Red Notice Law Journal - Red Notices, International Extradition, and Perspective

In the 2011 film version of The Adventures of Tintin:  the Secret ofthe Unicorn, part of the plot concerned two detectives who were "INTERPOL agents" investigating a crime.  The two detectives look very similar to one another and are portrayed as more or less bumbling, ineffective agents.  

This was an animated film, so some artistic license is to be expected, but it bears pointing out that INTERPOL does not send agents or detectives around the world investigating pickpockets (as in the film) or other crimes.  Rather, it receives information from the law enforcement agencies in INTERPOL member countries around the world and shares that information with other member countries to aid in the suspect's apprehension.  

When we hear about "U.S. INTERPOL" or "the Ethiopian INTERPOL office," we are hearing a reference to the liaison between that member country's National Central Bureau ("NCB") and INTERPOL, not to an office owned or operated by INTERPOL.

So it was with interest that I read yesterday that INTERPOL's agents in Mexico had gone missing while conducting an investigation.  Multiple media outlets reported that INTERPOL's investigating officials had left the city of Chihuahua on Monday and not reached their destination of Ciudad Juárez.  This would be odd, of course, when INTERPOL has no such officials.  

INTERPOL was quick to clarify that in Mexico, the NCB is under the authority of the Policía Federal Ministerial, a part of the Procuraduría General de la República, not INTERPOL.  Moreover, as reported here, Mexican officials have stated that not only are no INTERPOL officials missing, but no one at all is missing.

So, to be clear:  No Thompson and Thomson, no INTERPOL agents in Mexico, and no missing police officers in Mexico.  At all.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

We know that Egypt has attempted to utilize its access to INTERPOL's databases for political reasons against people who posed ideological threats to the current government, and more recently, to a political opponent of its current president.  In accordance with its own constitution, INTERPOL has rightly refused to become involved in (or stay involved in) such politically motivated matters.  Egypt has also at least threatened to seek INTERPOL's involvement in religiously based criminal offenses.

But what of other, less obvious violations of INTERPOL's rules?  If Egypt is willing to violate INTERPOL's rules in order to prosecute individuals, is it also willing to violate its own due process laws in order to obtain convictions?  The case of Wael Abbas is summed up here, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR")"

Award-winning digital journalist Wael Abbas was charged with selling communications services without a license, and because neither he nor his lawyers were ever informed of the trial date, he was sentenced in absentia to six months in prison and fined 500 Egyptian pounds ($86).

THe UNHCR went on to point out that, while the conviction was ultimately thrown out, the threat of multiple charges for the same alleged crime is also a very real threat in Egypt.

Even assuming that Egypt were to follow its own criminal procedure laws, Egyptian law does not contain the internationally accepted safeguards that allow for a due process compliant trial in absentia.  The problems with Egypt's form of trial in absentia were aptly described by Human Rights Watch in its Q & A column about the trial of Hosni Mubarak:

Trying a defendant in absentia can undermine some of the defendant’s basic rights to a fair trial, including the right to be present, to be defended by counsel of the person’s choice, and to examine witnesses. International law disfavors but does not prohibit trials in absentia. National systems that maintain the practice should, at a minimum, institute procedural safeguards to ensure the defendant’s basic rights. These include requirements that the defendant be notified in advance of the proceedings and that the defendant unequivocally and explicitly waive his right to be present. The defendant should also have the right to representation in his or her absence, and should be able to obtain a fresh determination on the merits of the conviction following the person’s return to the jurisdiction.

Egyptian law does not meet these minimum requirements... Egyptian law does not include any procedural safeguards requiring that the court take into account whether the defendant’s absence was by choice or assess whether a defendant unequivocally and explicitly waived the right to be present before deciding to proceed with a trial in absentia.

Given that we have seen Egypt's pattern and practice of using, and attempting to use, its access to INTERPOL's tools in an abusive fashion in political and religious cases, there is no basis to believe that Egypt does not also misuse that access to further its goals in criminal cases where gross due process violations have occurred.  When the goal is a criminal conviction regardless of the means by which the conviction is obtained, no other motivation is necessary for a member country to violate INTERPOL's rules.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

When most people think of someone who is listed on INTERPOL's wanted pages, they likely imagine someone exactly like Redoine Faid, the French gangster who blasted his way through multiple prison doors in order to escape from prison, as reported here.  Faid has been convicted of serious, violent crimes, and few people would be surprised about his being listed as a wanted man by an international crime-fighting organization.

What does surprise many people, however, is that the Red Notice does not guarantee an arrest.  Assuming that Mr. Faid is found by any INTERPOL member country's authorities, several factors will determine whether he is returned to France.  Those factors include:

• Whether the official who encounters Faid checks INTERPOL's databases and finds the Red Notice in Faid's name;
• Whether the member country chooses to detain Faid while investigating extradition possibilities; and
• Whether Faid is found in a member country that has an extradition treaty with France, or is willing to return him to France via deportation or diplomatic means.

Granted, the case of Redoine Faid appears to be one of the more egregious cases in INTERPOL's wanted lists, and it is unlikely that a member country would refuse to return him, all other matters being equal. 

As always, questions and comments are welcomed.

I received a question from a reader this week who was interested in knowing which countries were actually INTERPOL member countries.  INTERPOL keeps an updated list of its member countries on its website on this page.  Each member country has its own page of facts and relevant information.  Many also have links to press releases that were issued by INTERPOL with reference to that specific country.

Member countries can use their INTERPOL pages in varying ways.  A review of the INTERPOL page for any country of interest provides a bit of insight as to the country's most recent joint endeavors with INTERPOL, such as this page for South Africa.  It may also provide links to relevant law enforcement agencies, as is found in Norway's page.  Paraguay's page provides an example of how the countries also use their INTERPOL pages to highlight certain wanted subjects.  The United Arab Emirates provides little information compared to some other countries, but it includes a video in its page.

When I reviewed the pages for each of the countries, the inevitable question of superlatives arose.  Toward that end, I humbly suggest that the following awards go to the following member countries:

• Madagascar, Guinea Bissau and Marshall Islands, tied for the most concise pages
• Japan, for display of the most politically contested Red Notice (for the Sea Shepherd's Paul Watson)
• Thailand, for including the most flowers in a photograph with law enforcment officials
• Costa Rica, for best display of overkill in a takedown of a single subject

To the reader who posed the question, thanks for the opportunity to review the various member countries' INTERPOL pages.  We may have to make "superlatives" a yearly event.

As always, questions and comments are welcomed.

When INTERPOL introduced its I-link system, the goal of the system was to provide its member countries with near-instant access to one another's shared information about wanted subjects.  While that goal clearly has been met, it hasn't been without some bumps in the road.  

Along with the benefit of instant access come the drawbacks of lack of review.  Prior to I-link's implementation, member countries were required to submit their requests for Red Notices to Interpol for approval.  Only after the requests had been reviewed and approved by the General Secretariat would they be circulated in INTERPOL's databases and made available to other member countries.  

Under the current I-link system, however, no such review or approval is required prior to the entry and circulation of a Red Notice.  According to the 2011 annual report of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files, that lack of review presents one of the problems with the I-link system.  The Commission's finding in section 5.2.3 of the report addressed that concern and emphasized:  

While automatic checking mechanisms are increasingly advanced, they are not intended to replace human checks.

And given the fact that Red Notices are cloaked in a presumption of validity, the fact that they can now be issued without any "human check" is particularly alarming.  The simple truth is that any member country that has a corrupt, lazy, or improperly motivated INTERPOL liaison official can easily and quickly upload invalid Red Notices into INTERPOL'S databases.  The result is that truly innocent people may have their lives turned upside down while they navigate the waters of INTERPOL, detention, and extradition.

While the Commission must be commended for keeping INTERPOL honest, it remains to be seen exactly how INTERPOL will rectify the problem of Red Notices that are improperly entered into the I-link system.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

The last time Red Notice Law Journal addressed the issue of NGO workers charged with crimes in Egypt, it was here, with the focus being on the fact that NGO workers and journalists are critical in the work of evaluating human rights issues and country conditions around the world.  Egypt had charged employees of several NGOs for working in the country without their organizations being properly registered, although proper registration was not made possible by the Egyptian government.

Some of the workers who were charged were U.S. citizens. One of them is Robert Becker, who has remained in Egypt to face the charges and who regularly reports on the progress of the trial.  The other U.S. citizens left the country.  Because they had left Egypt, they were charged in absentia and Egypt requested Red Notices to be issued by INTERPOL.  INTERPOL rightly refused to issue the Red Notices.

However, for Becker and for Defendants 27, Rawda Ali, and 28, Hafsa Halawa, and thirteen  other Egyptians, INTERPOL did not become involved because they remained in Egypt.  As reported here by Nancy Youssef and Amina Ismail, both women were  employees of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), as was Becker.  The NDI and other NGOs were working in Egypt with the goal of educating reporters on fair and impartial reporting methods, those NGOs were accused of operating without being properly registered as organizations within Egypt.

It is truly impossible to overstate the value of the work done by people like Ali, Becker and Halawa and their fellow defendants.  But for people like them, the world has no real hope of obtaining reliable, verified, accurate information about any kind of activity, political or otherwise, in any foreign country.  The ideal of unbiased journalism cannot be realized without journalists dedicated to unbiased research and reporting methods.

Every country has journalists for sale, those who will write what is easy, or unverified, or false.  We know that.  But we also know that there are journalists who are not afraid to find the truth, to understand the truth, and to tell the truth.  They deserve our protection and they deserve that we bear witness to their dedication.  

These journalists and their colleagues are braver than most of us, and we are indebted to them.  INTERPOL was right not to become involved in this matter.  The political motivation behind the charges is palpable, and it is important for these defendants to know that they are not forgotten, and that the world is, in fact, watching.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In the last post, I addressed the latest events in the case of Michael Misick, former Premier of Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI).  Today's post is a continuation of that discussion and an update of a related post from earlier this year.

INTERPOL’s constitution forbids its involvement in politically motivated cases

Regardless of that fact that Mr. Misick’s political asylum claim was denied in Brazil, it would be surprising if he did not also challenge his Red Notice directly to INTERPOL on political grounds as well.

Article 3 of INTERPOL’s constitution establishes that

            It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or

            activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.

Given that the allegations against Mr. Misick stem from his tenure in office, one might assume that the question of INTERPOL’s involvement should end there:  activities conducted in a political office are necessarily political. 

However, the analysis of whether a Red Notice is politically motivated requires a more thorough review of the underlying charges and Red Notice application.  The question of political motivation requires a study of all the circumstances involving the allegations, as well as a review of the political landscape and history of the requesting country. Additionally, the relationship between the Red Notice subject and the requesting country must be considered along with their respective activities.  

If the predominant reason for the Red Notice is the accomplishment of the issuing country’s political goals, then the Red Notice very well may be politically motivated to an unacceptable level.  However, if the true overriding basis for the Red Notice is the underlying criminal charge, then a challenge based on the political motivation of the Red Notice likely will not succeed. 

TCI responded to allegations of political motivation behind charges

Earlier in 2012, the TCI government addressed concerns about the reason behind the issuance of the Red Notice. Mr. Misick’s supporters had  speculated that the notice against him was politically motivated based upon a public argument in March of this year between Mr. Misick and Governor Ric Todd.  The argument was precipitated by Mr. Misick's criticism of Mr. Todd.  

Governor's Office spokesman Neil Smith, in response to those allegations, reportedly stated that the country had applied for the Notice back in February.  Therefore, goes the logic, the Notice could not have been based upon a spat that occurred in March.

While the timing and manner of the Red Notice issuance is yet unclear, one thing is certain:  any Red Notice challenge by Mr. Misick's attorneys will certainly include evidence of his criticism of, and later argument with, Governor Todd.  The success of such a challenge will depend on the strength and validity of the documentation of the underlying criminal charges.

** Note to readers:  Red Notice Law Journal placed a request for verification of the grounds for the Red Notice in Mr. Misick's name with INTERPOL’s press office.  As of today’s date, no response has been forthcoming.

In a continuation of a series of posts about the CCF's Annual Report for 2011, today's post focuses on a perhaps surprising, but apparently common, occurence in INTERPOL member country courts around the world.

In its Annual Report, the CCF noted that many domestic courts were confused about INTERPOL's role in extradition proceedings.  The CCF reported:

When processing complaints from requesting parties arrested on the basis of red notices

published by INTERPOL, the Commission has been faced with the position of national judicial authorities that considered that they could not rule on an extradition request when the person concerned had sent a complaint to INTERPOL.

On several occasions, the Commission has had to explain to national authorities via the NCBs the limits of its role which consists of determining whether the information recorded in INTERPOL’s files has been processed in compliance with INTERPOL’s rules, and that it has no power over proceedings taken against a person at the national level.

It cannot recommend that a national authority cancel an arrest warrant, halt proceedings, or cooperate or not with a requesting authority; only the national judicial or police authorities concerned may do so. It is up to national judges to determine, based on the criteria that are applicable to them, whether they consider that they can act upon a request for extradition. The study on compliance with INTERPOL’s rules conducted by the Commission is not meant to affect the process of a judicial procedure on the national level.

While INTERPOL's internal activity is not intended by INTERPOL to have any collateral effect on domestic cases, attorneys representing immigration, criminal, and INTERPOL clients can attest to the fact that courts are sometimes concerned with an individual's INTERPOL status.  That status may have an effect, intended or not, on matters such as asylum claims and extradition evaluations.  

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

INTERPOL's role in the world of law enforcement, boiled down to its bare bones, is to aid its member countries with two things:  1) alerting them to the movement of wanted persons, and 2) assisting in the apprehension of wanted persons.  The alerting is normally accomplished via a member country's request for a Red Notice.  The assisting in apprehension normally arises when local authorities come into contact with the Red Notice subject and detain him or her.

Corruption in the Application for Red Notices

It would be news to no one that I frequently complain about the fact that INTERPOL is subject to misuse, or that it has some corrupt member countries that seek Red Notices for reasons unrelated to crime-fighting.  I've addressed the issues of member countries' National Central Bureaus using their INTERPOL access to support politically motivated goals, to obtain bribes, and to circumvent basic due process. When Red Notice requests are made in the context of such impropriety, they are subject to challenges by Red Notice subjects and their attorneys.

And it remains true that INTERPOL is susceptible to abuse by its member countries who improperly seek and obtain Red Notices.  The nature of an international organization with 190 member countries, all of which have varying degrees of oversight and corruption, is that abuse of process will occur.

Corruption in the Apprehension (or Failure to Apprehend) of a Red Notice Subject

What might be surprising, though, is that when a Red Notice is properly obtained based on criminal activity, the suspect is sometimes not even detained, let alone extradited.  

Even when a member country properly obtains a Red Notice against a suspect, plenty of room remains for law enforcement officials to behave illegally for their own purposes.  A prime example of a country's failure (or refusal) to take action on a Red Notice is provided in last week's article by Emma Graham-Harrison's article on Afghanistan's treatment of a Red Notice for financial crime suspect Sherkhan Farnood.

Mr. Farnoond has been charged with fraud and theft from Kabul Bank, which he founded.  Also charged is the the bank's CEO, Khalilullah Ferozi.  The investigation of Farnood's financial activity in Afghanistan revealed a massive Ponzi scheme that most likely would not have gone undetected for so long if Afghan police had acted upon a Red Notice issued against Mr. Farnood by INTERPOL member country Russia.

The reason for the lack of action by Afghan authorities appears by all accounts to be based on the disproportionate level of influence held by relatively few individuals in Afghanistan.  Graham-Harrison reported that

[A]mong the bank's creditors are a group who got $3.1m in loans but are so powerful that receivers for Kabul Bank have declined to even ask for the money back.

With such pervasive corruption, it is anticipated that most of the stolen funds will go unrecovered, leaving the citizens of Afghanistan to make up the losses.

INTERPOL's "Disciplinary" Options for Corrupt Activity

When faced with a member country's refusal to act on a Red Notice, INTERPOL may decide to do nothing at all. Recall that every member country's protocol for reacting to the discovery of a Red Notice subject is different, and every case has distinct characteristics which may not make it appropriate to detain or extradite the Red Notice subject.  An individual act of refusal to detain a subject may not merit any intervention by INTERPOL.

Simultaneously, the entire aim of INTERPOL is to provide for international police cooperation.  In the new Rules on the Processing of Data ("RPD"), INTERPOL reiterates that aim, and also provides for "corrective measures" to be applied to NCBs that do not fulfill their obligations under the rules.  One of the available corrective measures is the suspension of the NCBs access rights to INTERPOL's data system.  Another option is that the General Secretariat must remind NCBs of their INTERPOL obligations whenever necessary.

It might be time for Kabul NCB to be reminded. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

When clients or attorneys ask me what an INTERPOL Red Notice is, I often answer that it's similar to what we would call a BOLO in the United States.  A BOLO, or Be On the Lookout, is an announcement dissiminated to law enforcement officials that describes a criminal suspect in an effort to have him or her apprehended quickly after a crime has occurred.

Similarly, a Red Notice is a request issued by INTERPOL on behalf of any of its 190 member countries, and its goal is to apprehend a criminal suspect or convict who has fled to another country.  

One difference between a BOLO and a Red Notice is that the BOLO is intended to be dissiminated in the time immediately following a crime, with little expectation that the BOLO will remain active for much time afterwards if the suspect is not apprehended.  A Red Notice, on the other hand, can remain active for years, as long as certain of INTERPOL's criteria are met.

A man from El Salvador recently felt the effect of Red Notice's longevity when he was deported from the United States to El Salvador for a crime alleged to have been committed in 1999.  His Red Notice caused United States immigration officials to learn about his wanted status all these years later, as reported here by Bob Egelko of the San Francisco Chronicle.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

We last addressed the matter of Paul Watson, the leader of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society ("SSCS"), and INTERPOL back in May, when Watson was arrested in Germany.  That arrest was made at the request of Costa Rica, for activity alleged to have occurred over ten years ago, and the arrest did not involve INTERPOL.  INTERPOL issued a press release at that time indicating that its denial of a Red Notice was based on a lack of compliance with its constitution and rules.  

Now, however, things have changed.  INTERPOL has confirmed that it has issued Red Notices in Mr. Watson's name on behalf of both Costa Rica and Japan.

Prior to the second Red Notice being issued, Watson's German attorney, Oliver Wallasch, issued a letter to SSCS. The letter has been publicized and explains the situation from the attorney's perspective.

Obviously, Watson's travel will either be curtailed until the Red Notices are addressed, or he will likely be detained if he attempts to exit or enter any INTERPOL member country while the Notices are outstanding.

Whether Watson decides to formally challenge the Notices remains to be seen.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A reader sent in this series of questions, which are good ones for INTERPOL newbies:

1. Can a country member of Interpol get a red notice, if this country has sentenced a person in absence, without this person having been stopped and obviously without having knowledge that in some country she was prosecuted or sentenced? 

2. Are the condemnations valid dictated in a person's absence and without detention nor previous knowledge of the one imputed, so that Interpol issues a Red Notice?

3. The condemnations in absence are contrary to the Universal declaration of Human rights, is Interpol able to issue the red notice against this declaration?

It is true that a person may be tried and convicted in absentia in some countries. If the underlying charges and the judicial proceedings were handled in accordance with the country's rule of law, then INTERPOL very well may issue a Red Notice at that country's request.

On the other hand, if the proceedings were contrary to the country's laws, then the Red Notice may be subject to challenge and eventual removal. Likewise, if the proceedings were violative of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Red Notice removal may be appropriate.

The one certainty is this: if INTERPOL doesn't know that the proceedings were illegal, the Red Notice will remain in effect.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A reader recently posed this question:

I would like to know if you can asnwer my questions. I know of a person, Ethiopian citizen, which has been red-noticed. The individual has committed crimes in the US and has been now hiding for the past 14 years in Ethiopia. I have met this man and he is very violent and dangerous.

How can I make sure that this man gets apprehended and the families of the victims get justice? Do you think he can get extradited to the US?

The issue of extradition to any INTERPOL member country will depend on the nature of the extradition treaty between the two countries (if one exists) and the possibly the nature of the diplomatic relations between the countries.  The list of countries having extradition treaties with the United States can be found here. (Regarding the reader's specific question, Ethiopia does not have such a treaty with the United States, but the countries do maintain diplomatic relations.)

 In terms of "making sure" that a Red Notice subject is apprehended, that may be beyond the control of any particular person.  Naturally, it is more likely that a person will be apprehended if he or she has contact with law enforcement officials who are aware of their Red Notice status than if no such contact ever occurs.

Obviously, if there are problems with the validity of the Red Notice and the subject challenges the notice, it may be withdrawn, modified, or destroyed.  Assuming that the notice is valid in every respect, then it can be instrumental in aiding in a subject's apprehension.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Once upon a time, a business with interests abroad had little reason to consider INTERPOL in its evaluation of whether to accept international business opportunities.  That time is no longer.

As INTERPOL grows and its member countries have increasing contact with one another both politically and economically, so grows the need for private businesses to conduct previously unheard-of analyses of costs and benefits.  INTERPOL receives requests for Red Notices not only for people accused of violent crimes, terrorism, and human trafficking, but also for people alleged to have been involved in business gone bad.

For those accustomed to a more Western approach to business issues, there is a frequently held assumption that an unsuccessful business transaction or plan will result in nothing more than lost future oppportuniities or, at the worst, a civil law suit.  In many other countries, however, the loss of money by one party can quickly become a criminal matter for the other party. When this transformation of a civil matter into a criminal matter takes place in an INTERPOL member country, the member country may request a Red Notice after criminal charges are filed.

How does this play out?  Even if the accused party is innocent, and even if that party has always conducted business activity from outside the member country, once criminal charges are filed, the accused party becomes the subject of a Red Notice.  Whether the Red Notice was properly requested or not, the now-subject of the Red Notice is left to either challenge the propriety of the Red Notice or live with the fact that she can no longer travel for business or pleasure and is subject to being detained.

Just like grandmother used to say, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.  A business considering international contracts or endeavors would be well-served to research the country of concern prior to engaging in that activity.  Questions to be answered in advance by a company or its attorney should be:

• How does the country treat debtors?
• Does the country have a history of jailing people for primarily civil matters?
• How does the country's judicial system regard failed business transactions?
• Does the country have a high level of corruption?

Obviously, if these inquiries are not made by the interested company, the individual charged with conducting the international activities will need to research those issues prior to becoming involved.  Only once the answers to these questions are known should a new business concern with an INTERPOL member country begin.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

As we discussed in the last post, INTERPOL's new rules are called the Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD) and will become effective July 1, 2012.  Among the changes from the old rules, and of interest to Red Notice subjects and their attorneys, will be the following:

• Better organization of topics in a more streamlined layout
• Additional responsibilities (and repurcussions for failing to observe those responsibilites) for the National Central Bureaus (NCB's).
• More clearly delineated distance between the roles and functions of NCB's and INTERPOL.

Obviously, ease of reading the rules is particularly important when navigating INTERPOL.  That change doesn't require much more discussion as far as how it will affect attorneys.  Suffice to say that a more intuitive approach to setting forth the rules makes for a more organized approach to preparing every case.

The changes regarding the NCB's are significant.  The RPD create enhanced responsibilities to which the NCB's must adhere regarding employee training, observation of country-specific legal requirements, and data protection and entry.  Where NCB's embrace the new rules, there will be little room for complaint.  However, where the rules are violated, challenges will likely include those violations as grounds for relief.  NCB's have ample reason to carefully review the new rules:  violation of the rules carries penalties such as re-training, supervision, and finally, suspension from accessing INTERPOL's tools.

One of the rule changes will have an effect that is more difficult to predict:  built into the new rules is an obvious effort to create distance between the NCB's and INTERPOL.  It's no secret that INTERPOL intends to maintain its status as an international organization generally not subject to lawsuits in member country courts.  As INTERPOL's reach expands and more people suffer the effects of improperly issued Red Notices, the drumbeat to hold INTERPOL accountable for aiding improperly acting member countries grows louder.  The new rules are absolutely meant to hold that movement at bay.  Whether it succeeds or not, only time will tell.  

In dealing with INTERPOL-related matters, attorneys and Red Notice subjects often naturally seek assistance from their countries' National Central Bureau (NCB) in an effort to resolve their cases.  To understand why those efforts may not yield the desired results, consider the purpose of the U.S. NCB.

On its "Who We Serve" page, the U.S. NCB addresses its role as an INTERPOL liaison agency, and explains the services it offers.  More importantly, it explains to whom its services are offered:

"The USNCB offers these services to the law enforcement community exclusively."

If the requesting party is not a member of law enforcement, the U.S. NCB is not the place to go seek assistance.  Recall that all Red Notices have underlying charges or convictions, and if the original charge/conviction is within the United States, any errors regarding those charges must be directed to the originating court or law enforcement agency for correction.  

When do we go to INTERPOL for relief?  Have a look here for our previous discussion on that issue.

 As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

The following post was originally published in March of 2011.  What a disappointment to see how Egypt has come to view its INTERPOL-related obligations. 

For those of us who are proponents of democracy, it has been mesmerizing to watch from afar the developments in Egypt recently. Like everyone, I wonder how the fledgling democracy will work for the people of Egypt, and whether they will be better off, as we all hope.

Perhaps unlike everyone except for other INTERPOL-philes, I also wonder what this means for the future of Egypt-originated Red Notices. Egypt was one of the founding member countries of INTERPOL and has a long history of both requesting and offering assistance with Red Notice subjects. How will the altered Egyptian government handle future requests for Red Notices? Will it be more or less observant of the rules designed to prevent political abuses of the judicial system?

Although the requirements for a Red Notice are inflexible and consistent, the individuals who request the Red Notices are still human, with all the biases that accompany the human condition. When we consider the information publicized by INTERPOL, we may not always consider its veracity, its reliability, or its very legality.

We should. The information publicized by INTERPOL is presumed to be accurate primarily due to the rigorous prerequisites to which the information is supposed to be subject prior to publication. When a national central bureau of any given participating country submits information to INTERPOL, the organization relies upon its General Secretariat to verify that the information is correct, but also that it was obtained legally. For the information to be gained legally, it must be obtained not only in compliance with INTERPOL’s various governing documents, but also with the requesting country’s laws.

But what happens if the requesting country doesn’t comply with its own laws when, say, issuing an arrest warrant? If an arrest warrant is issued illegally in Egypt, and Egypt’s National Central Bureau (NCB) accepts the information and forwards it to the General Secretariat of INTERPOL, that arrest warrant can be published internationally. The General Secretariat relies upon each member country’s representation that the information it submits is validly and legally obtained.

Even though the subject of the Red Notice has the ability to challenge the notice, the proper issuance of the notice is of critical significance because of the presumption of correctness which accompanies its issuance. A defensive challenge to a Red Notice begins with the presumption that the Notice has been properly issued, and that hurdle must be overcome by the challenging party. As noted by Mark Leon Goldberg of the UN Dispatch, INTERPOL is concerned with more than Julian Assange.  Most of the subjects of its Red Notices lack Assange’s considerable resources with which to challenge their Notices. If a Red Notice is issued without being truly subject to the rigors of INTERPOL’s prerequisites, not only is the integrity of INTERPOL damaged, but the person named in the Notice is substantially prejudiced before his attack on the notice ever begins.

My hope, like that of many others, is that Egypt’s people ultimately experience a democratic form of government, and one that is observant of its international, as well as domestic responsibilities to justice. Given the level of civility, respect, and civic responsibility shown by the citizens of Egypt during their protests, I’m guessing that any government that is truly reflective of the wishes of the Egyptian people will handle its international policing activities in true accordance with INTERPOL’s constitution and governing documents. 

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

Egypt's recent diffusion action against NGO staffers is not exactly the start we hoped to see a year ago.

Chances are, if you're reading this blog, you have an interest in international politics, crime, persecution, or all of the above.  For the information you have accessed thus far in your life regarding such issues, you can likely thank an international journalist or an NGO employee or volunteer.  In the last post, we discussed the fact that Egypt is taking steps to prosecute those professionals based on recent activities in Egypt, and to obtain Red Notices in their names. Today seems like a good time to give some thought to the work that goes into an NGO report or a reliable news article. 

In order for us to recieve the information about other countries that we rely upon for our professional and personal pursuits, real people must travel to the countries that are to be studied.  They engage in difficult, and often dangerous, activities as necessary to obtain information, check the validity of the information, and export it from the country.  

A day in the life of such an investigative journalist often includes the following:

• Deciding whether to brave a certain area of town in an effort to speak with residents, who may be too afraid of their government to even be seen with a journalist.
• Weighing the benefit of conducting interviews with political dissidents against the risk of arrest in a country known for its human rights abuses.
• Researching an interview subject's background to determine whether any unseen agenda exists.
• Attending journalist training programs to learn the skill of fair and balanced reporting.

An NGO worker's day might look like this:

• Monitoring elections for signs of irregularity while risking arrest on charges of interfering with an election.
• Attempting to convince people who live in countries ruled by particularly oppressive regimes that it's safe to speak out.
• Avoiding physical danger while moving from place to place and collecting information in post-conflict regions.
• Hoping against hope for the safety of the people he just interviewed before he was ordered out of a country by its government.

Any professional who works in this field encounters the unavoidable fact that we do not live in a perfect world, where people would feel free to speak about injustices and harsh governmental treatment.  We live in a world where some countries are so oppressive that, as a journalist recently told me,

"People are terrified . . . people just want to get through their

daily lives and are wary of talking to journalists."

 Despite that reluctance to speak, and despite the danger involved, some people do tell the truth.  Some NGO's do get information out of countries and into country reports.  Some journalists do take the risks that result in real and balanced information getting out to the rest of the world.  

While we don't all pay the price for those efforts, we all reap the benefits.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Last week, we addressed the issue of former premier Michael Misick of Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI).  A Red Notice was issued against Mr. Misick, based on underlying allegations of money laundering and corruption.

Recently, the TCI government addressed concerns about the reason behind the issuance of the Red Notice. There has been public speculation that the Notice was politically motivated based upon a public argument between Mr. Miscik and Governor Ric Todd, precipitated by Mr. Misick's criticism of Mr. Todd.   Governor's Office spokesman Neil Smith, in response to those allegations, reportedly stated that the country had applied for the Notice back in February.  Therefore, goes the logic, the Notice could not have been based upon a spat that occurred in March.

Such a procedure, "applying for" a Red Notice, would be unusual these days, given that a Red Notice is now issued directly by an INTERPOL member country's National Central Bureau (NCB).  The ability to issue a Red Notice for immediate circulation without the prior approval of INTERPOL's offiicals in Lyon, France was made possible by the organization's I-Link system.  

I-Link, discussed more thoroughly here, became available in 2009 and is now widely used by member countries.  While it is certainly possible that TCI requested approval for a Red Notice, and received approval over a month later, the I-Link system makes it completely unnecessary for a member country to do so. 

While the timing and manner of the Red Notice issuance is yet unclear, one thing is certain:  any Red Notice challenge on behalf of Mr. Misick will certainly include evidence of his criticism of, and later argument with, Governor Todd.

** Note to readers:  Red Notice Law Journal placed a request for verification of the grounds for the Red Notice in Mr. Misick's name with INTERPOL's press office.  To date, no response has been forthcoming.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

As much as we may complain about some NCB's (National Central Bureaus) behaving improperly with respect to their INTERPOL duties,  it's always nice to hear that others handle their responsibilities properly.

A few months ago, I spoke with a subject of a Red Notice from Denmark who had agreed to be extradited in order to resolve the matter.  Once he was in Denmark, he closed his criminal case.  The next natural step in a perfect world would have been that Denmark's officials, of their own accord, would have requested from Denmark's NCB that the Notice be destroyed since it was no longer valid.  As it turns out, that's exactly what happened, and the Notice was removed almost immediately.

More recently, a Red Notice subject with an issue arising from the United Arab Emirates was able to resolve his underlying criminal case.  The UAE ensured that its NCB destroyed the Red Notice accordingly.  That's how INTERPOL's tools are supposed to be used:  fairly, quickly and efficiently.  

We all know that it doesn't always happen the way it should; this post is about giving credit where credit is due.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A reader commented on February 12 as follows regarding an old post regarding Venezuela's Red Notice history:

"Your animus towards Venezuela (or towards the Chavez Govt.) is misplaced, given the malfeasance of other INTERPOL member states.  The judge you mention, Maria Lourdes Afiun, did not merely dismiss charges against a corrupt Venezuelan banker (which she was not entitled to do), she also ushered him out of her courtroom via a back door where an accomplice was waiting to spirit him away on a motorcycle.

This is hardly acceptable judicial practice.  And Lourdes Afiun is not incarcerated; she is under house arrest.

Neither Lourdes Afiun nor the banker in question face the death penalty - unlike Hamza Kashgari, detained yesterday in Kuala Lumput at INTERPOL's request, on behalf of the Saudi Theorcrates.  Kashgari faces extradition, torture, and death at the hands of the Sauds, thanks to INTERPOL.  His crime?  Tweeting about the Prophet (pbuh)."

Hmmm.  Where to start?  First, I would probably characterize my writings as criticism of the Venezuelan government rather than animus.  But let's say we go with animus:  "hostile spirit or angry temperment."  I'm not sure such an attitude would be inappropriate given Venezuela's use of INTERPOL's tools.

Second, while it is true that the judge discussed in the post is now on house arrest, it is also true that she was incarcerated until February of last year, when the post was written. 

More to the reader's point, however, is the idea that such criticism, or animus, might better be directed at those member countries engaged in even worse abuses than Venezuela.  The reader focuses on Hamza Kashgari, who is wanted by Saudi Arabia, and who now has reportedly been extradited to Saudi Arabia.  There were initial reports that INTERPOL aided in that extradition, but INTERPOL has repeatedly denied any involvement in Mr. Kashgari's case.

As already pointed out by Fair Trials International leader Jago Russell, any involvement by INTERPOL in Mr. Kashgari's case would be inappropriate.  INTERPOL's constitution prohibits it from taking a role in any matter of a religious nature, as Article 3 provides that:

"It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character."  

At this point, it is unclear why the Malaysian police would have indicated that INTERPOL was involved in the case.  Reuters has reported that Malaysian Home Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has now clarified that INTERPOL did not, in fact, have a role in this extradition, and that when the police said otherwise this past Friday, it was a mistake. 

Minister Hussein also stated that Malaysia will not allow itself to be used as a safe haven by terrorists or other wanted people.  In choosing to use Mr. Kashgari as an example of this policy, Malaysia has brought into serious question its dedication to human rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Its actions stand in stark contrast to its statement in 2006 when it applied to the United Nations Human Rights Council: 

"Consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), successive Malaysian Governments have made the guarantee of the individual's fundamental rights and liberties, as enshrined in the Constitution, the cornerstone of its policies and programmes . . . "

So at this point it appears that we have two INTERPOL member countries acting outside their capacities as member countries.  Any criticism of either country, however deserved, would be unrelated to their status as member countries.

I will say, though, that I agree with the reader on the premise that abusive INTERPOL member countries should continue to be criticized and held accountable for their INTERPOL-related activities.  I would simply stretch that idea to allow for the fact that all "malfeasance," whether relatively slight or  more severe, is properly subject to being publicly denounced.  To reserve criticism to only the worst offenders, I believe, allows for a kind of relativism that runs contrary to the absolute rules set forth in INTERPOL's governing rules and texts.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

A reader posted a question recently in response to a previous post about the manner in which INTERPOL member countries respond to locating a Red Notice subject.  The reader specifically asked whether Red Notice subjects would be arrested in every member country upon their arrival to the country.

As the reader's question focused on New Zealand, let's use that member country as an example:  New Zealand's policy regarding the arrest of Red Notice subjects was stated clearly by Detective Senior Sergeant Liam Clinton this past November.  He advised that New Zealand cannot make an arrest based upon a Red Notice, and instead requires a local arrest warrant issued pursuant to a formal extradition request.

While some other member countries have similar policies, it would be unwise for a Red Notice subject to believe that she can move freely about member countries with no problems.  Both official and anecdotal information reveal that whether a Red Notice subject is detained in a member country depends on several factors.  Those factors include:

• the relationship between the originating member country and the member country where the subject finds himself;
• the nature of the underlying charge; 
• the policy regarding Red Notices in the member country; and
• the depth of the security check to which the person is subjected.

Obviously, the existence of a Red Notice has a profound effect on a person's ability to conduct business, to travel, and to maintain a livelihood.  The temptation to travel and hope for the best is a strong one, especially for people who travel for business. While there are plenty of examples of people who have been able to travel without being detained despite a Red Notice in their names, a substantial likelihood of detention exists.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In order for INTERPOL to exist, it must be financed.  Certainly, it receives occasional donations and gifts. But by and large, like any other large and voluntary organization, it can function because members pay "dues." 

All member countries pay to be member countries of INTERPOL.  The fee for membership is commensurate with the country's fiscal well-being.  How this pans out is that the wealthier countries effectively subsidize the membership of the the poorer countries.  If everyone agrees that the goal of global police communication is worth supporting the less affluent countries, then everyone is relatively happy with the arrangement.

But what happens when it one of the member countries is using INTERPOL for corrupt purposes?  In recent posts, we have considered the issue of corruption and misuse of Red Notices.  Today, the conversation includes the idea that "clean" member countries effectively support those countries who would abuse their INTERPOL membership.  

When a member country with little or no history of corruption, such as Sweden or Denmark, acts as an INTERPOL member country, few complaints can expect to be heard regarding bribery attempts and the like.  Such members clearly "earn their keep" as INTERPOL member countries, and impose no negative image on INTERPOL.

However, when one of the historically more corrupt countries, utilizes any of the tools at its disposal as an INTERPOL member country, it is much more likely that corruption will taint that effort in some fashion. The possibility of inappropriate Red Notice requests or improper use of data is much greater for those countries.

Both types of member countries are afforded the same level of access and presumption of validity of action by INTERPOL.  What this means is that the "clean" countries pay into the system which supports and allows the actions of the "dirtier" countries.  

Could INTERPOL survive without the "clean" countries and their financial support?  Probably not.  An international organization is only as good as its reputation, and for INTERPOL, much of its credibility comes from its acceptance and recognition by the more powerful, and less corrupt, countries who are members.

But what of the "dirtier" countries?  Next time:  Could INTERPOL survive without the participation of its more corrupt member countries? 

As always, questions and comments are welcomed.

A reader recently emailed me a very practical question:  How long does it take for INTERPOL to consider and decide a case that has been submitted by a Red Notice subject?

For those who are new to the world of INTERPOL, the question itself requires explanation.  A Red Notice subject is a person who is wanted for a crime committed in any of INTERPOL's 190 member countries, and who is believed to have fled from that country.  In order for a member country to locate and eventually extradite the wanted person, that country obtains a Red Notice in the person's name.  The Red Notice is circulated worldwide among all member countries, and the Red Notice subject is effectively immobilized: if she travels, she is likely to be monitored, detained, and possibly extradited back to the member country for prosecution or sentencing.

Many times, the subject of the Red Notice believes that the Red Notice was improperly issued for reasons ranging from political motivation to mistaken identity.  In those instances, the subject may seek relief from INTERPOL, asking that the Red Notice be withdrawn or modified.

Time is clearly of the essence for such a request, given the profound impact of a Red Notice on a person's professional and personal life.  A number of factors will influence the amount of time its takes for a Red Notice request to be reviewed and determined.

Some factors are determined by the subject herself, or her attorney:

• Is the challenge to the Red Notice well-prepared?  Is everything submitted properly in accordance with INTERPOL's rules?  Will the applicant create a delay because of an incomplete or inappropriately based request?  

Other issues depend on the nature of the individual case:

• How complex is the case?  How many issues will have to be studied?  Are there questions to which the member country will have to respond?

And of course, there are some matters over which the subject has little or no control:

• When is the request submitted in relation to the CCF's next meeting?  Will the applicant's matter be put into the queue behind numerous other requests ? 

In my experience and observation, requests for relief to INTERPOL have taken anywhere from just a few months to several years to resolve.  It is true that responses can take what feels like an extremely long time, especially as INTERPOL has grown and changed in the last few years.  However, the subject of the Red Notice can reduce the time it takes to obtain an appropriate response by ensuring that the challenge to the Red Notice is properly and fully prepared, and does not need to be "re-done" later. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In the previous post, I addressed the issue of a Blue Notice that had been issued by INTERPOL in the name of Ramona Bautista, who is under investigation for a crime alleged to have occurred in the Philippines. Today, the topic is how a Blue Notice request from a member country could be denied by INTERPOL.

Although the purpose of a Blue Notice (to monitor the movements of a criminal witness or suspect) is different from a Red Notice (to immobilize a criminal defendant or convict), these different notices have similiarities.  Specifically, they must be made in compliance with INTERPOL's governing rules and texts.

Just as with a Red Notice, INTERPOL might refuse to issue a Blue Notice if its rules or binding texts would be violated by issuing the requested notice.  For example, in 2009, INTERPOL refused a request by member country Ecuador.

Ecuador had requested a Blue Notice in the name of Colombia's former Minister of Defense (and current president), Juan Manuel Santos Calderon.  INTERPOL denied the request, and as grounds for the denial stated that the request was of a predominantly political and military nature.  INTERPOL's constitution prohibits the organization from interfering in any such matters, and that prohibition naturally includes Blue Notice requests.

INTERPOL's decision did not sit well with some authority figures in Ecuador, who publicly criticized the refusal to issue the Blue Notice.  INTERPOL eventually issued a public statement defending its decision, which reitereated the political and military nature of the request, and emphasized INTERPOL's commitment to neutrality.

It even went so far as to state that if Ecuador didn't like the decision, it could appeal to the Executive Committee or eventually to the entire General Assembly.   Eventually, the two countries began a normalization of relations, but the relationship is unstable and has shown recent indications of strain.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Since we have been on the issue of the ease with which Red Notices often seem to be obtained by INTERPOL member countries, today's discussion centers on the burden of proof faced by Red Notice subjects and their lawyers.  

Once it is issued, a Red Notice is presumed to be accurate and proper, according to INTERPOL's rules.  In order to overcome that presumption, substantial and competent evidence must be presented to show precisely which rules or laws have been violated.

When an NCB has complied with all of the rules governing INTERPOL member countries, this presumption may be fair.  But when a member country has engaged in illegal behavior or has a consistent record of human rights violations, the idea that the member country enjoys such a presumption is a bit hard to stomach.

In order to be successful in their challenges, Red Notice subjects and their attorneys are required to obtain credible evidence of the illegalities and/or rules violations in their cases.  The evidence must be presented in a clear, cogent, and persuasive manner, and then the subject must wait for a decision.  If that evidence cannot be found, it can be quite difficult to prevail on a request for a Red Notice removal or modification.

As to the question of whether that burden is fair, NCB's would likely think it is.  Red Notice subjects, however, probably disagree.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

There's been lots of talk lately surrounding the idea that INTERPOL is issuing Red Notices almost automatically, with no actual review of the request taking place.  Some say that INTERPOL is ripe for abuse by certain member countries, while INTERPOL counters that it has procedures in place to avoid such abuses.

Support for INTERPOL's position is found in one recent example of INTERPOL rejecting a Red Notice request from Thailand.  The ex-prime minister, Thaksin Thongphakdi, was the subject of a warrant issued after he was sentenced to a prison term, but the country's request for a Red Notice in his name was rejected by INTERPOL.  The stated reason for the rejection was that the request did not meet INTERPOL's critera, which could mean anything from the paperwork not being properly submitted to the request being obviously politically based.

Another example comes from India, where Red Notice requests for wanted terrorists were reportedly rejected by INTERPOL. In an article discussing the Indian cases, the author writes that Indian official complain that "It is very difficult to build a strong case and provide the exact details that Interpol is looking for."  

That last line would honestly astound some Red Notice subjects, who complain that the information submitted to obtain a Red Notice typically does not require much detail at all about the underlying charges, nor does it require any details regarding the strength of any given case. Nonetheless, it seems that in certain cases, this particular part of the application process has frustrated Indian officials. 

There does appear to be some anecdotal support for INTERPOL's assertion that it not only possesses but utilizes mechanisms to prevent member country abuses and improper Red Notice requests.  There also appears to be anecdotal support for the position of many Red Notice subjects, which is that member country abuse occurs with some frequency.  

Without a more transparent process or judicial oversight, INTERPOL will likely continue to find itself on the defensive. When it comes to INTERPOL's decision-making processes, criticism from both member country applicants and Red Notice subjects can be expected as long as those processes remain relatively mysterious.  

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Most of those familiar with INTERPOL know that any of the 188 INTERPOL member countries can request that the international police organization issue a Red Notice for a fugitive based upon their association with INTEPROL.

Now, with the issuance of the Red Notices in Muammar Gaddafi's name and the names of his sons, we see an example of another means of obtaining a Red Notice.  The International Criminal Court, or ICC, has requested those Red Notices, and they have been issued by INTERPOL.  The requests were reportedly made by the ICC's chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo.  

What allows a prosecutor of the ICC to appeal directly to INTERPOL for a Red Notice?  There is a special cooperation agreement in place between the ICC and INTERPOL.  It allows for the ICC to make such a request, and also provides the ICC with access to INTERPOL's data, similar to the arrangement with member countries.  

And because nothing in life is free, the ICC has a financial obligation to INTERPOL, just as the member countries do, in exchange for its ability to benefit from INTERPOL's considerable resources.  The ICC is also bound by all of the internal rules and regulations as the member countries.

In addition to highlighting the relationship between the ICC and INTERPOL, the Gaddafi Red Notice also signifies a recognition of Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC) as the country's new formal government.  In the next post, look for a discussion of the NTC.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

On August 9, I wrote about two fathers on different sides of INTERPOL Red Notices.  One of the fathers was looking for his daughter, who allegedly had been taken illegally from the United States to the United Arab Emirates by her mother and maternal grandparents. The good news for that father is that his little girl was found, as reported here.

The other news is that the UAE does not have an extradition treaty with the United States, so the child's mother and maternal grandparents will not be brought back to the United States pursuant to an extradition treaty.  It remains to be seen whether diplomatic efforts will result in their return to the United States.  

Of course, the father is also awaiting news of the path that the child's return may or may not take from here.  

This incident highlights both the strengths and the limits of an INTERPOL Red Notice.  The Notice was very effective in allowing law enforcement officials to track and very quickly immobilize the fugitives. However, once they were found and detained, and released on bond, the law of the UAE becomes predominant for extradition purposes.

As always, comments and thoughts are welcomed.

How could INTERPOL shield itself from being used as a political weapon against a corrupt country's own people?  In the last post, I referenced an article by CNN writer Libby Lewis entitled, "Are some countries abusing Interpol?"  In the article, Lewis raises numerous questions, one of which is whether a more in-depth review process should occur prior to INTERPOL's acceptance of Red Notice requests.

As it stands, INTERPOL relies on member countries to be aware of and observe the rules requiring that Red Notice requests be made legally, in compliance with the country's own laws and INTERPOL's rules.  A Red Notice request is processed with a presumption of validity and remains so unless it is challenged specifically, or otherwise brought to INTERPOL's attention as being improper.

Senator Jeff Sessions from Alabama reportedly requested a revision of that process, and his is a good idea.  For INTERPOL, however, the thought may be rather daunting.  Imagine having to review the validity of thousands of Red Notice requests, particularly when they originate from 188 countries across the globe, all with differing legal systems and law enforcement practices.  Where is one to start?

Here's an idea.  Start by amending the rules and governing texts of INTERPOL to allow for the existence, funding, and operation of a small human rights monitoring division.  Charge that division with the limited duty of studying and documenting human rights violation activity among member countries.  When a member country with a questionable history of violating human rights requests a Red Notice from INTERPOL, require additional information and checks from the country to guard against improper requests being granted.

All member countries must contribute financially in order to be members of INTERPOL, and as discussed here before, INTERPOL occasionally benefits from other monetary contributions.  Funding such a division is within easy reach.  An amendment providing for a human rights monitoring division, with the accompanying appropriation of funding, would allow INTERPOL to do the one thing that would allow it to continue serving as a law enforcement aid while maintaining a sense of integrity:  trust but verify. 

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

It is a given that a certain level of trust, even if for limited purposes, must exist between INTERPOL and its member countries.  Member countries send requests for Red Notices to INTERPOL in hopes of obtaining Red Notices against wanted persons.  The requests then become part of INTERPOL's files.  

With 188 member countries, there is a fair likelihood that, at any one time, several member countries are in the position of having strained relations with other member countries.  As a consequence, such requesting countries may prefer that the other member countries not have access to the information they submit to INTERPOL.  

Luckily for them, INTERPOL does not own the files that it receives from member countries.

The information sent in by member countries belongs to the submitting member countries.  INTERPOL acts as a depository for that information, and is not allowed to modify it absent the member country's request or consent.  

INTERPOL has strict rules regarding who may have access to its files, and under what circumstances. Unless another member countries submits a qualifying request for such access, the information will not be released.  

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed. 

In a continuation of the discussion of the current Venezuelan Red Notice situation, I thought it interesting to consider INTERPOL'S public explanation of two matters:  first, the historic visit by Ronald K. Noble, INTERPOL's Secretary General, to Venezuela early this month, and second, the possible reasons for INTERPOL's denial of Venezuela's Red Notice requests.

Why the visit?

In its media release of May 4, 2011, INTERPOL publicized Mr. Noble's trip to meet with Luisa Ortega Díaz, the Attorney General of Venezuela, with the stated purpose of improving cooperation between the country and the organization, and contained repeated references to INTERPOL's respect for Venezuela.  The release was carefully crafted to paint a picture of a confined, limited argument, rather than a complete breakdown of relations.

 Mr. Noble emphasized that,

"[t]here are currently more than 100 valid Red Notices issued by INTERPOL on behalf of Venezuela in circulation worldwide.  The decision therefore to refuse specific Red Notices, in a specific catergory of cases and for specific defendants should not be interpreted as any kind of 'attack' on Venezuela, but simply that INTERPOL is adhering to its rules."

INTERPOL also characterized the tiff between it and Venezuela as a "current disagreement between Venezuela and INTERPOL and its independent oversight body, the CCF, on whether INTERPOL should issue Red Notices in a specific category of cases for specific defendants," and that it should not "be misconstrued as a broader conflict between Venezuela and INTERPOL." 

Why the denials?

Although it is not specifically stated in the release, INTERPOL certainly implied that previous denials of Red Notice requests were the result of improper requests.  Mr. Noble is quoted as pointing out that INTERPOL's rules and regulations must be followed in order for one of its tools, such as a Red Notice, to be used.  

INTERPOL also seemed to distance itself from its own Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's files (CCF) by twice referring to the CCF as being "independent," and referring to the disagreement as being between "Venezuela and INTERPOL and . . . the CCF."  Perhaps that distance is a means of insulating the CCF from the politically delicate matters that currently require INTERPOL to continue to deal intimately with Venezuela.

Mr. Noble called for more communication between INTERPOL and Venezuela, but did not indicate an intention to back down from previous decisions.  As for the type of communication that is to come, there may be room for concern.  More on that next time.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.

In keeping with this week's theme of Blue Notices, this post addresses the question of whether a Blue Notice can eventually lead to a Red Notice.  The answer is that old lawyer favorite:  it depends.  When a Blue Notice Application Form is completed, the requesting country supplies a "purpose" for the request.  The purpose may be to obtain information about someone's identity, criminal records, and activities; or to locate and trace a person's movements, or for other stated reasons.

Just as with a Red Notice request, a Blue Notice request may be denied by INTERPOL if the request does not comply with the organization's rules.  A request for Blue Notice issuance was denied and the denial was actually explained back in 2009 when INTERPOL refused Equador's request for a Blue Notice.  However, if the request satisfies the rules of INTERPOL, then it may be issued. 

If a Blue Notice is issued for investigative purposes or for identifying the witnesses to a crime, the witnesses may never be suspected of, nor sought for, criminal prosecution.  They may simply be sought for whatever testimony or evidence they have to provide. 

Likewise, if the Blue Notice is made for the purpose of simply locating or tracing the movements of a person, the Notice may be being used for an overall criminal investigation which does not eventually target the subject of the Blue Notice.  Obviously, this type of request could also lead to evidence of criminal activity.

In the case of Indian Premier League Chairman Lalit Modi, a Blue Notice was requested based upon the BCCI Disciplinary Committe's investigation of financial irregularities during the dealings of the Twenty20 League. (The BCCI is the Board of Control for Cricket in India.  I know- lots of cricket references lately.)  If this, or any, investigation were to reveal sufficient evidence of criminal activity as to justify the filing of criminal charges, then a request for a Red Notice may certainly be made. 

While a Blue Notice will not magically transform into a Red Notice, it could very well eventually lead to an application for, and issuance of, a Red Notice.  Whether this happens or not will depend on the initial purpose of the Blue Notice and the information that is gathered as a result of the Blue Notice.

As always, thoughts and comments are welcomed.