Today's post addresses an insightful and very personal comment that was posted here.  The author of that comment noted, correctly, that INTERPOL is sometimes used to further the corrupt goals of certain law enforcement officials in various member countries.  Obviously, the issuance of a Red Notice has a debilitating effect on its subject, and when the Notice is improperly issued, that effect is worsened by the very real sense of injustice that accompanies the Notice.  The author of the comment reports having experienced just such an injustice, and wonders why INTERPOL seems to allow this to happen without oversight.

Unfortunately, his is not an isolated experience.  INTERPOL has 190 member countries, each of which is bound by its membership conditions with INTERPOL to request or publish Red Notices only when it has ensured that the proper legal channels have been followed.  Based on that obligation, INTERPOL does assign a rather high level of trust to member countries, and Red Notices are strongly presumed to have been validly issued.

This does not mean that a Red Notice, once issued, must remain active until it has led to an arrest.  On the contrary, INTERPOL's stated goals include observation and adherence to not only its own rules, but also such texts as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  When a subject or his lawyer files a proper challenge which shows a violation of INTERPOL's governing rules and texts, it is indeed possible for a Red Notice to be withdrawn, modified, or revoked.

Nonetheless, what of the author's larger question about INTERPOL's quality assurance issues? INTERPOL's "honor system" with its member countries inevitably results in the problem that any honor system encounters:  someone, somewhere, cheats.   That cheating may take the form of active misinformation or simple laziness and failure to carry out one's duties.  Regardless of the manner of non-compliance with INTERPOL's rules, the outcome for the Red Notice subject is the same:  she is immobilized, finds difficulty obtaining employment, suffers financially, and risks detention by law enforcement constantly.  

My thanks to the author of the comment for raising these important questions about a persistent problem, and I hope that he or his lawyer were able to resolve his problems.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

But what of other, less obvious violations of INTERPOL's rules?  If Egypt is willing to violate INTERPOL's rules in order to prosecute individuals, is it also willing to violate its own due process laws in order to obtain convictions?  The case of Wael Abbas is summed up here, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR")"

Award-winning digital journalist Wael Abbas was charged with selling communications services without a license, and because neither he nor his lawyers were ever informed of the trial date, he was sentenced in absentia to six months in prison and fined 500 Egyptian pounds ($86).

THe UNHCR went on to point out that, while the conviction was ultimately thrown out, the threat of multiple charges for the same alleged crime is also a very real threat in Egypt.

Even assuming that Egypt were to follow its own criminal procedure laws, Egyptian law does not contain the internationally accepted safeguards that allow for a due process compliant trial in absentia.  The problems with Egypt's form of trial in absentia were aptly described by Human Rights Watch in its Q & A column about the trial of Hosni Mubarak:

Trying a defendant in absentia can undermine some of the defendant’s basic rights to a fair trial, including the right to be present, to be defended by counsel of the person’s choice, and to examine witnesses. International law disfavors but does not prohibit trials in absentia. National systems that maintain the practice should, at a minimum, institute procedural safeguards to ensure the defendant’s basic rights. These include requirements that the defendant be notified in advance of the proceedings and that the defendant unequivocally and explicitly waive his right to be present. The defendant should also have the right to representation in his or her absence, and should be able to obtain a fresh determination on the merits of the conviction following the person’s return to the jurisdiction.

Egyptian law does not meet these minimum requirements... Egyptian law does not include any procedural safeguards requiring that the court take into account whether the defendant’s absence was by choice or assess whether a defendant unequivocally and explicitly waived the right to be present before deciding to proceed with a trial in absentia.

Given that we have seen Egypt's pattern and practice of using, and attempting to use, its access to INTERPOL's tools in an abusive fashion in political and religious cases, there is no basis to believe that Egypt does not also misuse that access to further its goals in criminal cases where gross due process violations have occurred.  When the goal is a criminal conviction regardless of the means by which the conviction is obtained, no other motivation is necessary for a member country to violate INTERPOL's rules.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

While all outward appearances indicate that INTERPOL has become wary of many Red Notices that are initiated or requested by Venezuela, particularly those that concern charges of easily fabricated financial crimes, there remains plenty of room for concern that Venezuelan authorities will continue to attempt to abuse their access to INTERPOL's tools.

Because of the fact that INTERPOL's I-Link system provides member countries with the ability to instantly issue Red Notices, which are not subject to an immediate "human" check, countries that do not honor their obligations to properly utlize INTERPOL's tools can - and do- obtain Red Notices improperly.  If INTERPOL authorities are  unaware of the illicit nature of the Red Notice, it remains active at least until the problem is brought to INTERPOL's attention and reviewed.

Nicolas Maduro campaigned on a pledge to continue with Chavez' policies, and there is every indication that he will do just that, including the misuse of their access to INTERPOL's databases.

As always, questions and comments are welcomed.

The raid on Amnesty International is the most recent in a series of actions taken by the Russian government to tighten control over NGOs that provide human rights observation and advocacy services. Russian law now requires any nonprofit organizations that receive financing from abroad to register as "foreign agents."  The inspections that have resulted from this policy have appeared to focus on advocacy groups in particular.

The significance of this particular brand of oppressive activity is that it often results in the NGO being forced to reduce its functions in the oppressive country, or to leave the country altogether.  John Dalhuisen, Amnesty International’s Europe and Central Asia director, articulated his concern about Amnesty International's future in Russia in a statement issued last week:

 “There has long been a fear that Russia’s new NGO law would be used to target prominent critical organizations,” said John Dalhuisen, Amnesty International’s Europe and Central Asia director. “The spate of inspections in recent weeks appears to confirm this suspicion. The bigger fear is that this is just round one, and that, after the smearing, the forced closures will come.

For those people who find themselves to be the subjects of Red Notices, the work of NGOs such as Amnesty International could not be more significant.  When challenging a Red Notice, it is often necessary to place an individual's own experience into the context of a country's ongoing practices, and to provide documented proof of a country's history of human rights violations.  

Without the consistent and documented observations of reputable human rights organizations, it would be difficult to provide any substantive evidence of a given country's history and pattern of human rights violations. And once the NGOs are attacked, it becomes increasingly difficult for other advocacy groups to maintain a voice of any kind.  Human rights observers will recall that Egypt conducted a this type of campaign against various NGOs in 2012.

About this time last year, we addressed a very similar situation in Egypt, wherein NGO workers were being arrested for working for unregistered agencies.  With the passage of time, and fewer observers and protections in place, we now see that activists are being targeted for prosecution.  Associated Press reporters Hamza Hendawi and Saral El Deeb report that five promininet activits in opposition to Egyptian President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are the subject of arrest warrants.  In their report, here, Hendawi and El Deeb point out that the five activists who are the subjects of the warrants were at the forefront of the 2011 uprising against former President Hosni Mubarark.  Is anyone surprised?

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Not surprisingly, many Red Notice subjects claim innocence.  The fact that they are (or believe themselves to be) innocent often drives their decision to flee the country that issued the arrest warrants and Red Notices in their names.  They often flee to avoid participating in a judicial process that is notoriously corrupt, politically biased, or violative of basic human rights.  While the subjects usually know that they are wanted in a certain country, they often do not know whether a Red Notice exists in their names.

In order to determine whether one is the subject of a Red Notice, the most obvious course of action is to check the INTERPOL website under "wanted."  The Red Notices listed here have been published at the request of the member countries.  The vast majority of Red Notices, however, do not appear on the website and are not available to non-law enforcement individuals.

A person who believes that she is wanted, but whose name is not published by INTERPOL, is left with the following choices in order to ascertain that status:

• Travel, and take the chance of possibly being detained
• Appear at a law enforcement agency and inquire as to her wanted status
• Inquire with INTERPOL regarding the data that INTERPOL possesses in her name

If the person chooses the third option, it is important that she or her attorney follow the regulations in force for INTERPOL so that the request is accepted.  Once she knows whether she is a Red Notice subject, she can decide whether to challenge the Notice or not.

As always, comments and questions are welcomed. 

In the case of religious law violations, it doesn't.  INTERPOL's member countries include many with strict, religious-based codes, that provide for severe penalties for religious transgressions.  When a person accused of violating those laws absconds, the member country may request INTERPOL's assistance in apprehending the person.  According to INTERPOL's constitution, INTERPOL should refuse that request.

Article 3 of INTERPOL's constitution is most often cited for its prohibition on any involvement with matters that are primarily political in nature.  However, religiously motivated charges are also prohibited:

"It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, or religious or racial character."

Article, 3, constitution of INTERPOL.

When member countries utilizes INTERPOL's I-Link system, which allows for Red Notices to be entered into INTERPOL's databases without quality checks being made prior to entry, it is possible that inappropriate Red Notices may be issues.  This possibility certainly exists for crimes based on religious violations as well as politically motivated criminal charges.  

If a person is the subject of an improperly issued Red Notice due to its being religiously based, it is important for that fact to be brought to INTERPOL's attention in a challenge to the Red Notice.  Violations of INTERPOL's constitution provide for valid grounds for the Notice to be destroyed.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

INTERPOL’s constitution forbids its involvement in politically motivated cases

Regardless of that fact that Mr. Misick’s political asylum claim was denied in Brazil, it would be surprising if he did not also challenge his Red Notice directly to INTERPOL on political grounds as well.

Article 3 of INTERPOL’s constitution establishes that

            It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or

            activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.

Given that the allegations against Mr. Misick stem from his tenure in office, one might assume that the question of INTERPOL’s involvement should end there:  activities conducted in a political office are necessarily political. 

However, the analysis of whether a Red Notice is politically motivated requires a more thorough review of the underlying charges and Red Notice application.  The question of political motivation requires a study of all the circumstances involving the allegations, as well as a review of the political landscape and history of the requesting country. Additionally, the relationship between the Red Notice subject and the requesting country must be considered along with their respective activities.  

If the predominant reason for the Red Notice is the accomplishment of the issuing country’s political goals, then the Red Notice very well may be politically motivated to an unacceptable level.  However, if the true overriding basis for the Red Notice is the underlying criminal charge, then a challenge based on the political motivation of the Red Notice likely will not succeed. 

TCI responded to allegations of political motivation behind charges

Earlier in 2012, the TCI government addressed concerns about the reason behind the issuance of the Red Notice. Mr. Misick’s supporters had  speculated that the notice against him was politically motivated based upon a public argument in March of this year between Mr. Misick and Governor Ric Todd.  The argument was precipitated by Mr. Misick's criticism of Mr. Todd.  

Governor's Office spokesman Neil Smith, in response to those allegations, reportedly stated that the country had applied for the Notice back in February.  Therefore, goes the logic, the Notice could not have been based upon a spat that occurred in March.

While the timing and manner of the Red Notice issuance is yet unclear, one thing is certain:  any Red Notice challenge by Mr. Misick's attorneys will certainly include evidence of his criticism of, and later argument with, Governor Todd.  The success of such a challenge will depend on the strength and validity of the documentation of the underlying criminal charges.

** Note to readers:  Red Notice Law Journal placed a request for verification of the grounds for the Red Notice in Mr. Misick's name with INTERPOL’s press office.  As of today’s date, no response has been forthcoming.

The CCF is the arm of INTERPOL charged with the protection and monitoring of data processed by INTERPOL.  The General Secretariat has the authority to either accept or reject the CCF's recommended responses to challenges against Red Notices.

In its 2011 Annual Report, the CCF noted that the General Secretariat accepted all of the Commission's recommendations regarding the validity of data processed by INTERPOL.  While there is a procedure in place for that dictates the protocol for instances in which the General Secretariat disagrees with the Commission, no such scenarios arose in 2011 that required the implementation of that procedure. 

Because of the fact that the CCF holds the position of guardian of individual rights within INTERPOL, this is good news for Red Notice subjects and their attorneys.  It remains true that fighting a Red Notice is an uphill battle due to the presumption of validity that cloaks every Red Notice.  However, the  lack of discord between the General Secretariat and the CCF indicates a high level of respect for the CCF's decisions, including its decisions to delete improper data from its databases.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In its Annual Report, the CCF noted that many domestic courts were confused about INTERPOL's role in extradition proceedings.  The CCF reported:

When processing complaints from requesting parties arrested on the basis of red notices

published by INTERPOL, the Commission has been faced with the position of national judicial authorities that considered that they could not rule on an extradition request when the person concerned had sent a complaint to INTERPOL.

On several occasions, the Commission has had to explain to national authorities via the NCBs the limits of its role which consists of determining whether the information recorded in INTERPOL’s files has been processed in compliance with INTERPOL’s rules, and that it has no power over proceedings taken against a person at the national level.

It cannot recommend that a national authority cancel an arrest warrant, halt proceedings, or cooperate or not with a requesting authority; only the national judicial or police authorities concerned may do so. It is up to national judges to determine, based on the criteria that are applicable to them, whether they consider that they can act upon a request for extradition. The study on compliance with INTERPOL’s rules conducted by the Commission is not meant to affect the process of a judicial procedure on the national level.

While INTERPOL's internal activity is not intended by INTERPOL to have any collateral effect on domestic cases, attorneys representing immigration, criminal, and INTERPOL clients can attest to the fact that courts are sometimes concerned with an individual's INTERPOL status.  That status may have an effect, intended or not, on matters such as asylum claims and extradition evaluations.  

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

The CCF does an admirable job of publicly highlighting the problems faced by INTERPOL and by its member countries, and credibly appears to take seriously its obligation of balancing law enforcement interests with individual human rights.

Among the challenges to be corrected, the CCF noted the rather pervasive problem of member countries' National Central Bureaus ("NCB's") failing to advise INTERPOL when a Red Notice was no longer valid.  The CCF reported that, even when a Red Notice subject had been arrested and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the Notice frequently remained live.

Experience showed that NCBs generally did not follow up such information and only rarely informed the General Secretariat that the person had served his or her sentence.

Corruption in the Application for Red Notices

It would be news to no one that I frequently complain about the fact that INTERPOL is subject to misuse, or that it has some corrupt member countries that seek Red Notices for reasons unrelated to crime-fighting.  I've addressed the issues of member countries' National Central Bureaus using their INTERPOL access to support politically motivated goals, to obtain bribes, and to circumvent basic due process. When Red Notice requests are made in the context of such impropriety, they are subject to challenges by Red Notice subjects and their attorneys.

And it remains true that INTERPOL is susceptible to abuse by its member countries who improperly seek and obtain Red Notices.  The nature of an international organization with 190 member countries, all of which have varying degrees of oversight and corruption, is that abuse of process will occur.

Corruption in the Apprehension (or Failure to Apprehend) of a Red Notice Subject

What might be surprising, though, is that when a Red Notice is properly obtained based on criminal activity, the suspect is sometimes not even detained, let alone extradited.  

Even when a member country properly obtains a Red Notice against a suspect, plenty of room remains for law enforcement officials to behave illegally for their own purposes.  A prime example of a country's failure (or refusal) to take action on a Red Notice is provided in last week's article by Emma Graham-Harrison's article on Afghanistan's treatment of a Red Notice for financial crime suspect Sherkhan Farnood.

Mr. Farnoond has been charged with fraud and theft from Kabul Bank, which he founded.  Also charged is the the bank's CEO, Khalilullah Ferozi.  The investigation of Farnood's financial activity in Afghanistan revealed a massive Ponzi scheme that most likely would not have gone undetected for so long if Afghan police had acted upon a Red Notice issued against Mr. Farnood by INTERPOL member country Russia.

The reason for the lack of action by Afghan authorities appears by all accounts to be based on the disproportionate level of influence held by relatively few individuals in Afghanistan.  Graham-Harrison reported that

[A]mong the bank's creditors are a group who got $3.1m in loans but are so powerful that receivers for Kabul Bank have declined to even ask for the money back.

With such pervasive corruption, it is anticipated that most of the stolen funds will go unrecovered, leaving the citizens of Afghanistan to make up the losses.

INTERPOL's "Disciplinary" Options for Corrupt Activity

When faced with a member country's refusal to act on a Red Notice, INTERPOL may decide to do nothing at all. Recall that every member country's protocol for reacting to the discovery of a Red Notice subject is different, and every case has distinct characteristics which may not make it appropriate to detain or extradite the Red Notice subject.  An individual act of refusal to detain a subject may not merit any intervention by INTERPOL.

Simultaneously, the entire aim of INTERPOL is to provide for international police cooperation.  In the new Rules on the Processing of Data ("RPD"), INTERPOL reiterates that aim, and also provides for "corrective measures" to be applied to NCBs that do not fulfill their obligations under the rules.  One of the available corrective measures is the suspension of the NCBs access rights to INTERPOL's data system.  Another option is that the General Secretariat must remind NCBs of their INTERPOL obligations whenever necessary.

It might be time for Kabul NCB to be reminded. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

After I requested that a Red Notice against my client be removed, I received no answer, but it disappeared from INTERPOL's website.  Can I assume that it has been removed?

As with any question about assumptions, the answer is that one shouldn't assume, but should verify.

First, it should be noted that any request regarding the validity of a Red Notice should be met with a response regarding admissibility in thirty days.  In my experience, such responses have always been forthcoming within that timeframe.

Second, while it is possible that the Notice has been removed from INTERPOL's databases, it is also possible that it has not.  The Notice may have become the subject of an inquiry regarding its validity.

Additionally, it is possible that the country that requested the Notice in the first place later requested that it not be published on the website any longer.  Recall that the decision to publish a Red Notice is made by the requesting country, and the requesting country is the owner of the information supplied to INTERPOL. Moreover, the vast majority of Red Notices are unpublished.

Instead of assuming, a better approach would be to directly inquire with the CCF (the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files), INTERPOL's processor of personal information, regarding the status of the matter.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Just wanted to know if a person committed a crime 28 years ago and has been on the run ever since, would that individual be on the Interpol red list if he tries to fly internationally?

We naturally assume that the question is merely one of curiousity, and posed solely for academic purposes.  The reader is referring to a Red Notice, and it is not known from the question whether the person who committed the underlying crime was ever made the subject of a Red Notice.  Assuming that a Red Notice was requested, there is a good chance that the Notice is still active.  This issue was addressed not too long ago in a post, here. 

The reader's question is reminiscent, in its cautiously casual tone, of the thought that must run through many a man's mind:

Just wondering if that transgression of mine from so long ago would be raised if I were to engage in the obviously impending argument with my wife?

And of course, the answer is that, unless the woman is really no longer interested at all, that issue will probably be raised, because the female memory bank tends to be rather broad and readily accessible.

Likewise, unless the requesting country is no longer interested in prosecution, the Red Notice likely remains outstanding and that the travelling Red Notice subject will be detained during his travels.  If there is reason to believe that the notice is no longer valid or was improper to begin with, then the subject or his attorney may wish to challenge the Notice and seek its removal.  He may have better luck than the guy arguing with his wife.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

This year, we humbly request that the General Assembly acknowledge that the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF) is in need of additional resources.  The time it takes to obtain a response to some appeals for relief can be excruciating for attorney and client alike.  Were there more resources made available to the CCF, the rapidly rising number of Red Notice challenges could be more efficiently addressed, and in a more timely fashion.  When we say "more resources," here's what we mean:

1. More staff.  By increasing the number of staff assigned to the CCF, cases will be reviewed and prepared for sessions at a quicker rate than is currently the case.
2. More sessions.  The CCF has been meeting three times per year, which is the minimum number of sessions allowed per year according to INTERPOL's rules.  By increasing the number of sessions, CCF members would be allowed more time for the consideration of individual requests for relief.
3. More funding.  As the number of Red Notices (and other notices, for that matter) increase, the number of requests for relief increase as well.  Funding must increase in an amount that is commensurate with the demands placed on the CCF if it is to function effectively.

An increase in these resources would also serve as an opportunity for INTERPOL to lend credence to its stated goal of respecting the rights of individuals and ensuring that its member countries are acting in compliance with INTERPOL's governing rules and texts.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Unlike those temporary and fictional fears, many business owners and employees have learned that the troubles accompanying business failures abroad can be very real and very long-lasting.

As individuals and corporate organizations engage more frequently in international business endeavors, there are naturally more successes as well as more failures in such endeavors.  In many countries, a business deal gone bad ends in a financial loss, a loss of future business opportunities, or perhaps bankruptcy or a civil lawsuit.

In other countries, however, an otherwise civil matter may be treated as a criminal offense.  When a person is charged with a criminal offense related to a failed business transaction, he may find himself the subject of an INTERPOL Red Notice.  While the matter may be improper for a Red Notice, INTERPOL will likely not be alerted to that fact by the country requesting the Red Notice.

In these instances, business people who become the subjects of Red Notices often travel without knowing their Red Notice status, and are detained in INTERPOL member countries while they await extradition, trial, or sentencing.  That's the bad news.

The good news is that Red Notice subjects can challenge the propriety of the Notices.  When they are improper, INTERPOL will destroy the Notices and the subjects are able to resume their lives as usual- kind of like rising from the dead.

Happy Halloween.

Similarly, a Red Notice is a request issued by INTERPOL on behalf of any of its 190 member countries, and its goal is to apprehend a criminal suspect or convict who has fled to another country.  

One difference between a BOLO and a Red Notice is that the BOLO is intended to be dissiminated in the time immediately following a crime, with little expectation that the BOLO will remain active for much time afterwards if the suspect is not apprehended.  A Red Notice, on the other hand, can remain active for years, as long as certain of INTERPOL's criteria are met.

A man from El Salvador recently felt the effect of Red Notice's longevity when he was deported from the United States to El Salvador for a crime alleged to have been committed in 1999.  His Red Notice caused United States immigration officials to learn about his wanted status all these years later, as reported here by Bob Egelko of the San Francisco Chronicle.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

There are times, however, when a Red Notice removal requires some mention.  Kevin Walls, a legitimate and established businessman, has succeeded in having his name removed from INTERPOL's Red Notice list.  Mr. Walls' Red Notice received much publicity, and so should its removal.  His story is here and here, at the box marked, "Press Release: Kevin Walls."

 As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

Every INTERPOL member country has its own National Central Bureau (NCB), which acts as a liaison with INTERPOL itself.  Red Notices are issued at the request of the member countries, and the information contained in the Red Notice, as well as the information contained in the files kept by INTERPOL, actually belongs to the member country that supplies that information to INTERPOL. That ownership was discussed in more detail here (back when INTERPOL had only 188 member countries.)

The requesting member country may decide to publicize the Red Notice or not, and also may decide to withdraw the information at any point.  For example, if a Red Notice is no longer needed because a person has been acquitted or an underlying charging document has been found to be invalid, the member country has the capability of instructing its NCB to arrange the removal of its information from INTERPOL's files.

Once such a decision has been made, the removal can and should be almost immediate.  If the member country is efficient, the subject should not need an attorney to facilitate that process.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A question that arises when any country launches an anti-corruption initiative is this:  Who's watching the watcher?  

Any observer of anti-corruption drives can attest that with such efforts usually comes a measure of . . . corruption.  How does it happen?

• First, a government official is charged with the duty of rooting out corruption, and such rooting may target bribery, fraud, embezzlement, and the like.  
• When officials begin to prosecute such crimes, the public is often quite supportive of those actions, and governments are allowed a bit more wiggle room in their law enforcement activities than they might otherwise have.
• Once the anti-corruption activity gains steam, it sometimes takes on the taint of the very corruption it seeks to eliminate.  Officials feel emboldened to act in ways that are technically illegal, but seem palatable in an "end justifies the means" sort of way.

The anti-corruption effort can be used as a shield to cover politically motivated criminal charges, as has been seen in countries such as Ethiopia, Indonesia, Cameroon, and Malaysia.  After criminal charges are filed and the accused has reason to believe that his rights will continue to be violated, he often flees the jurisdiction and a Red Notice is issued.

With the World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency aiding in the investigation of allegedly corrupt activity, the hope is certainly that such investigations will be more transparent and properly targeted than we might otherwise see.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

Now, however, things have changed.  INTERPOL has confirmed that it has issued Red Notices in Mr. Watson's name on behalf of both Costa Rica and Japan.

Prior to the second Red Notice being issued, Watson's German attorney, Oliver Wallasch, issued a letter to SSCS. The letter has been publicized and explains the situation from the attorney's perspective.

Obviously, Watson's travel will either be curtailed until the Red Notices are addressed, or he will likely be detained if he attempts to exit or enter any INTERPOL member country while the Notices are outstanding.

Whether Watson decides to formally challenge the Notices remains to be seen.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.