conditions, human rights violations, and the integrity of elections.  This information makes up the substance of much of the work we do.

To maintain its international credibility, Egypt should reconsider its position on this issue.  Absent that, the U.S. should stand strong in its position in support of its citizens and against the issuance of Red Notices in their names.  By all current indications, the U.S. is doing just that.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Next time:  what it takes to get the information out of a country and into a country report.

If a Red Notice subject applies for and is granted political asylum in a given country, does that necessarily mean that his claim to INTERPOL of politically motivated criminal charges will be successful?

And if a Red Notice subject's claim to INTERPOL that his Red Notice is based on a politically motivated criminal charge succeeds, does that necessarily mean that his petition for political asylum will be granted?

No and no.  While this may seem counterintuitive, success (or failure) on one front does not dictate the same result on the other front.  To understand why, imagine that a client has a Red Notice from Ethiopia and also seeks political asylum in the United States.

Claims for political asylum are made to the appropriate governmental bodies within the varying countries.  In our example, a political asylum claim made in the United States is submitted to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the form of an application, or if the applicant is outside the United States, he may submit a refugee claim to the nearest U.S. Consulate or DHS office.  The regulations governing U.S. proceedings must be followed if a favorable result is to be had.

On the other hand, a request for relief from an INTERPOL Red Notice is handled by the appropriate body within INTERPOL.  An application for relief must follow the rules and texts that govern INTERPOL, and those rules and texts are completely independent of those in the United States.

In this example, one sees that the United States could arrive at a completely different decision than INTERPOL. Our Red Notice subject could thereby prevail on his Red Notice issue but still be denied political asylum in the United States, or vice versa.  In order to succeed, each matter must be given careful consideration, time and attention as the attorney prepares with the client.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

As much as we may complain about some NCB's (National Central Bureaus) behaving improperly with respect to their INTERPOL duties,  it's always nice to hear that others handle their responsibilities properly.

A few months ago, I spoke with a subject of a Red Notice from Denmark who had agreed to be extradited in order to resolve the matter.  Once he was in Denmark, he closed his criminal case.  The next natural step in a perfect world would have been that Denmark's officials, of their own accord, would have requested from Denmark's NCB that the Notice be destroyed since it was no longer valid.  As it turns out, that's exactly what happened, and the Notice was removed almost immediately.

More recently, a Red Notice subject with an issue arising from the United Arab Emirates was able to resolve his underlying criminal case.  The UAE ensured that its NCB destroyed the Red Notice accordingly.  That's how INTERPOL's tools are supposed to be used:  fairly, quickly and efficiently.  

We all know that it doesn't always happen the way it should; this post is about giving credit where credit is due.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

MSNBC reporter Greg Keller writes that twenty-five suspected members of Anonymous were arrested in connection with hacking into various law enforcement databases.  An investigation that began in mid-February led to the arrests.  

Now it is being reported that INTERPOL's website also may have been the victim of an attack by Anonymous when its website crashed briefly on Tuesday after the arrests were announced.

Questions arise in my mind regarding the extent of the invasion, if any truly occurred, on the website by Anonymous. Specifically, I would like to know whether:

1. Anonymous has previously breached INTERPOL's website?
2. Anonymous made changes to the substantive information about Red Notice subjects on the INTERPOL website?
3. Is an attorney's already difficult job of challenging Red Notices going to become even more so by the resulting confusion?

I pose these questions because of concerns expressed by clients that information regarding their cases has been modified after they were initially made public on the INTERPOL website.  Previously, these questions would be directed to the appropriate party within INTERPOL.  Now, however, I suppose that I am asking Anonymous.

So, Anonymous, what say you?  How far into INTERPOL's business have you been, and have you made any changes to its website?

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In a recent MSNBC.com article, Ian Johnston reports on some of the frustrations experienced by Red Notice subjects as they attempt to challenge their Red Notices.  He addresses the issue of possibly pending lawsuits against INTERPOL as a means of changing the manner in which a Red Notice is issued or challenged.

Although such efforts are in very early stages, and previous similar efforts have failed, INTERPOL has long been aware of the possibility of such legal action and governs itself accordingly.  In its 2010 Annual Activity Report, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files ("CCF") recognized its possible vulnerability to lawsuits.  Specifically, the CCF lauded INTERPOL's decision to have its Constitution registered with the United Nations Charter as a means of solidifying its status as an international organization operating under international law.  The CCF noted that such status would

              "enhance INTERPOL's immunity from legal process vis-a-vis     

                    national courts in all of its member countries."

The CCF went on to highlight the fact that its I-link project (discussed in more detail here and in the next post) has created a significant likelihood that INTERPOL and its NCBs would both be liable in the event that a Red Notice subject was prejudiced by the inappropriate entry of information into its databases.

This concern was echoed in CCF Chairman Billy Hawkes' speech to the General Assembly in November of 2011.  As always, his speech was both respectful and frank.  He discussed the CCF's concern that, at that time, the appropriate control mechanisms for the I-Link project had not been implemented in a timely fashion.  He further acknowledged that the data quality of information processed through the I-Link system would determine whether National Central Bureaus of member countries could properly rely on Red Notices.

It is clear that the CCF is both aware of the issue of potential liability for INTERPOL's actions and actively working to ensure that INTERPOL does not process information improperly.  Mr. Hawkes rightly observed that "for an Organisation of 190 members, this will always be a significant challenge."  But if the appropriate safeguards are not in place, that challenge becomes unwieldy, and perhaps, impossible.

Next time:  more on I-Link.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

How many bribes does it take to get a Red Notice removed?  While this sounds like the lead-in to a bad joke, for many people facing Red Notices, it is unfortunately a matter that bears consideration.

Let me be clear:  never once have I read, observed, or been advised by anyone about any bribery efforts on the part of anyone who works for INTERPOL.  In fact, to the contrary, in the cases to which I am privy, I have found that INTERPOL's staff members have gone out of their way to avoid any appearance of impropropriety.

The issue of bribery, when it arises, inevitably appears in the judicial and executive branches of government of the member countries that request Red Notices.  Subjects report requests for bribes from National Central Bureau ("NCB") officials (who are employees of the member countries, not of INTERPOL), arresting officers, judges, prosecuting attorneys, and other judicial and law enforcement officials.

Red Notice subjects have complained regarding the issue of bribery in so many member countries that the question has to be asked at some point, are they all lying?  While any person charged with a crime arguably has a motive to lie, should we not also recognize that these individual, un-verifiable reports take on credibility after they are made repeatedly from different sources at different times under different circumstances?

Member countries interact with INTERPOL via their own governmental officials who work at NCBs, which serve as the liaisons between the countries and INTERPOL.  This arrangement ensures that the people who are in the best position to determine whether a country's laws have been followed- that country's own law enforcement officials- serve as the gatekeepers between the country and INTERPOL. 

It also also creates opportunity for non-INTERPOL staff to introduce corruption into INTERPOL's processes. Every member country's NCB is run by a law enforcement agency assigned by the member country itself.  It is also staffed by employees of the member country, not INTERPOL.  The NCB officials are therefore in a position to decide whether to request a new Red Notice, or to request that one be removed.  In the more corrupt member countries, officials who are so inclined may seek bribes in exchange for either the issuance or removal of the Notice.

If the claims of some Red Notice subjects are true, the subjects are left to decide whether to:

1. pay a bribe, which is likely a crime in both the country where they are wanted and the country in which they reside, 
2. blow the whistle, or 
3. say nothing.  

If they either pay the bribe or report the bribery efforts, they further endanger themselves.  If they do not, they fight the Red Notice while playing by the rules, even though the corrupt member country does not.

Quite a quandry.  

In the next posts, more on this topic.

As always, questions and comments are welcomed.

For people who find themselves the subject of Red Notices, it seems that the more questions they ask, the more confused they become.  Part of this phenomenon is due to the nature of INTERPOL:  it can be difficult to digest the verbiage used by INTERPOL, and the organization's processes and rules are not exactly intuitive.  

A few of the questions that may arise for Red Notice subjects are:

How can INTERPOL issue a Red Notice against me when it's obvious that the charges are false?  INTERPOL allows its member countries to request or issue Red Notices if certain application criteria are met.  Those criteria do not include proof of guilt (although a record of a conviction is acceptable to INTERPOL as well.)  INTERPOL acts as an information conduit, not as a court which determines guilt or innocence.  This question is addressed in more detail in a previous post, here.

Can a lawyer help me?  It depends.  If your case was processed properly and all of the relevant rules, laws, and texts were followed, then no.  Your Red Notice was validly issued and you likely would have no claim for relief.  On the other hand, if the information regarding you was processed in violation of any of the applicable rules, laws, or texts, then you may have a valid claim for relief with INTERPOL and a competent lawyer can assist you with that claim.

How long will INTERPOL take to respond to an application for relief? Again, it depends.  Many variables will determine the length of time it will take to receive a response.  Those variables include:  the timing of your claim in relation to the next scheduled meeting wherein such claims will be considered; the complexity of your claim; and the need for INTERPOL to seek information from the relevant country's National Central Bureau (NCB) regarding the matters raised in your claim.  It is not at all unusual for Red Notice disputes to take months or years to be fully resolved.  Therefore, if you have a Red Notice issue, waiting to address it only adds more time to the final resolution of the matter.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

When challenging a Red Notice, a lawyer has to be cognizant of many issues, not the least of which is the client's personal timetable.  But the lawyer must ensure that the client's need for speed does not overcome the more critical element of a complete and persuasive first submission for relief to INTERPOL.

In my experience, by the time the client decides to confront the Red Notice against him, he has already been through an investigation, charges being filed against him, efforts at defense, and flight from (or avoidance of) the country where the accusation lies.  He may have also already spent considerable funds on defense work and investigative efforts of his own.  Unfortunately, he also may have made pro se, and unsuccessful, efforts at resolving his Red Notice.

The client in this situation is exhausted, frustrated, and angry, and wants the Red Notice removed- now.  It can be difficult to explain to the client that his challenge will take time to prepare, perhaps more time than he would like.  But once the attorney explains the reasons for that timetable, the client will likely not only not mind it, but will fully support it.

Why does the first submission for relief to INTERPOL need to be the best possible?  Here's why:

1.  First impressions matter.  Assuming that the same commission members are still sitting from the time of the first application for relief, they very well may recall your case and the fact that they already decided against you.  This unnecessarily steepens the slope in an already uphill battle against your client.

2.  Incomplete and unprofessional work requires "clean-up" work.  No one wants to be in the position of submitting an ill-prepared package, only to have it denied, and then later seek relief again on similar grounds once the nvestigation of the client's case is complete.

3.  INTERPOL may deny successive applications for relief based simply on the existence of previous submissions.  INTERPOL's rules allow for the refusal to review claims for relief if they are substantially similar to previous claims, or if they are so numerous as to be considered abusive of INTERPOL's processes.  This consideration is particularly relevant if the attorney is representing a previously pro se client.

If these valid reasons for taking a measured and considered approach to preparing a client's case are presented to the client, then it is much more likely that the client will be a temporal ally instead of demanding quick, but ineffective, action.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A good number of people who complain about unfairly issued Red Notices argue that the charges underlying their Red Notices are politically motivated.  Many times, the claim of political motivation is true.

A government's basis for bringing charges against one of its citizens or residents may stem from the governing regime's desire to control dissidents, to quiet whistleblowers, or to discourage political opposition.  As any human rights non-governmental organization can attest, politically motivated criminal charges are brought with frequency in many countries.

INTERPOL's Constitution prohibits INTERPOL from becoming involved in any matter of a political character. Nonetheless, the argument that a Red Notice is politically based can be made, substantiated, and submitted with proof to INTERPOL, and the subject's request to remove the Red Notice can still be validly denied.

How can such a claim fail?  For INTERPOL, the existence of political motivation is not the only determining factor regarding whether a Red Notice is properly issued or not.  There are certainly numerous criminal cases in any country which are brought based on legitimate criminal violations, but which are also partially based on the political motivation of a government official.  Because of this reality, INTERPOL will only categorize a Red Notice request as impermissibly politically motivated when the primary character is political.

If this sounds a bit like the old, "I know it when I see it" standard articulated for pornography by American Supreme Court Justice Stewart, take solace in this: INTERPOL does have actual criteria that it applies to each case to determine whether it is primarily politically motivated or based on the stated crime.  If INTERPOL agrees that the primary motivation for the Red Notice request is political, then it will be deemed inappropriate for INTERPOL's involvement. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A great example of INTERPOL's adherence to its own rules is that of its refusal to assist in the extradition of persons accused of violating dowery law.  INTERPOL's rules require that a Red Notice be issued with an eye towards extradition.  Extradition requires that a crime be recognized by both the country requesting extradition, and the country examining whether an extradition request will be granted.  If one of the countries does not recognize the matter in question as a crime, extradition will not occur.

This does not mean that dowry issues have not led to Red Notices in the past.  For instance, in 2005, a woman requested and received a Red Notice when her husband allegedly demanded dowry from her after their honeymoon.  The woman, of India, received assistance from the police in obtaining a Red Notice against her husband as well as his parents, who were of Austrailian nationality.

For now, however, INTERPOL has recognized that dual criminality does not exist and has taken the position that dowry violations are improper subjects for Red Notice requests.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In the last post, the focus was on the manner in which INTERPOL might publish erroneous information. While a Red Notice client is certainly interested in how such an error might have occurred, it is obviously even more important to know that it can be corrected- sometimes.

It may be intuitive to think that INTERPOL will correct an error immediately once it is brought to INTERPOL's attention, but that is not necessarily so.  This is because a correction is not always made, and when it is, it often not immediate.

Where the error is due to INTERPOL's actions, such as INTERPOL's characterization of offenses, it is appropriate to seek the correction directly through INTERPOL.  INTERPOL can and does correct its own mistakes by reviewing its own decision-making process in the publication of the notice, and it does so on its own timetable.  Clients who have sought a modification of the information circulated by INTERPOL in the the past have ultimately received the requested relief, but it can take an agonizingly long time to happen.

On the other hand, some errors, such as false charges emanating from the country that requested the Red Notice, may require a different form of correction.  In the next post, look for a discussion of modifying information received by outside sources.

As always, questions and comments are welcomed.

Still on the topic of INTERPOL's ability and need for improvement of its information processing methods and internal accountability, today's post addresses INTERPOL's own discussions of those issues.

While there are certainly many valid points to be made regarding the frustrating experience that many have while dealing with INTERPOL, there is also evidence that INTERPOL is aware of the need for continual improvements in its processing of Red Notice requests.  It also takes steps, slower than some may like, towards making those improvements. 

In his 2010 speech to INTERPOL's General Assembly, Billy Hawkes, the Chairman of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files candidly discussed the issue of accountability, as well as the need for an increased level of dedication to international human rights standards.  Towards the issue of accountabilty, he stated:

The Commission represents the Organisation's commitment to the outside world that it is willing to be accountable to an independed body for the manner in which it deals with the sensitive information entrusted to it. . .

Regarding the frequently raised question of respect for human rights, he proposed an idea: 

The Organisation's commitment to international human rights standards would be further strengthened by the incscription of the Organisation's Constitution with the United Nations, a proposal that the Commission fully supports.

Similar issues were discussed by the former Chairman, Peter Hustinx, in his 2007 speech of the same nature.  Additionally, Chairman Hustinx raised other issues.  He raised the rather uncomfortable fact that, in the Commission's observation, there appeared to be an "almost systematic" practice of INTERPOL assessing the accuracy and relevance of information in favor of NCBs (National Central Bureaus).

These two very brief examples indicate a willingness to effect change, at least from within the CCF.  They also indicate what must be more than a little tension between the CCF and INTERPOL itself, which is probably healthy given their respective roles.  

INTERPOL is capable of making changes to allow for transparency, fairness, and due process.  We also know that it is aware of the need for those changes.  Whether it will continue to make real progress towards those goals, well, time will tell.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

In a continuation of the issue of INTERPOL's seemingly blind trust in the representations of its member countries, today's post concerns the application process of member countries requesting Red Notices from INTERPOL.  And this just in . . . an article by Libby Lewis, sponsored by the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists, wherein the author asks, "Are Some Countries Abusing Interpol?"

A great, and timely, question.  It goes without saying that in any group of 188 countries, some of those countries necessarily will be governed more honestly or more corruptly than others.  Lewis' article accurately points out that INTERPOL's Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's files cannot investigate cases on its own.  Adding to that frustrating fact is another increasingly frustrating fact:  law enforcement agencies now enter the information regarding Red Notice applications on their own.  Not surprisingly, this change has coincided with a rise in applications for Red Notices.

As the numbers of Red Notice applications rise, so naturally do the instances of rules violations stemming from improper Red Notice Requests.  The ICIJ has identified seventeen countries with a history of improperly utilizing Red Notices to persecute political opponents, economic targets, or environmental activists.

We do know, and the Lewis article recognized that, once INTERPOL becomes aware of a given member country's improper Red Notice request habits, INTERPOL takes notice and acts.  An example discussed here previously is that of Venezuela.  Raising that awareness, however, can require the considerable and repeated efforts of Red Notice subjects and their lawyers.    

In the next post, look for a discussion of an idea proposed by Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions: the modification of INTERPOL's Red Notice request review process.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

One of the more inconvenient results of being the subject of a Red Notice is that your bank might break up with you.  One of the more frustrating parts of that break up may be that the bank won't say exactly why.

All financial institutions have their own policies (or should have them) regarding risk management practices. When a risk management department becomes aware that a customer has an existing Red Notice, it may decide that it no longer desires that person's business, even if the customer is unaware of the Notice's existence. 

Given that all banks are different, it's natural that their approaches to closing customer accounts differ. Some institutions may provide a specific reason for the closing of the account, while others simply refer to generalized "suspicious activity" as the reason.  Still others advise from the very beginning of the banking relationship that they may close the account at any time for any reason, and then may do just that without saying more.

So what's a Red Notice subject to do?  If the reason for the account closure is not given, or if it is stated as being based on "suspicious activity," it would be wise to begin the inquiry process to determine whether a Red Notice does exist, and if so, why it exists, and whether it should be challenged.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

As INTERPOL has developed over time, it has experienced the growing pains that normally attend any large and relatively complex entity, and also some that are more specific to its own, unusual functions.  In his book that I love, The Legal Foundations of INTERPOL, Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha touched on one of these developments:  the creation of the Commisssion for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF).

The CCF was created when France and INTERPOL were renegotiating INTERPOL's Headquarters Agreement. France was concerned about the rights of individuals to have access to the information that INTERPOL possessed about them, and argued that French law should govern the files that were in France.  INTERPOL disagreed, based on the fact that French governance would result in INTERPOL losing its autonomy from any one country's authority, which is critical to its mission.  

A compromise was reached in the form of the CCF.  Its function includes the processing of requests for access to INTERPOL's files by individuals who are the subjects of Red Notices, and other Notices as well. This arrangement also allows for other member countries to communicate with INTERPOL free from worry that the French government will be privy to their communications.  More on that in the next post.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Back in February, I discussed the fact that Venezuela's Attorney General, Luisa Ortega Díaz, complained about what she painted as INTERPOL's unfair treatment of Venezuela's request for Red Notices against a certain group of people.  Specifically, she argued that Venezuela's requests for Red Notices were being denied for people charged with crimes related to the banking industry.  She rejected the idea that the requests were politically based.   

In response to this complaint, INTERPOL's Secretary General, Ronald K. Noble, made an official visit to Venezuela to address the issues raised by Ms. Ortega Díaz. This visit was unprecedented.  An INTERPOL Secretary General has never visited Venezuela in an official capacity before, according to INTERPOL.

Noble's visit to Venezuela was reported in its news, but the ultimate reaction of the Venezuelan government to the visit remains to be seen.  Obviously, the Venezuelan government hopes that INTERPOL will revise its previous denials of Red Notices, and its Attorney General is reported to have said that she expects just that.  

Why is INTERPOL so concerned about Venezuela's complaints?

Perhaps INTERPOL is extremely sensitive to Ms. Ortega Díaz' feelings.  More likely, INTERPOL is interested in at least maintaining a relationship with Venezuela, both as a member country and especially given Venezuela's geographic location and potential role in anti-drug trafficking efforts.  Venezuela has made some recent, public efforts to cooperate with INTERPOL's mission to combat the illegal drug trade, even if some of those efforts may be less than completely altruistic.

Whether a revision of decisions to deny past Red Notice requests will result from the meeting, however, is not so clear from the press release issued by INTERPOL.  The press statement reads as more of an explanation and defense of decisions than an indication of possible reconsideration.

Next time:  INTERPOL's defense of its decisions on Venezuelan Red Notice requests.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

When the phone call comes that a client may be, or is, the subject of an INTERPOL Red Notice, an attorney’s immediate response may be to start thinking about an extradition hearing. That’s good, but it’s not always enough.

A client can greatly benefit from the attorney’s investigation into whether INTERPOL does, in fact, possess any information on the client, and if a Red Notice has been issued, whether the Notice was properly issued.  As noted in the very thoughtful book, The Legal Foundations of Interpol, by Rutsel Silverstre J. Martha, 2010, INTERPOL may refuse to acknowledge possession or non-possession of information on a person.  However, once it is public, there is generally no objection to the information's release upon request by an authorized person.

When the existence of a Red Notice has been confirmed, in addition to a working knowledge of

• INTERPOL’s constitution,
• text,
• agreements, 
• resolutions, and
• pertinent treaties,

the attorney will either need to know the relevant law of the country that requested the Notice, or to co-counsel with an attorney who does. Only by understanding the law in the originating country is the attorney fully able to determine the applicability of INTERPOL’s available remedies for the client. Part of the legal investigation may involve the acquisition of documents related to the criminal investigation against the client. Obviously, the more oppressive the regime of the requesting country, the more difficult it may be to obtain documentation of the history of the client’s warrant. 

It is also critical to the challenge of a Red Notice to understand and document the political background and atmosphere of the requesting country, particularly as it applies to the client individually. This element of representation requires extremely thorough interviews with the client and witnesses to his or her political activity, if the challenge is politically based, as well as a compilation of evidence to demonstrate any such activity.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.